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Richard Bradley & Mareile Drechsler (2014). Types of Uncertainty.

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  1.  46
    The Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment.Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):249-284.
    We provide a critical assessment of the ambiguity aversion literature, which we characterize in terms of the view that Ellsberg choices are rational responses to ambiguity, to be explained by relaxing Savage's Sure-Thing principle and adding an ambiguity-aversion postulate. First, admitting Ellsberg choices as rational leads to behaviour, such as sensitivity to irrelevant sunk cost, or aversion to information, which most economists would consider absurd or irrational. Second, we argue that the mathematical objects referred to as in the ambiguity aversion (...)
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  2. Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2011 - Princeton University Press.
    It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian (...)
     
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  3. Revising Incomplete Attitudes.Richard Bradley - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):235 - 256.
    Bayesian models typically assume that agents are rational, logically omniscient and opinionated. The last of these has little descriptive or normative appeal, however, and limits our ability to describe how agents make up their minds (as opposed to changing them) or how they can suspend or withdraw their opinions. To address these limitations this paper represents the attitudinal states of non-opinionated agents by sets of (permissible) probability and desirability functions. Several basic ways in which such states of mind can be (...)
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  4. Desire, Belief and Expectation.John Broome - 1991 - Mind 100 (2):265-267.
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  5. Decision Making Under Great Uncertainty.Hansson Sven Ove - 1996 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (3):369-386.
    This article is an attempt at a systematic account of decision making under greater uncertainty than what traditional, mathematically oriented decision theory can cope with. Four components of great uncertainty are distinguished: (1) the identity of the options is not well determined (uncertainty of demarcation) ; (2) the consequences of at least some option are unknown (uncertainty of consequences); (3) it is not clear whether information obtained from others, such as experts, can be relied on (uncertainty of reliance); and (4) (...)
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  6. Decision Theory.Sven Ove Hansson - unknown
    This text is a non-technical overview of modern decision theory. It is intended for university students with no previous acquaintance with the subject, and was primarily written for the participants of a course on risk analysis at Uppsala University in 1994.
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  7.  32
    Ifs. Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time.W. Harper, R. Stalnaker & G. Pearce - 1984 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):181-182.
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  8. The Logic of Decision.Richard Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
    "[This book] proposes new foundations for the Bayesian principle of rational action, and goes on to develop a new logic of desirability and probabtility."—Frederic Schick, _Journal of Philosophy_.
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  9. A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
  10.  59
    The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.James M. Joyce - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves (...)
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  11. The General Theory of Employment.John Maynard Keynes - 1937 - Quarterly Journal of Economics 51:209-223.
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  12.  11
    Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.Frank Knight - 1921 - University of Chicago Press.
    Role of the entrepreneur in a distinct role of profit.
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  13.  60
    Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict.Isaac Levi - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    It is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often have to juggle competing values, and that no choice will maximise satisfaction of them all. However, the prevailing account of these cases assumes that there is always a single ranking of the agent's values, and therefore no unresolvable conflict between them. Isaac Levi denies this assumption, arguing that agents often must choose without having balanced their different values and that to be rational, an act does not have to be optimal, (...)
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  14.  47
    Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.
    Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey.
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    On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. D. Reidel. pp. 233--261.
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  16. Desire as Belief.David Lewis - 1988 - Mind 97 (418):323-32.
    Argues for the humean theory of motivation on the grounds that rejecting it requires rejecting decision theory.
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  17. Causal Decision Theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
    Newcomb's problem and similar cases show the need to incorporate causal distinctions into the theory of rational decision; the usual noncausal decision theory, though simpler, does not always give the right answers. I give my own version of causal decision theory, compare it with versions offered by several other authors, and suggest that the versions have more in common than meets the eye.
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  18.  97
    Harmony, Purity, Truth.Graham Oddie - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):451-472.
    David Lewis has argued against the thesis he calls "Desire as Belief", claiming it is incompatible with the fundamentals of evidential decision theory. I show that the argument is unsound, and demonstrate that a version of desire as belief is compatible with a version of causal decision theory.
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  19. The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl R. Popper - 1959 - Routledge.
    Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.
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  20. The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
    Classic analysis of the subject and the development of personal probability; one of the greatest controversies in modern statistcal thought.
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  21. Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity.David Schmeidler - 1989 - Econometrica 57:571-589.
  22. Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities.Peter Walley - 1991 - Chapman & Hall.
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  23.  89
    Desire as Belief, Lewis Notwithstanding.Ruth Weintraub - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):116-122.
    In two curiously neglected papers, David Lewis claims to reduce to absurdity the supposition (commonly labeled DAB) that (some) desires are belief-like. My aim in this paper is to explain the significance of this claim and rebut the proof.
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