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Pain, philosophical aspects of

In Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. pp. 495-498 (2009)

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  1. Scientific Thought.C. D. Broad - 1923 - Paterson, N.J.,: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
  • A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
    Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 - remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate.
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  • A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character.Michael Tye - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.
  • Perception: A Representative Theory.Stephanie A. Ross - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (4):623.
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  • Pain Perception.George Pitcher - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (3):368.
  • Sensing The World.J. S. Kelly - 1990 - Noûs 24 (5):782-792.
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  • On viewing pain as a secondary quality.Natika Newton - 1989 - Noûs 23 (5):569-98.
  • Scientific Thought.C. I. Lewis - 1925 - Philosophical Review 34 (4):406.
  • Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
    What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between mediate and (...)
  • The Mind's Awareness of Itself.Fred Dretske - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-124.
  • D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind[REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):812-818.
  • Sensing The World.Moreland Perkins - 1983 - Indianapolis: Hackett.
    PREFACE In Berkeley's language, the question from which this book arises is this one: Is what we immediately perceive by the senses something that depends ...
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