References in work:

David J. Chalmers (2014). Intensions and Indeterminacy: Reply to Soames, Turner, and Wilson.

12 found
Order:
Are we missing references?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add references for the above work:

  1. Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge?D. Barnett - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.
    On two standard views of vagueness, vagueness as to whether Harry is bald entails that nobody knows whether Harry is bald—either because vagueness is a type of missing truth, and so there is nothing to know, or because vagueness is a type of ignorance, and so even though there is a truth of the matter, nobody can know what that truth is. Vagueness as to whether Harry is bald does entail that nobody clearly knows that Harry is bald and that (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  2. Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
  3. The Nature of Epistemic Space.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    There are many ways the world might be, for all I know. For all I know, it might be that there is life on Jupiter, and it might be that there is not. It might be that Australia will win the next Ashes series, and it might be that they will not. It might be that my great-grandfather was my great-grandmother's second cousin, and it might be that he was not. It might be that copper is a compound, and it (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  4. Vagueness Without Ignorance.Cian Dorr - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):83–113.
    I motivate and briefly sketch a linguistic theory of vagueness, on which the notion of indeterminacy is understood in terms of the conventions of language: a sentence is indeterminate iff the conventions of language either forbid asserting it and forbid asserting its negation, under the circumstances, or permit asserting either. I then consider an objection that purports to show that if this theory (or, as far as I can see, any other theory of vagueness that deserved the label "linguistic" were (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  5. Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and Arguments From Epistemic Misclassification.Edward Elliott, Kelvin McQueen & Clas Weber - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):375-389.
    According to Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics (E2D), expressions have a counterfactual intension and an epistemic intension. Epistemic intensions reflect cognitive significance such that sentences with necessary epistemic intensions are a priori. We defend E2D against an influential line of criticism: arguments from epistemic misclassification. We focus in particular on the arguments of Speaks [2010] and Schroeter [2005]. Such arguments conclude that E2D is mistaken from (i) the claim that E2D is committed to classifying certain sentences as a priori, and (ii) the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  6.  77
    Vagueness and the Mind of God.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):1 - 25.
    This paper examines the mind and language of an omniscient being from a supervaluationist perspective. Two questions hall receive special attention. How ought the supervaluationist explicate the concept of omniscience? And what ought the supervaluationist expect an omniscient speaker to say about a Sorites series?
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  7.  57
    Epistemic Intensions.Scott Soames - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):220-228.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8. Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism.Scott Soames - 2005 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    In this book, Scott Soames defends the revolution in philosophy led by Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and David Kaplan against attack from those wishing to revive ..
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   40 citations  
  9.  96
    No Easy Argument for Two-Dimensionalism.Jeff Speaks - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):775-781.
    Some opponents of epistemic two-dimensionalism say that the view should be rejected on the grounds that it misclassifies certain a posteriori claims as a priori. Elliott, McQueen, & Weber [2013] have argued that any argument of this form must fail. I argue that this conclusion is mistaken, and defend my argument [Speaks (2010] against their criticisms.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10. Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and the Epistemic Argument.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):59 – 78.
    One of Kripke's fundamental objections to descriptivism was that the theory misclassifies certain _a posteriori_ propositions expressed by sentences involving names as _a priori_. Though nowadays very few philosophers would endorse a descriptivism of the sort that Kripke criticized, many find two-dimensional semantics attractive as a kind of successor theory. Because two-dimensionalism needn't be a form of descriptivism, it is not open to the epistemic argument as formulated by Kripke; but the most promising versions of two-dimensionalism are open to a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  11.  51
    Scrying an Indeterminate World.Jason Turner - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):229-237.
  12.  83
    David Chalmers Versus the Boll Weevil.Mark Wilson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):238-248.