This book contains important technical innovations, including comparative measures for the testable content, depth, and unity of scientific theories. Originally published in 1984. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich (...) scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

The paper exposes the principal procedures of assessing methodological theories. The first one is based on a consensus about the aims of science, the second uses epistemological criteria, and the third checks the adequacy of methodological requirements against the history of science. This third procedure is singled out for a more detailed treatment. It is argued that rational reconstruction constitutes a separate level of historiography and concerns historical explanation. The subject of a rational reconstruction is the methodological explanation of all (...) basic value judgments, whereas all additional factors are not determined by methodological rules. It is further specified in which way rationally reconstructed history should correspond to the actual course of historical events, i. e. to which extent rational reconstruction is free to interpret history according to methodological categories. In the last paragraph the connection between scientific progress and the growth of knowledge is discussed. (shrink)

William Whewell is considered one of the most important nineteenth-century British philosophers of science and a contributor to modern philosophical thought, particularly regarding the problem of induction and the logic of discovery. In this volume, Robert E. Butts offers selections from Whewell's most important writings, and analysis of counter-claims to his philosophy.

Summary There is a traditional reluctance among methodologists to study the ever increasingly important phenomenon of research-projects, research-project evaluations, etc. The reason for this is that projects are embedded in programs and programs in intellectual frameworks, or conceptual frameworks, or metaphysical systems. It sounds dogmatic to judge the product of research by a reference to a metaphysical system. Yet, first of all, it is not so dogmatic if judgment can go both ways, if we have competing systems at work, and (...) if what we assess is not the outcome of a project but the existing assessments of projects prior to their implementation. Indeed, one of the most obvious things to do is to compare our assessments of projects before and after their implementations. To this end some further theorizing is required. (shrink)