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  1. Meta-Logical Problems: Knights, Knaves, and Rips.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1990 - Cognition 36 (1):69-84.
  • Mental Models Cannot Exclude Mental Logic and Make Little Sense Without It.Martin D. S. Braine - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):338-339.
  • Processing Capacity Defined by Relational Complexity: Implications for Comparative, Developmental, and Cognitive Psychology.Graeme S. Halford, William H. Wilson & Steven Phillips - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):803-831.
    Working memory limits are best defined in terms of the complexity of the relations that can be processed in parallel. Complexity is defined as the number of related dimensions or sources of variation. A unary relation has one argument and one source of variation; its argument can be instantiated in only one way at a time. A binary relation has two arguments, two sources of variation, and two instantiations, and so on. Dimensionality is related to the number of chunks, because (...)
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  • Reasoning Strategies for Suppositional Deductions.R. Byrne - 1997 - Cognition 62 (1):1-49.
    Deductive reasoning shares with other forms of thinking a reliance on strategies, as shown by the results of three experiments on the nature and development of control strategies to solve suppositional deductions. These puzzles are based on assertors who may or may not be telling the truth, and their assertions about their status as truthtellers and liars. The first experiment shows that reasoners make backward inferences as well as forward inferences, to short-cut their way through the alternatives, and the generation (...)
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  • The Psychology of Knights and Knaves.Lance J. Rips - 1989 - Cognition 31 (2):85-116.
  • Paralogical Reasoning: Evans, Johnson-Laird, and Byrne on Liar and Truth-Teller Puzzles.Lance J. Rips - 1990 - Cognition 36 (3):291-314.
  • The Nature of "Intelligence" and the Principles of Cognition.C. Spearman - 1924 - Journal of Philosophy 21 (11):294-301.
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  • Why Models Rather Than Rules Give a Better Account of Propositional Reasoning: A Reply to Bonatti and to O'Brien, Braine, and Yang.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Walter Schaeken - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):734-739.
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  • Cognitive Processes in Propositional Reasoning.Lance J. Rips - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (1):38-71.
  • Error and Bias in Meta-Propositional Reasoning: A Case of the Mental Model Theory.W. Schroyens - 1999 - Thinking and Reasoning 5 (1):29 – 66.
    The mental model theory predicts variations in the percentage of errors in meta-propositional reasoning tasks but does not specify the nature of these errors. In the present study, we drew predictions concerning the nature of errors in a meta-propositional reasoning task by importing and elaborating the distinction between implicit and explicit models previously applied by the mental model theory to the domain of propositional reasoning. An experiment was conducted in which participants were asked to solve problems concerning the truth or (...)
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  • Propositional Reasoning by Model.Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. Byrne & Walter Schaeken - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (3):418-439.
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  • Propositional Reasoning by Mental Models? Simple to Refute in Principle and in Practice.David P. O'Brien, Martin D. S. Braine & Yingrui Yang - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):711-724.
  • Reasoning From Suppositions.Ruth M. J. Byrne, Simon J. Handley & Philip N. Johnson-Laird - 1995 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 48 (4):915-944.
    Two experiments investigated inferences based on suppositions. In Experiment 1, the subjects decided whether suppositions about individuals' veracity were consistent with their assertions—for example, whether the supposition “Ann is telling the truth and Beth is telling a lie”, is consistent with the premises: “Ann asserts: I am telling the truth and Beth is telling the truth. Beth asserts: Ann is telling the truth”. It showed that these inferences are more difficult than ones based on factual premises: “Ann asserts: I live (...)
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