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Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy.Terry Horgan & George Graham - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 321-344.details
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Skepticism about the internal world.Alex Byrne - 2015 - In Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen & Seana Valentine Shiffrin (eds.), The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. New York: W. W. Norton.details
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Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives.Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokić (eds.) - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.details
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Intentionality and phenomenology.Robert A. Wilson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):413-431.details
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How should we understand the relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:271-89.details
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Is there a phenomenology of thought?Michael Tye & Briggs Wright - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 35.details
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Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Cognitive phenomenology: real life.Galen Strawson - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 285--325.details
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The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.details
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The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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The ins and outs of perception.David Woodruff Smith - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (March):187-211.details
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The connection principle and the ontology of the unconscious: A reply to Fodor and Lepore.John R. Searle - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):847-55.details
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Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person.John R. Searle - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):123-146.details
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Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.Bertrand Russell - 1911 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.details
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A frugal view of cognitive phenomenology.William S. Robinson - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197.details
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The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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In Defense of Definitions.David Pitt - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):139-156.details
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Intentional Psychologism.David Pitt - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117-138.details
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Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content.David Pitt - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 141-173.details
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Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 83.details
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Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234.details
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How phenomenological content determines the intentional object.George H. Miller - 1999 - Husserl Studies 16 (1):1-24.details
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Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
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Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.details
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The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution.Colin McGinn - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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The case for phenomenal externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-35.details
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Reference from the first person perspective.Brian Loar - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:53-72.details
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Subjective intentionality.Brian Loar - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):89-124.details
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Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet.Joseph Levine - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):215-236.details
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On the Phenomenology of Thought.Joseph Levine - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 103.details
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Wittgenstein on rules and private language: an elementary exposition.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.details
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Phenomenal intentionality past and present: introductory.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.details
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Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 79--102.details
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Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality.Terence Horgan - 2013 - The Monist 96 (2):232-251.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press. pp. 55–81.details
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Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.details
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Does Mary know I experience plus rather than quus? A new hard problem.Philip Goff - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):223-235.details
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The Subject’s Point of View.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal intentionality without compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.details
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Constructing a World for the Senses.Katalin Farkas - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-115.details
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Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.details
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