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Logic for equivocators.David Lewis - 1982 - Noûs 16 (3):431-441.details
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Theories of Aboutness.Peter Hawke - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):697-723.details
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Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto & Mark Jago - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Mark Jago.details
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Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Oxford: Princeton University Press.details
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Yablo on subject-matter.Kit Fine - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):129-171.details
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Sensitivity, safety, and impossible worlds.Guido Melchior - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):713-729.details
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Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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A classically-based theory of impossible worlds.Edward N. Zalta - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):640-660.details
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Indicative and subjunctive conditionals.Brian Weatherson - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.details
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Remarks on the logic of imagination. A step towards understanding doxastic control through imagination.Heinrich Wansing - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2843-2861.details
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The only necessity is verbal necessity.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):71-85.details
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Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):299-322.details
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Why Propositions Cannot be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances.Scott Soames - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):267-276.details
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Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content.Scott Soames - 1987 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 33-71.details
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Truthmakers, entailment and necessity.Greg Restall - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.details
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