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  1. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. [REVIEW]David Zaret - 1977 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):146-149.
  • Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism.Larry Laudan - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):19 - 31.
  • Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate.Larry Laudan - 1984 - University of California Press.
    Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a longtime problem for the philosopher of science: how to explain the simultaneous and widespread presence of both agreement and disagreement in science. Laudan critiques the logical empiricists and the post-positivists as he stresses the need for centrality and values and the interdependence of values, methods, and facts as prerequisites to solving the problems of consensus and dissent in science.
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  • Turns in the Evolution of the Problem of Induction.Carl G. Hempel - 1981 - Synthese 46 (3):389 - 404.
  • Laudan's Progress and Its ProblemsProgress and Its Problems. Larry Laudan.Ernan McMullin - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (4):623-644.
  • Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth.L. Laudan - 1977 - University of California Press.
    (This insularity was further promoted by the guileless duplicity of scholars in other fields, who were all too prepared to bequeath "the problem of ...
  • Rationality and Theory Choice.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (10):563-570.
  • On the Value of Scientific Knowledge.Lars Bergström - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 30:53-63.
    Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even i f it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. (...)
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  • Notes on the Value of Science.Lars Bergström - 1994 - In D. Prawitz, B. Skyrms & D. Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX. Elsevier Science B. V..
  • A Response to My Critics.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
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