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Death, pain and time

Philosophical Studies 97 (3):317-341 (2000)

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  1. Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • Morality, Mortality: Rights, duties, and status.F. M. Kamm - 1993 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This volume continues the examination of issues of life and death which F.M. Kamm began in 'Morality, Mortality, ' Volume I (1993). Kamm continues her development of a non-consequentialist ethical theory and its application to practical ethical problems.
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  • Death and deprivation; or, why lucretius' symmetry argument fails.Frederik Kaufman - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):305 – 312.
  • Why is Death Bad and Worse Than Pre‐Natal Non‐Existence?F. M. Kamm - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (2):161-164.
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  • Pre‐Vital and Post‐Vital Times.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):171-180.
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  • Why is death bad?Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
    It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...)
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  • The asymmetry of early death and late birth.Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (3):327-331.
    In a previous paper, we argued that death's badness consists in the deprivation of pleasurable experiences which one would have had, had one died later rather than at the time of one's actual death. Thus, we argued that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies, even if it is an experiential blank. But there is a pressing objection to this view, for if the view is correct, then it seems that it should also be the case (...)
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  • Being born earlier.Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):110 – 114.
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  • Asymmetry and non-existence.Christopher Belshaw - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):103 - 116.
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