Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. A treatise on probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.
    With this treatise, an insightful exploration of the probabilistic connection between philosophy and the history of science, the famous economist breathed new life into studies of both disciplines. Originally published in 1921, this important mathematical work represented a significant contribution to the theory regarding the logical probability of propositions. Keynes effectively dismantled the classical theory of probability, launching what has since been termed the “logical-relationist” theory. In so doing, he explored the logical relationships between classifying a proposition as “highly probable” (...)
    $8.88 used    View on Amazon.com
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   383 citations  
  • The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy.Tomoji Shogenji - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):29-48.
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Discussion: Re‐solving irrelevant conjunction with probabilistic independence.James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):505-514.
    Naive deductivist accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H·X, for any X—even if X is completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of confirmation may appear to have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. Fitelson then proposes a new‐and‐improved Bayesian account that overcomes the problem of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • 1. How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.
    Could some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it might, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further, we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • A Treatise on Probability.J. M. Keynes - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):219-222.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   294 citations  
  • A treatise on probability.J. Keynes - 1924 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 31 (1):11-12.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   287 citations  
  • 10. Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution (pp. 550-570).Paul Teller, Stefano Gattei, Kent W. Staley, Eric Winsberg, James Hawthorne, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Peter Achinstein & Mathias Frisch - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4).
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations