- Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification.Declan Smithies - 2014 - In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 98-124.details
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The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.details
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Transparent experience and the availability of qualia.Brian Loar - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Immediate and Reflective Senses.Angela Mendelovici - 2019 - In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado & Dena Shottenkirk (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. pp. 187-209.details
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Real Intentionality 3: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness.Galen Strawson - 2008 - In Real Materialism: And Other Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 279--297.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory.Michael Tye - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1):25--50.details
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A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character.Michael Tye - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.details
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Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Cognitive phenomenology: real life.Galen Strawson - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 285--325.details
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What Is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought?Declan Smithies - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (1):5-34.details
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The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.details
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The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind.John R. Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.details
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Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Intentionality.John R. Searle - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):193-209.details
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Consciousness, unconsciousness and intentionality.John R. Searle - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:45-66.details
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Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.details
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Reason, Truth and History.Kathleen Okruhlik - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):692-694.details
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Reason, truth, and history.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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In Defense of Definitions.David Pitt - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):139-156.details
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Intentional Psychologism.David Pitt - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117-138.details
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Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content.David Pitt - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 141-173.details
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Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234.details
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Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation.Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):57-92.details
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Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.details
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Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
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Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.details
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Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57:89-97.details
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Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1987 - MIT Press.details
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Review of W ittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Brian Loar - 1985 - Noûs 19 (2):273-280.details
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Wittgenstein on rules and private language: an elementary exposition.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.details
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Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.details
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Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 79--102.details
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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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Representation and narrow belief.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):99-112.details
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Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisited.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2):55-70.details
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Metaphysics Without Conceptual Analysis.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):631-636.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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The Language of Thought.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1975 - Noûs 14 (1):120-124.details
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The subject's point of view * by Katalin Farkas. [REVIEW]Katalin Farkas - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):791-794.details
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Phenomenal intentionality without compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.details
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Constructing a World for the Senses.Katalin Farkas - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-115.details
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The nature of thought.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (2):185-99.details
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Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.details
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