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  1. The direct contextual realism theory of perception.John R. Shook - 2003 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17 (4):245-258.
  • Putnam and the Relativist Menace.Richard Rorty - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (9):443-461.
  • A misunderstanding of Peirce's phenomenology.Joseph Ransdell - 1978 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (4):550-553.
  • A dynamic view of perception.Stephen C. Pepper - 1971 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (1):42-46.
    Acts of perception are shown to be based on dynamic drives and interests, And so to be parts of purposive acts. A number of consequences follow. For instance, In distal auditory or visual perceptions there are two objects--The transcendent object of the distant goal and source of stimulation, And the immediate sensory object with its anticipatory references. This leads to an operational-Correspondence theory of truth to verify the references. Passive traditional theories are confused on this and other relevant points.
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  • On some philosophical accounts of perception.George S. Pappas - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (Supplement):71-82.
    Philosophical accounts of perception in the tradition of Kant and Reid have generally supposed that an event of making a judgment is a key element in every perceptual experience. An alternative very austere view regards perception as an event containing nothing judgmental, nor anything conceptual. This account of perception as nonconceptual is discussed first historically as found in the philosophies of Locke and (briefly) Berkeley, and then examined in the contemporary work of Chisholm and Alston.
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  • 9 The Development of Peirce's Theory of Signs.T. L. Short - 2004 - In C. J. Misak (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Peirce. Cambridge University Press. pp. 214.