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David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici (2016). Phenomenal Intentionality.

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  1. Horgan and Tienson on Phenomenology and Intentionality.Andrew R. Bailey & Bradley Richards - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):313-326.
    Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the (...)
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  2. Perceptual Symbol Systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
    Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statis- tics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement record- ing systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the (...)
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  3. Cognitive Phenomenology.Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.
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  4. Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.
  5. Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. pp. 209-235.
    This paper overviews the current status of debates on tracking representationalism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking features of one's environment in a certain way. We overview the main arguments for the view and the main objections and challenges it faces. We close with a discussion of alternative versions of representationalism that might overcome the shortcomings of tracking representationalism.
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  6. Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Routledge.
  7. Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
  8.  78
    Skepticism About the Internal World.Alex Byrne - 2015 - In Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen & Seana Valentine Shiffrin (eds.), The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. W. W. Norton.
  9. Experience and Content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
    The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are (...)
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  10. The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology.Peter Carruthers & Bénédicte Veillet - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 35.
    The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenal properties of our mental lives. We therefore defend the view that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively experiential (or nonconceptual) in character. The main focus of the chapter is on the alleged contribution that concepts make to the phenomenology of visual experience. For we take it that if (...)
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  11. Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
  12. The Components of Content.David Chalmers - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
    [[This paper appears in my anthology _Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings_ (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 608-633. It is a heavily revised version of a paper first written in 1994 and revised in 1995. Sections 1, 7, 8, and 10 are similar to the old version, but the other sections are quite different. Because the old version has been widely cited, I have made it available (in its 1995 version) at http://consc.net/papers/content95.html.
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  13. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Cornell University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to develop a terminological structure in which private perceptions can be discussed publicly without bringing into existence the usual unnecessary philosophical problems of confused usage of language. chisholm displays an appraisive, quasi-ethical use of language, whereby he claims that a thing has some particular sensible property is to have adequate evidence that it actually does have that property. (staff).
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  14. Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.
    According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant (...)
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  15. Intellectual Gestalts.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 174.
    Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this paper is (...)
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  16. Consciousness and the Varieties of Aboutness.Martin Davies - 1995 - In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press. pp. 2.
    Thinking is special. There is nothing quite like it. Thinking.
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  17. Constructing a World for the Senses.Katalin Farkas - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-115.
    It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...)
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  18. Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...)
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  19. The Subject's Point of View.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of (...)
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    What Is The Connection Principle?Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):837 - 845.
    No categories
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  21.  38
    The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language.Nicholas Georgalis - 2006 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    In this highly original monograph, Nicholas Georgalis proposes that the concept of minimal content is fundamental both to the philosophy of mind and to the philosophy of language. He argues that to understand mind and language requires minimal content -- a narrow, first-person, non-phenomenal concept that represents the subject of an agent's intentional state as the agent conceives it. Orthodox third-person objective methodology must be supplemented with first-person subjective methodology. Georgalis demonstrates limitations of a strictly third-person methodology in the study (...)
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  22. The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
    This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of (...)
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  23. Does Mary Know I Experience Plus Rather Than Quus? A New Hard Problem.Philip Goff - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):223-235.
    Realism about cognitive or semantic phenomenology, the view that certain conscious states are intrinsically such as to ground thought or understanding, is increasingly being taken seriously in analytic philosophy. The principle aim of this paper is to argue that it is extremely difficult to be a physicalist about cognitive phenomenology. The general trend in later 20th century/early 21st century philosophy of mind has been to account for the content of thought in terms of facts outside the head of the thinker (...)
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  24. Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science.Alvin Goldman - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
    This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness (...)
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    " T Fl The Psychology of Folk Psychology".Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 347.
  26. The Connection Principle and the Classificatory Scheme of Reality.Oscar L. Gonzalez-Castan - 1999 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):85-98.
     
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  27. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
  28. (Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press. pp. 55–81.
    CRS says that the meanings of expressions of a language or other symbol system or the contents of mental states are determined and explained by the way symbols are used in thinking. According to CRS one.
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  29. Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality.Terence Horgan - 2013 - The Monist 96 (2):232-251.
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  30. Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy.Terry Horgan & George Graham - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. De Gruyter.
  31. Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
  32. Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.
    This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind...
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  33. Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this (...)
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  34. Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Phenomenal intentionality is supposed to be a kind of directedness of the mind onto the world that is grounded in the conscious feel of mental life. This book of new essays explores a number of issues raised by the notion of phenomenal intentionality.
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  35. Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present: Introductory.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):437-444.
    This is an introduction to a special issue on the history of phenomenal intentionality.
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  36. Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 79--102.
    Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non- conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. In this paper, I compare and contrast four possible accounts of unconscious intentionality, which I call potentialism, (...)
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  37.  93
    The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Oxford University Press USA.
    What do thoughts, hopes, paintings, words, desires, photographs, traffic signs, and perceptions have in common? They are all about something, are directed, are contentful - in a way chairs and trees, for example, are not. This book inquires into the source of this power of directedness that some items exhibit while others do not. An approach to this issue prevalent in the philosophy of the past half-century seeks to explain the power of directedness in terms of certain items' ability to (...)
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  38. Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
  39. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Harvard University Press.
    In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of following a rule.
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    On the Phenomenology of Thought.Joseph Levine - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 103.
  41. Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet.Joseph Levine - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):215-236.
  42. Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
    This is the second volume of philosophical essays by one of the most innovative and influential philosophers now writing in English. Containing thirteen papers in all, the book includes both new essays and previously published papers, some of them with extensive new postscripts reflecting Lewis's current thinking. The papers in Volume II focus on causation and several other closely related topics, including counterfactual and indicative conditionals, the direction of time, subjective and objective probability, causation, explanation, perception, free will, and rational (...)
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  43. Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 229--258.
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  44. Reference From the First Person Perspective.Brian Loar - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:53-72.
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    Subjective Intentionality.Brian Loar - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):89-124.
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  46.  85
    Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness.Kirk A. Ludwig - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.
    _The Significance of Consciousness_ . Princeton: Princeton University Press. $42.50 hbk. x + 374pp. ISBN: 0691027242. ABSTRACT: I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to.
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    Explaining Why Things Look the Way They Do.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1996 - In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 18-60.
    How are we able to perceive the world veridically? If we ask this question as a part of the scientific investigation of perception, then we are not asking for a transcendental guarantee that our perceptions are by and large veridical; we presuppose that they are. Unless we assumed that we perceived the world for the most part veridically, we would not be in a position to investigate our perceptual abilities empirically. We are interested, then, not in how it is possible (...)
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  48. The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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  49. The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution.Colin McGinn - 1991 - Blackwell.
    This book argues that we are not equipped to understand the workings of conciousness, despite its objective naturalness.
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  50. Intentionalism About Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
    According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism (...)
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