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Richard Yetter Chappell & Helen Yetter-Chappell (2016). Virtue and Salience.

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  1. Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
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  2. Moral Perception and Particularity.Lawrence Blum - 1991 - Ethics 101 (4):701-725.
    Most contemporary moral philosophy is concerned with issues of rationality, universality, impartiality, and principle. By contrast Laurence Blum is concerned with the psychology of moral agency. The essays in this collection examine the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgment, perception, and group identifications, and explore how all these psychic capacities contribute to a morally good life. Blum takes up the challenge of Iris Murdoch to articulate a vision of moral excellence that provides a worthy aspiration for human beings. Drawing on (...)
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  3. Modesty as a Virtue of Attention.Nicolas Bommarito - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):93-117.
    The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in certain ways. By analyzing modesty in this way, we (...)
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    Modesty Without Illusion.Jason Brennan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):111-128.
    The common image of the fully virtuous person is of someone with perfect self-command and self-perception, who always makes correct evaluations. However, modesty appears to be areal virtue, and it seems contradictory for someone to believe that she is modest. Accordingly, traditional defenders of phronesis (the view that virtue involves practical wisdom) deny that modesty is a virtue, while defenders of modesty such as Julia Driver deny that phronesis is required for virtue. I offer a new theory of modesty-the two (...)
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    Modesty and Ignorance.Julia Driver - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4):827-834.
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    The Virtues of Ignorance.Julia Driver - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (7):373.
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  7. Famine Ethics: The Problem of Distance in Morality and Singer's Ethical Theory.Frances Kamm - 1999 - In Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 174--203.
     
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  8. Friendship and Belief.Simon Keller - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):329-351.
    I intend to argue that good friendship sometimes requires epistemic irresponsibility. To put it another way, it is not always possible to be both a good friend and a diligent believer.
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    Why IS Modesty a Virtue?G. F. Schueler - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4):835-841.
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    Why Modesty is a Virtue.G. F. Schueler - 1997 - Ethics 107 (3):467-485.
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  11. Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
    As I write this, in November 1971, people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical caxc. The suffering and death that are occurring there now axe not inevitable, 1101; unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond Lhe capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to (...)
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  12. Famine, Affluence, and Virtue.Michael Slote - 2007 - In Rebecca L. Walker & P. J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems. Oxford University Press. pp. 279.
     
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  13. Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.
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