References in work:

Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri (2017). In the Thick of Moral Motivation.

48 found
Order:
Are we missing references?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add references for the above work:

  1.  7
    II—Does Knowledge Entail Belief?D. M. Armstrong - 1970 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70 (1):21-36.
  2. Recent Work on Motivational Internalism.Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Caj Strandberg - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):124-137.
    Reviews work on moral judgment motivational internalism from the last two decades.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  3. Spreading the world.Simon Blackburn - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3):385-387.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   74 citations  
  4. Moral Motivation.David O. Brink - 1997 - Ethics 108 (1):4-32.
  5. Belief Through Thick and Thin.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):748-775.
    We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  6. Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.
    The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see the diagnosis of verbal disputes as a tool for philosophical progress. Second, they are interesting as a subject matter for first-order philosophy. Reflection on the existence and nature of verbal disputes can reveal something about the nature of concepts, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   37 citations  
  7.  27
    More About Knowing and Feeling Sure.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):11 - 16.
  8. Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith's "the Moral Problem".David Copp - 1997 - Ethics 108 (1):33-54.
  9. Internalism and Speaker Relativism.James Dreier - 1990 - Ethics 101 (1):6-26.
    In this article I set out a reason for believing in a form of metaethical relativism. In rough terms, the reason is this: a widely held thesis, internalism, tells us that to accept (sincerely assert, believe, etc.) a moral judgment logically requires having a motivating reason. Since the connection is logical, or conceptual, it must be explained by a theory of what it is to accept a moral claim. I argue that the internalist feature of moral expressions can best be (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   83 citations  
  10. Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism.Jamie Dreier - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
  11. The Epistemology of Belief.Fred I. Dretske - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19.
    By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  12.  10
    VIII.—“Ought” and Motivation.W. D. Falk - 1948 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48 (1):111-138.
  13. A Theory of Content I.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
  14. Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
  15. Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
    I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   55 citations  
  16.  2
    Alief in Action.Tamarszabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552-585.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  17.  61
    The Psychology of Belief.William James - 1889 - Mind 14 (55):321-352.
  18.  50
    Knowing and Guessing: By Examples.O. R. Jones - 1971 - Analysis 32 (1):19 - 23.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  19. Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson (ed.), Moral Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    It seems to many that moral opinions must make a difference to what we’re motivated to do, at least in suitable conditions. For others, it seems that it is possible to have genuine moral opinions that make no motivational difference. Both sides – internalists and externalists about moral motivation – can tell persuasive stories of actual and hypothetical cases. My proposal for a kind of reconciliation is to distinguish between two kinds of psychological states with moral content. There are both (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  20. Thinking Like a Scientist: Innateness as a Case Study.Joshua Knobe & Richard Samuels - 2013 - Cognition 126 (1):72-86.
    The concept of innateness appears in systematic research within cognitive science, but it also appears in less systematic modes of thought that long predate the scientific study of the mind. The present studies therefore explore the relationship between the properly scientific uses of this concept and its role in ordinary folk understanding. Studies 1-4 examined the judgments of people with no specific training in cognitive science. Results showed (a) that judgments about whether a trait was innate were not affected by (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  21. The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1996 - Mind 106 (424):791-794.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   120 citations  
  22. Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.
    In a series of publications, Tamar Gendler has argued for a distinction between belief and what she calls ?alief?. Gendler's argument for the distinction is a serviceability argument: the distinction is indispensable for explaining a whole slew of phenomena, typically involving ?belief-behaviour mismatch?. After embedding Gendler's distinction in a dual-process model of moral cognition, I argue here that the distinction also suggests a possible (dis)solution of what is perhaps the organizing problem of contemporary moral psychology: the apparent tension between the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  23. Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong.J. L. Mackie - 1977 - Erkenntnis 18 (3):425-430.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   90 citations  
  24. On the Very Concept of Free Will.Joshua May - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2849-2866.
    Determinism seems to rule out a robust sense of options but also prevent our choices from being a matter of luck. In this way, free will seems to require both the truth and falsity of determinism. If the concept of free will is coherent, something must have gone wrong. I offer a diagnosis on which this puzzle is due at least in part to a tension already present in the very idea of free will. I provide various lines of support (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  25.  62
    Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness.Alfred R. Mele - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):727-753.
    This paper criticizes the conjunction of two theses: 1) cognitivism about first-person moral ought-beliefs, the thesis (roughly) that such beliefs are attitudes with truth-valued contents; 2) robust internalism about these beliefs, the thesis that, necessarily, agents' beliefs that they ought, morally, to A constitute motivation to A. It is argued that the conjunction of these two theses places our moral agency at serious risk. The argument, which centrally involves attention to clinical depression, is extended to a less demanding, recent brand (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  26. God Knows (but Does God Believe?).Dylan Murray, Justin Sytsma & Jonathan Livengood - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):83-107.
    The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments are seldom given for this entailment thesis, however; instead, its truth is typically assumed. Against the entailment thesis, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (Noûs, forthcoming) report that a non-trivial percentage of people think that there can be propositional knowledge without belief. In this paper, we add further fuel to the fire, presenting the results of four new studies. Based on our results, we argue that the entailment thesis does not (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  27. Knowing That P Without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.
    Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  28. On The Genealogy Of Norms: A Case For The Role Of Emotion In Cultural Evolution.Shaun Nichols - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):234-255.
    One promising way to investigate the genealogy of norms is by considering not the origin of norms, but rather, what makes certain norms more likely to prevail. Emotional responses, I maintain, constitute one important set of mechanisms that affects the cultural viability of norms. To corroborate this, I exploit historical evidence indicating that 16th century etiquette norms prohibiting disgusting actions were much more likely to survive than other 16th century etiquette norms. This case suggests more broadly that work on cultural (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  29. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.C. S. PEIRCE - 1958
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   61 citations  
  30. Knowledge---By Examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1--11.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   39 citations  
  31. Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
    The question of moral realismwhether our ethical beliefs rest on some objective foundationis one that mattered as much to Aristotle as it does to us today, and his writings on this topic continue to provide inspiration for the contemporary debate. This volume of essays expands the fruitful conversation among scholars of ancient philosophy and contemporary ethical theorists on this question and related issues such as the virtues, justice, and Aristotles theory of tragedy.The distinguished contributors to this volume enrich and clarify (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   200 citations  
  32. When Words Speak Louder Than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (4):1-18.
    People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli, or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behaviour and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  33. Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.
    Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. But Radford has claimed to offer a counterexample: the case of the unconfident examinee. And Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have claimed empirical vindication of Radford. We argue, in defense of orthodoxy, that the unconfident examinee does indeed have belief, in the epistemically relevant sense of dispositional belief. We buttress this with empirical results showing that when the dispositional conception of belief is specifically elicited, people’s intuitions then conform with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  34.  37
    Patients with Ventromedial Frontal Damage Have Moral Beliefs.Adina Roskies - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):617 – 627.
    Michael Cholbi thinks that the claim that motive internalism (MI), the thesis that moral beliefs or judgments are intrinsically motivating, is the best explanation for why moral beliefs are usually accompanied by moral motivation. He contests arguments that patients with ventromedial (VM) frontal brain damage are counterexamples to MI by denying that they have moral beliefs. I argue that none of the arguments he offers to support this contention are viable. First, I argue that given Cholbi's own commitments, he cannot (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  35. Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons From "Acquired Sociopathy".Adina Roskies - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):51 – 66.
    Metaethical questions are typically held to be a priori , and therefore impervious to empirical evidence. Here I examine the metaethical claim that motive-internalism about belief , the position that moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating, is true. I argue that belief-internalists are faced with a dilemma. Either their formulation of internalism is so weak that it fails to be philosophically interesting, or it is a substantive claim but can be shown to be empirically false. I then provide evidence for the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  36.  87
    The Metaethical Problem.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1997 - Ethics 108 (1):55-83.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  37.  72
    Persistent Bias in Expert Judgments About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: A Test of the Expertise Defense.E. Schultz, E. T. Cokely & A. Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.
    Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate-as measured by (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   36 citations  
  38.  72
    Philosophers’ Biased Judgments Persist Despite Training, Expertise and Reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141:127-137.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  39. Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
    We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar-sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action-omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   81 citations  
  40.  8
    Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Robert Shaver & David O. Brink - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):458.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   118 citations  
  41.  6
    The Moral Problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   88 citations  
  42. Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology.Michael Stocker - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):738-753.
  43. Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?Caj Strandberg & Fredrik Björklund - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):319-335.
    In the metaethical debate on moral internalism and externalism, appeal is constantly made to people’s intuitions about the connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, internalists and externalists disagree considerably about their content. In this paper, we present an empirical study of laymen’s intuitions about this connection. We found that they lend surprisingly little support to the most celebrated versions of internalism, which provide reasons to be skeptical of the evidential basis for these views.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  44. Moral Cognitivism and Motivation.Sigrun Svavarsdottir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.
    The impact moral judgments have on our deliberations and actions seems to vary a great deal. Moral judgments play a large part in the lives of some people, who are apt not only to make them, but also to be guided by them in the sense that they tend to pursue what they judge to be of moral value, and shun what they judge to be of moral disvalue. But it seems unrealistic to claim that moral judgments play a pervasive (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   55 citations  
  45. Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.
    Recently psychologists and experimental philosophers have reported findings showing that in some cases ordinary people's moral intuitions are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of the content of the intuition. Some defend the use of intuition as evidence in ethics by arguing that philosophers are the experts in this area, and philosophers' moral intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. We conducted two experiments indicating that philosophers and non-philosophers do indeed sometimes have (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  46.  63
    The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions.Krist Vaesen, Martin Peterson & Bart Van Bezooijen - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (5):559-578.
    Armchair philosophers have questioned the significance of recent work in experimental philosophy by pointing out that experiments have been conducted on laypeople and undergraduate students. To challenge a practice that relies on expert intuitions, so the armchair objection goes, one needs to demonstrate that expert intuitions rather than those of ordinary people are sensitive to contingent facts such as cultural, linguistic, socio-economic, or educational background. This article does exactly that. Based on two empirical studies on populations of 573 and 203 (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  47.  58
    The Meaning of 'Good'.Donald C. Williams - 1937 - Philosophical Review 46 (4):416-423.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48. The Indifference Argument.Nick Zangwill - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):91 - 124.
    I argue against motivational internalism. First I recharacterise the issue over moral motivation. Second I describe the indifference argument against motivation internalism. Third I consider appeals to irrationality that are often made in the face of this argument, and I show that they are ineffective. Lastly, I draw the motivational externalist conclusion and reflect on the nature of the issue.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations