Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. How Does Moral Judgment Work?Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (12):517-523.
  • Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   518 citations  
  • Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
    David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This view--according to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truths--is familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns to defend Robust Realism against traditional objections, it mobilizes the original positive (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   170 citations  
  • Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
    Death.--The absurd.--Moral luck.--Sexual perversion.--War and massacre.--Ruthlessness in public life.--The policy of preference.--Equality.--The fragmentation of value.--Ethics without biology.--Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness.--What is it like to be a bat?--Panpsychism.--Subjective and objective.
  • A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
    Contemporary realist theories of value claim to be compatible with natural science. In this paper, I call this claim into question by arguing that Darwinian considerations pose a dilemma for these theories. The main thrust of my argument is this. Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes. The challenge for realist theories of value is to explain the relation between these evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes, on the one hand, and the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   335 citations  
  • Darwin and Moral Realism: Survival of the Iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.
    This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Two Kinds of Naturalism in Ethics.Neil Sinclair - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (4):417 - 439.
    What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential account of moral rightness fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who doesn’t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Do the Evolutionary Origins of Our Moral Beliefs Undermine Moral Knowledge?Kevin Brosnan - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):51-64.
    According to some recent arguments, if our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, then we do not have moral knowledge. In defense of this inference, its proponents argue that natural selection is a process that fails to track moral facts. In this paper, I argue that our having moral knowledge is consistent with, the hypothesis that our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, and the claim that natural selection fails to track moral facts. I also argue that natural (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Ethics and Intuitions.Peter Singer - 2005 - Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):331-352.
    For millennia, philosophers have speculated about the origins of ethics. Recent research in evolutionary psychology and the neurosciences has shed light on that question. But this research also has normative significance. A standard way of arguing against a normative ethical theory is to show that in some circumstances the theory leads to judgments that are contrary to our common moral intuitions. If, however, these moral intuitions are the biological residue of our evolutionary history, it is not clear why we should (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   189 citations  
  • Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.
    The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason.Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer - 2012 - Ethics 123 (1):9-31.
    Evolutionary accounts of the origins of human morality may lead us to doubt the truth of our moral judgments. Sidgwick tried to vindicate ethics from this kind of external attack. However, he ended The Methods in despair over another problem—an apparent conflict between rational egoism and universal benevolence, which he called the “dualism of practical reason.” Drawing on Sidgwick, we show that one way of defending objectivity in ethics against Sharon Street’s recent evolutionary critique also puts us in a position (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience.Selim Berker - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.
    It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  • Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of evaluative beliefs to undermine their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs—a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I argue that such arguments face serious obstacles. It is often overlooked, for example, that they presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative ethics is incompatible with a (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   101 citations  
  • The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Mind 95 (380):531-533.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Moral Philosophy as Applied Science: A Darwinian Approach to the Foundations of Ethics.Ruse Michael & O. Wilson Edward - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (236):173-192.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • Self-Evidence.Robert Audi - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):205-228.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism.David Copp - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):186-206.
  • Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-38.
    This paper reconstructs what I take to be the central evolutionary debunking argument that underlies recent critiques of moral realism. The argument claims that given the extent of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties, and assuming the truth of moral realism, it would be a massive coincidence were our moral faculties reliable ones. Given this coincidence, any presumptive warrant enjoyed by our moral beliefs is defeated. So if moral realism is true, then we can have no warranted moral beliefs, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • Cuteness.John Morreall - 1991 - British Journal of Aesthetics 31 (1):39-47.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence.Matthew S. Bedke - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.
    Having no recourse to ways of knowing about the natural world, ethical non-naturalists are in need of an epistemology that might apply to a normative breed of facts or properties, and intuitionism seems well suited to fill that bill. Here I argue that the metaphysical inspiration for ethical intuitionism undermines that very epistemology, for this pair of views generates what I call the defeater from cosmic coincidence. Unfortunately, we face not a happy union, but a difficult choice: either ethical intuitionism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason.David O. Brink - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):291 – 307.
  • Moral Philosophy as Applied Science.Michael Ruse & Edward O. Wilson - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (236):173-192.
    For much of this century, moral philosophy has been constrained by the supposed absolute gap between is and ought , and the consequent belief that the facts of life cannot of themselves yield an ethical blueprint for future action. For this reason, ethics has sustained an eerie existence largely apart from science. Its most respected interpreters still believe that reasoning about right and wrong can be successful without a knowledge of the brain, the human organ where all the decisions about (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  • Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About.Sharon Street - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):207-228.
  • On the Epistemic Status of Considered Moral Judgments.Mark Timmons - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):97-129.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • .Peter Railton - 1985 - Rowman & Littlefield.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   134 citations  
  • The Expanding Circle.Peter Singer - 1984 - Mind 93 (369):138-140.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Self-Evidence.Robert Audi - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):205-228.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):441-464.
    Evolutionary debunkers of morality hold this thesis: If S’s moral belief that P can be given an evolutionary explanation, then S’s moral belief that P is not knowledge. In this paper, I debunk a variety of arguments for this thesis. I first sketch a possible evolutionary explanation for some human moral beliefs. Next, I explain how, given a reliabilist approach to warrant, my account implies that humans possess moral knowledge. Finally, I examine the debunking arguments of Michael Ruse, Sharon Street, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  • The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology.Peter Singer - 1981 - Oxford University Press.
  • Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues.Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph - 2004 - Daedalus 133 (4):55-66.
  • .Jonathan Haidt - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • .Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   133 citations  
  • The Expanding Circle.Anthony Manser & Peter Singer - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (132):305.
  • Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Evolution, Animals, and the Basis of Morality.Colin McGinn - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):81 – 99.
    Some have supposed that morality has its basis in altruistic emotions implanted in accordance with the standard principles of natural selection. It is argued, to the contrary, that the falsity of group selection theory precludes founding genuine altruism on such a basis, and that the correct theory of evolution renders morality possible only if a cognitivist conception of moral psychology is accepted. Some independent reasons are given for favouring that conception over its noncognitivist rival. Morality is then claimed to be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations