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  1. Psychological Eudaimonism and Interpretation in Greek Ethics.Mark Lebar & Nathaniel Goldberg - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy:287-319.
    Plato extends a bold, confident, and surprising empirical challenge. It is implicitly a claim about the psychological — more specifically motivational — economies of human beings, asserting that within each such economy there is a desire to live well. Call this claim ‘psychological eudaimonism’ (‘PE’). Further, the context makes clear that Plato thinks that this desire dominates in those who have it. In other words, the desire to live well can reliably be counted on (when accompanied with correct beliefs about (...)
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  • Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche.Jon Moline - 1978 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60 (1):1-26.
  • Socrates' Kantian Conception of Virtue.Daniel Devereux - 1995 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (3):381-408.
  • Plato on the Attribution of Conative Attitudes.Rachana Kamtekar - 2006 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (2):127-162.
    Plato’s Socrates famously claims that we want (bou9lesqai) the good, rather than what we think good (Gorgias 468bd). My paper seeks to answer some basic questions about this well-known but little-understood claim: what does the claim mean, and what is its philosophical motivation and significance? How does the claim relate to Socrates’ claim that we desire (e7piqumei=n)1 things that we think are good, which..
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  • Knowledge Vs True Belief in the Socratic Psychology of Action.Terry Penner - 1996 - Apeiron 29 (3):199 - 230.
  • Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
    It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...)
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  • The Socratic Paradoxes.Gerasimos Santas - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (2):147-164.
  • No One Errs Willingly: The Meaning of Socratic Intellectualism.Heda Segvic - 2000 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19:1-45.
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  • Pleasure and Illusion in Plato.Jessica Moss - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):503 - 535.
    Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but (...)
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  • Platonic Pessimism and Moral Education.Dominic Scott - 1999 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17 (15-36).
  • Why Externalism is Not a Problem for Ethical Intuitionists.Philip Stratton-Lake - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):77–90.
    Ethical intuitionists are often criticised on the ground that their view makes it possible for an agent to believe that she ought to ? whilst lacking any motive to ?-that is, on the ground that it involves, or implies a form of externalism. I begin by distinguishing this form of externalism (what I call 'belief externalism') from two other forms of ethical externalism-moral externalism, and reasons externalism. I then consider various reasons why one might think that ethical intuitionism is defective (...)
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  • Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul.Jessica Moss - 2005 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29:137-170.
  • Calculating Machines or Leaky Jars? The Moral Psychology of Plato's Gorgias.Gabriela Roxana Carone - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26:55-96.
  • Socrates on Goods and Happiness.George Klosko - 1987 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (3):251 - 264.
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  • Belief de Re and de Dicto.Justin Broackes - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (144):374-383.
  • Parmenides' Two Ways.F. M. Cornford - 1933 - Classical Quarterly 27 (02):97-.
    The object of this paper is to determine the relations between the two parts of Parmenides' poem: the Way of Truth, which deduces the necessary properties of a One Being, and the False Way, which contains a cosmogony based on ‘what seems to mortals, in which there is no true belief.’.
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