'Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences - the primary focus of most other contemporary theorists. This volume brings together a dozen essays published between 1957 and 1977, and includes two new ones as well. In the first, Foot argues explicitly for an ethic of virtue, and in the next five discusses abortion, euthanasia, free will/determination, and the ethics of Hume and (...) Nietzsche. The final eight essays chart her growing disenchantment with emotivism and prescriptivism and their account of moral arguments. All the essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue... Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle, ingenious, and some of them important.' Choice. (shrink)

Normative theories of obligation, moral and nonmoral value, and meta-ethical issues and theories are considered.

"Cornell Paperback." Includes index. Bibliography: p. 163-165.

This classic and controversial book examines the roots of the idea of virtue, diagnoses the reasons for its absence in modern life, and proposes a path for its recovery.

The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...) the differences between the well-Known english writers on moral philosophy from sidgwick to the present day are of little importance." (staff). (shrink)

"Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences--the primary focus of most other contemporary moral theorists....[These] essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue. Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle..."--Choice.

In his Carus Lectures, given in 1974 and printed in this journal in January 1980, W. K. Frankena attacks a number of philosophers who belong, he says, to a recent ‘Movement’ in moral philosophy. As there are many of us in the Movement, as e.g., Elizabeth Anscombe, Geoffrey Warnock, Anthony Quinton and myself, I shall not try to unravel the complications of our similarities and differences. No doubt others will be answering for themselves, and I shall deal only with arguments (...) particularly directed against me. It goes without saying that I am grateful to Frankena for giving my work a good deal of attention. Moreover, at certain points I share his uneasiness about theses that I have put forward, and especially about some of the things that I said in an article called ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ published in the Philosophical Review in 1972. I am sure that there is something wrong with that article, and my only doubt is as to whether Frankena’s own moral theories can help us to put it right. (shrink)

In his Carus Lectures, given in 1974 and printed in this journal in January 1980, W. K. Frankena attacks a number of philosophers who belong, he says, to a recent ‘Movement’ in moral philosophy. As there are many of us in the Movement, as e.g., Elizabeth Anscombe, Geoffrey Warnock, Anthony Quinton and myself, I shall not try to unravel the complications of our similarities and differences. No doubt others will be answering for themselves, and I shall deal only with arguments (...) particularly directed against me. It goes without saying that I am grateful to Frankena for giving my work a good deal of attention. Moreover, at certain points I share his uneasiness about theses that I have put forward, and especially about some of the things that I said in an article called ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ published in the Philosophical Review in 1972. I am sure that there is something wrong with that article, and my only doubt is as to whether Frankena’s own moral theories can help us to put it right. (shrink)

Reissue of Becker's 1973 monograph, which argues the following: Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited. The thesis of _On Justifying Moral Judgments_ insists, on the contrary, that rigorous (...) justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology, and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the ‘is-ought’ issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of argument. (shrink)

Selected by Christianity Today as one of the 100 most important books on religion of the twentieth century. Leading theological ethicist Stanley Hauerwas shows how discussions of Christology and the authority of scripture involve questions about what kind of community the church must be to rightly tell the stories of God. He challenges the dominant assumption of contemporary Christian social ethics that there is a special relation between Christianity and some form of liberal democratic social system.