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David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici (2014). Tracking Representationalism.

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  1. Blur.Keith Allen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273.
    This paper presents an ‘over-representational’ account of blurred visual experiences. The basic idea is that blurred experiences provide too much, inconsistent, information about objects’ spatial boundaries, by representing them as simultaneously located at multiple locations. This account attempts to avoid problems with alternative accounts of blurred experience, according to which blur is a property of a visual field, a way of perceiving, a form of mis-representation, and a form of under-representation.
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  2. The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1965 - In Ronald J. Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy. Blackwell. pp. 158-80.
  3. Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
    This book is the one to put into the hands of those who have been over-impressed by Austin 's critics....[Warnock's] brilliant editing puts everybody who is concerned with philosophical problems in his debt.
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  4. Neuronal Mechanisms of Consciousness: A Relational Global Workspace Approach.Bernard J. Baars, J. B. Newman & John G. Taylor - 1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. pp. 269-278.
    This paper explores a remarkable convergence of ideas and evidence, previously presented in separate places by its authors. That convergence has now become so persuasive that we believe we are working within substantially the same broad framework. Taylor's mathematical papers on neuronal systems involved in consciousness dovetail well with work by Newman and Baars on the thalamocortical system, suggesting a brain mechanism much like the global workspace architecture developed by Baars (see references below). This architecture is relational, in the sense (...)
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  5. Intentionalism and Pain.David Bain - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.
    The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand two objections: concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of the pain case. I rebut these objections, in a way that’s available (...)
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  6. In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique (...)
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  7. Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
    This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...)
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  8. Inverted Earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
  9. Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
    Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: I argue that they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also address objections which touch on a range (...)
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  10. The Representational Theory of Consciousness.David Bourget - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    A satisfactory solution to the problem of consciousness would take the form of a simple yet fully general model which specifies the precise conditions under which any given state of consciousness occurs. Science has uncovered numerous correlations between consciousness and neural activity, but it has not yet come anywhere close to this. We are still looking for the Newtonian laws of consciousness. -/- One of the main difficulties with consciousness is that we lack a language in which to formulate illuminating (...)
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  11. Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. [REVIEW]Alex Byrne - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):261-274.
    Consciousness, Color, and Content is a significant contribution to our understanding of consciousness, among other things. I have learned a lot from it, as well as Tye’s other writings. What’s more, I actually agree with much of it – fortunately for this symposium, not all of it. The book continues the defense of the “PANIC” theory of phenomenal consciousness that Tye began in Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995). A fair chunk of it, though, is largely independent of this theory: the (...)
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  12. Don't PANIC: Tye's Intentionalist Theory of Consciousness.Alex Byrne - 2001 - A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    _Consciousness, Color, and Content_ is a significant contribution to our understanding of consciousness, among other things. I have learned a lot from it, as well as Tye.
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    Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
  14. Qualia Ain't in the Head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.
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  15. The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
    Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...)
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  16. Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain.Brian Cutter & Michael Tye - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.
  17. Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
  18. Experience as Representation.Fred Dretske - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
  19. Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia?Fred Dretske - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.
  20. Conscious Experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.
  21. The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness.Gerald M. Edelman - 1989 - Basic Books.
    Having laid the groundwork in his critically acclaimed books Neural Darwinism (Basic Books, 1987) and Topobiology (Basic Books, 1988), Nobel laureate Gerald M. Edelman now proposes a comprehensive theory of consciousness in The Remembered ...
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  22. Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...)
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  23. The Logic of Perception.Jaakko Hintikka - 1969 - In Models for Modalities. Reidel.
  24. Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content.Terence E. Horgan - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
  25. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.
  26.  91
    Representation and Experience.Frank Jackson - 2004 - In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. pp. 107--124.
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  27. What's so Transparent About Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.
    Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is (...)
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  28. An Imperative Theory of Pain.Colin Klein - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (10):517-532.
    forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy.
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    Sensory States and Sensory Objects.Robert Kraut - 1982 - Noûs 16 (2):277-93.
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  30. PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64.
    Michael Tye has recently argued that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences is "one and the same as" (1) Poised (2) Abstract (3) Non-conceptual (4) Intentional Content (PANIC). Tye argues extensively that PANIC Theory accounts for differences in phenomenal character in representational terms. But another task of a theory of phenomenal consciousness is to account for the difference between those mental states that have phenomenal character at all and those that do not. By going through each of the four qualifiers (...)
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  31. Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation.David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):3-32.
  32. The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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  33. Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  34.  69
    Layered Perceptual Representation.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:81-100.
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    Phenomenal Objects: A Backhanded Defense.William G. Lycan - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26.
  36. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.
  37. Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.
    It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
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  38. Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.Angela Mendelovici - 2010 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
     
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  39. Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories.Ruth G. Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
    Preface by Daniel C. Dennett Beginning with a general theory of function applied to body organs, behaviors, customs, and both inner and outer representations, ...
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  40. The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...)
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  41. The Refutation of Idealism.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Mind 12 (48):433-453.
  42. Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-41.
  43. Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1993 - Blackwell.
  44. Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 254--309.
  45. What Are the Contents of Experiences?Adam Pautz - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.
    I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.
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  46. Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment.William Seager - 1999 - Routledge.
    Theories of Consciousness provides an introduction to a variety of approaches to consciousness, questions the nature of consciousness, and contributes to current debates about whether a scientific understanding of consciousness is possible. While discussing key figures including Descartes, Fodor, Dennett and Chalmers, the book incorporates identity theories, representational theories, intentionality, externalism and new information-based theories.
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    Tye on Consciousness: Time to Panic? [REVIEW]William E. Seager - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):237-247.
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  48. Emotional Introspection.William E. Seager - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.
    One of the most vivid aspects of consciousness is the experience of emotion, yet this topic is given relatively little attention within consciousness studies. Emotions are crucial, for they provide quick and motivating assessments of value, without which action would be misdirected or absent. Emotions also involve linkages between phenomenal and intentional consciousness. This paper examines emotional consciousness from the standpoint of the representational theory of consciousness . Two interesting developments spring from this. The first is the need for the (...)
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  49. Representationalism About Consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 261-276.
    A representationalist-friendly introduction to representationalism which covers a number of central problems and objections.
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  50. The Adverbial Theory of the Objects of Sensation.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1975 - Metaphilosophy 6 (April):144-160.
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