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  1. A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  • Why We Need Iconic Memory.George Sperling - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):37-39.
  • Beyond 'What'and 'How Many': Capacity, Complexity, and Resolution of Infants' Object Representations.Jennifer M. Zosh & Lisa Feigenson - 2009 - In Bruce M. Hood & Laurie Santos (eds.), The Origins of Object Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--51.
  • Towards a True Neural Stance on Consciousness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.
  • Consciousness and Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.
    This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other.
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  • On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 1999 - Cognitive Science 23 (2):207-245.
  • Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness.N. Block - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1-2):197--219.
    Dehaene and Naccache, Dennett and Jack and Shallice “see convergence coming from many different quarters on a version of the neuronal global workspace model†(Dennett, p. 1). (Boldface references are to papers in this volume.) On the contrary, even within this volume, there are commitments to very different perspectives on consciousness. And these differing perspectives are based on tacit differences in philosophical starting places that should be made explicit.  Indeed, it is not clear that different uses of “consciousness†and (...)
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  • Persistent Activity in the Prefrontal Cortex During Working Memory.Clayton E. Curtis & Mark D'Esposito - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (9):415-423.
  • The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow.Richard Brown - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604.
    In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.
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  • Do We See More Than We Can Access?Alex Byrne, David Hilbert & Susanna Siegel - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (5-6):501-502.
    Short commentary on a paper by Ned Block.
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  • Why Visual Attention and Awareness Are Different.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.
  • Implicit Working Memory.Ran R. Hassin, John A. Bargh, Andrew D. Engell & Kathleen C. McCulloch - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):665-678.
    Working Memory plays a crucial role in many high-level cognitive processes . The prevalent view holds that active components of WM are predominantly intentional and conscious. This conception is oftentimes expressed explicitly, but it is best reflected in the nature of major WM tasks: All of them are blatantly explicit. We developed two new WM paradigms that allow for an examination of the role of conscious awareness in WM. Results from five studies show that WM can operate unintentionally and outside (...)
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  • How Rich is Consciousness? The Partial Awareness Hypothesis.Sid Kouider, Vincent de Gardelle, Jérôme Sackur & Emmanuel Dupoux - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (7):301-307.
  • Partial Awareness and the Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness.Sid Kouider, Vincent de Gardelle, Emmanuel Dupoux & Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):510-510.
    The dissociation Block provides between phenomenal and access consciousness (P-consciousness and A-consciousness) captures much of our intuition about conscious experience. However, it raises a major methodological puzzle, and is not uniquely supported by the empirical evidence. We provide an alternative interpretation based on the notion of levels of representation and partial awareness.
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  • Perceptual Illusions in Brief Visual Presentations.Vincent de Gardelle, Jérôme Sackur & Sid Kouider - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):569-577.
    We often feel that our perceptual experience is richer than what we can express. For instance, when flashed with a large set of letters, we feel that we can see them all, while we can report only a few. However, the nature of this subjective impression remains highly debated: while many favour a dissociation between two forms of consciousness , others contend that the richness of phenomenal experience is a mere illusion. Here we addressed this question with a classical partial-report (...)
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  • Change Blindness.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.
  • Conscious, Preconscious, and Subliminal Processing: A Testable Taxonomy.Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur & Claire Sergent - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.
    Amidst the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of those dissenting results. On the basis of a minimal neuro-computational model, the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a (...)
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  • Attributive Vs. Cognitive Clearness.Karl M. Dallenbach - 1920 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 3 (3):183.
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  • Psychology Supports Independence of Phenomenal Consciousness.Tyler Burge - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):500-501.
    Inference-to-best-explanation from psychological evidence supports the view that phenomenal consciousness in perceptual exposures occurs before limited aspects of that consciousness are retained in working memory. Independently of specific neurological theory, psychological considerations indicate that machinery producing phenomenal consciousness is independent of machinery producing working memory, hence independent of access to higher cognitive capacities.
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  • Reportability and Illusions of Phenomenality in the Light of the Global Neuronal Workspace Model.Lionel Naccache & Stanislas Dehaene - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):518-520.
    Can we ever experimentally disentangle phenomenal consciousness from the cognitive accessibility inherent to conscious reports? In this commentary, we suggest that (1) Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness remains intractably entangled with the need to obtain subjective reports about it; and (2) many experimental paradigms suggest that the intuitive notion of a rich but non-reportable phenomenal world is, to a large extent illusory – in a sense that requires clarification.
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  • Reuniting (Scene) Phenomenology with (Scene) Access.David Papineau - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):521-521.
    Block shows that we can consciously see a scene without being able to identify all the individual items in it. But in itself this fails to drive a wedge between phenomenology and access. Once we distinguish scene phenomenology from item phenomenology, the link between phenomenology and access is restored.
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  • A Plug for Generic Phenomenology.Rick Grush - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):504-505.
    I briefly sketch a notion of generic phenomenology, and what I call the wave-collapse illusion to the effect that transitions from generic to detailed phenomenology are not noticed as phenomenal changes. Change blindness and inattentional blindness can be analyzed as cases where certain things are phenomenally present, but generically so.
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  • Free-Ranging Rhesus Monkeys Spontaneously Individuate and Enumerate Small Numbers of Non-Solid Portions.Justin N. Wood, Marc D. Hauser, David D. Glynn & David Barner - 2008 - Cognition 106 (1):207-221.
  • Conscious Access Overflows Overt Report.Claire Sergent & Geraint Rees - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):523-524.
    Block proposes that phenomenal experience overflows conscious access. In contrast, we propose that conscious access overflows overt report. We argue that a theory of phenomenal experience cannot discard subjective report and that Block's examples of phenomenal relate to two different types of perception. We propose that conscious access is more than simply readout of a pre-existing phenomenal experience.
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  • Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  • Overflow, Access, and Attention.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):530-548.
    In this response to 32 commentators, I start by clarifying the overflow argument. I explain why the distinction between generic and specific phenomenology is important and why we are justified in acknowledging specific phenomenology in the overflow experiments. Other issues discussed are the relations among report, cognitive access, and attention; panpsychic disaster; the mesh between psychology and neuroscience; and whether consciousness exists.
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  • Two Kinds of Access.Joseph Levine - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):514-515.
    I explore the implications of recognizing two forms of access that might be constitutively related to phenomenal consciousness. I argue, in support of Block, that we don't have good reason to think that the link to reporting mechanisms is the kind of access that distinguishes an experience from a mere state.
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  • Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness.Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):365-373.
  • Consciousness Cannot Be Separated From Function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
    Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
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  • Change Blindness: Past, Present, and Future.Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):16-20.
    Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set of requirements (...)
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  • A Detection Theory Account of Change Detection.Patrick Wilken & Wei Ji Ma - 2004 - Journal of Vision 4 (12):1120-1135.
    Previous studies have suggested that visual short-term memory (VSTM) has a storage limit of approximately four items. However, the type of high-threshold (HT) model used to derive this estimate is based on a number of assumptions that have been criticized in other experimental paradigms (e.g., visual search). Here we report findings from nine experiments in which VSTM for color, spatial frequency, and orientation was modeled using a signal detection theory (SDT) approach. In Experiments 1-6, two arrays composed of multiple stimulus (...)
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  • Attention, Seeing, and Change Blindness.Michael Tye - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):410-437.
  • Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy.James Stazicker - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (2):156-184.
    I propose a new argument showing that conscious vision sometimes depends constitutively on conscious attention. I criticise traditional arguments for this constitutive connection, on the basis that they fail adequately to dissociate evidence about visual consciousness from evidence about attention. On the same basis, I criticise Ned Block's recent counterargument that conscious vision is independent of one sort of attention (‘cognitive access'). Block appears to achieve the dissociation only because he underestimates the indeterminacy of visual consciousness. I then appeal to (...)
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  • What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness.Fred Dretske - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.
  • Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show.Ian B. Phillips - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):381-411.
    Philosophers have lately seized upon Sperling's partial report technique and subsequent work on iconic memory in support of controversial claims about perceptual experience, in particular that phenomenology overflows cognitive access. Drawing on mounting evidence concerning postdictive perception, I offer an interpretation of Sperling's data in terms of cue-sensitive experience which fails to support any such claims. Arguments for overflow based on change-detection paradigms (e.g. Landman et al., 2003; Sligte et al., 2008) cannot be blocked in this way. However, such paradigms (...)
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  • Attention and Iconic Memory.I. B. Phillips - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies and W. & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Orthodox interpretations of Sperling‘s partial report paradigm support the idea that there is substantially more in our streams of consciousness than we can attend to or recall. I propose an alternative, postdictive interpretation which fails to support any such conclusion. This account is defended at greater length in my ‗Perception and iconic memory‘. Here I focus on the role ascribed to attention by the rival interpretations. I argue that orthodox accounts fail to assign a plausible role to attention. In contrast, (...)
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  • The Legend of the Magical Number Seven.Nelson Cowan, Candice C. Morey & Chen & Zhijian - 2007 - In Sergio Della Sala (ed.), Tall Tales About the Mind and Brain: Separating Fact From Fiction. Oxford University Press.
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  • The Information Available in Visual Presentations.George Sperling - 1960 - Psychological Monographs 74:1-29.
  • Separate Neural Definitions of Visual Consciousness and Visual Attention: A Case for Phenomenal Awareness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2004 - Neural Networks 17 (5):861-872.
  • To See or Not to See: The Need for Attention to Perceive Changes in Scenes.Ronald A. Rensink, J. Kevin O'Regan & James J. Clark - 1997 - Psychological Science 8:368-373.
    Methods. We employed a "flicker" technique, in which an original and a modified image (each of duration 240 ms) continually alternated, with a blank field (duration 80 ms) between each display. Images were all of real-world scenes. One of three kinds of change (appearance/disappearance, color, or translation) was made to an object or region in each scene. Changes were large and easily seen under normal conditions. Subjects viewed the flicker display, and pressed a key when they noticed the change.
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