Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

In present day ecology, competition is a subject typically generating controversies that pervade the whole field. Ecology is concerned with relations between organisms and their environment. As the environment of any organism has biotic besides physical components, relations between organisms are obviously important. Competition is one of them. According to many ecologists it crucially affects the fate of populations and species. Precisely this assumption has led to vigorous debates (cf. Lewin 1984).I intend to show that elementary methodological analysis could easily (...) dissolve the controversy. Methodology, indeed, has not always been brought to bear on biology as it should. This point is elaborated at the end of the paper.Ecologists use a variety of descriptive units, beside individual organisms. Here the population - a group of individual organisms of the same species and the community - a group of populations are of special importance. (shrink)

The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a robust (...) argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the "reviewed view" of scientific explanation to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts. (shrink)

In this sequence of philosophical essays about natural science, the author argues that fundamental explanatory laws, the deepest and most admired successes of modern physics, do not in fact describe regularities that exist in nature. Cartwright draws from many real-life examples to propound a novel distinction: that theoretical entities, and the complex and localized laws that describe them, can be interpreted realistically, but the simple unifying laws of basic theory cannot.

In this collection of essays, some of the leading ecologists and philosophers discuss the foundations of ecology and evolutionary biology. While large scale philosophical convictions and attitudes often direct the theorist's line of concrete action in data collection and in theory information, the founda tional convictions typically remain tacit, and are seldom argued for. The present collection aims to remedy this situation. It brings together scholars representing different approaches in a joint effort to explicate and analyse some of the key (...) issues underlying ecological theorizing, be they conceptual, epistemological or ontological. The bulk of the present collection is reprinted from Synthese 43 (1980). William C. Wimsatt's paper 'Reductionistic Research Strategies and Their Biases in the Units of Selection Controversy' is in turn reprinted from T. Nickles (ed.) Scientific Discovery: Case Studies (D. Reidel, 1980). It appears here with the kind permission of Prof. Nickles. The publisher's consent for the reprints has been in each case automatic. The essays of Y rjo Haila and Olli Jarvinen, and of Leigh M. Van Valen appear here for the first time. In bringing the present collection together, as well as in editing the Synthese symposium on which it is based, I have greatly benefited from the suggestions of Professors Marjorie Grene, Olli J iirvinen and Daniel Simberloff. In addition to them, I wish to thank all the contributors for their interest in this project. (shrink)

Comprehensive evaluation and study of man's theories and knowledge of genetical characteristics and the evolutionary processes.

Studdert-Kennedy, Gerald, Evidence and Explanation in Social Science. ... Kauffman, Stuart, "Articulation of Parts Explanation in Biology and the Rational ...

What is the role (or roles) of mathematical theory in ecology and evolutionary biology? How does the construction of such theory advance our understanding? The lack of clear answers to this pair of questions has been a source of controversy both within the sciences themselves, and in the philosophical discussions of these sciences as well. In an attempt to shed some light on these issues, I look at what some biologists have had to say on the matter and at some (...) particular examples. I then draw some morals about the constraints on a successful philosophical treatment of the problem and on the limitations of current philosophical approaches to this type of theoretical explanation. (shrink)

Ever since ecology's inception, the concept of competition has generated discussion. Recent discussions have focused on the role of interspecific competition in shaping the structure of ecological communities. More in particular, ecologists are split up over the validity of a method that is currently in vogue to discredit explanations of community structure in terms of competition theory. An analysis of this controversy is presented which attempts to show that the discussions so far have focused on the wrong issues. Not the (...) method's ability to generate alternative explanations should be questioned, but its ability to generate superior explanations. The impact of Popperian philosophy of science on the dispute is briefly discussed. (shrink)

Although consensus appears to be on the horizon, the foundations of the theory of natural selection remain a matter of controversy. This paper looks at two recent challenges to the emerging "received view" of this theory. It argues that different views of the nature of scientific explanation are playing a pivotal role in the debates. Do explanations in biology fit the covering-law paradigm? What are the explanatory laws of biology like? Until agreement is reached on these fundamental questions, there is (...) little prospect for consensus on the foundations of the theory of natural selection. Furthermore, the three alternative positions identified in this paper each face serious challenges. (shrink)

One of the largest uncharted seas in contemporary philosophy of biology involves the structure and foundations of the science of ecology. In this work, I begin the project of developing a philosophical account of this science, and I extend the account along one important dimension--the relationship between ecology and evolution. The discussion of ecology focuses on the questions, styles of investigation and explanatory strategies which have, historically, given shape to the discipline. Ecology emerges as a science with two basic subject (...) matters: the dynamics of energy and matter in biological systems and the study of organisms and their environments. Organism ecology can be further subdivided into three broad categories of focus--the properties of individuals, the dynamics of populations and the structure of biological communities. Discussion at this level of analysis represents an important first step in thinking about ecology, but it also reveals a number of subsidiary projects, and it is these more particular studies which are crucial to a truly clear understanding of the nature of the science. The relationship between ecology and evolutionary biology is one such project. I investigate this issue by developing a model of the overall structure of evolutionary biology, and then describing the multi-faceted role which ecology plays in this structure. ;Not surprisingly, investigating the foundations of ecology generates new challenges for existing philosophical theory. In the course of this investigation I critically examine some central concepts in the philosophy of science. For example, the analysis provides further evidence that the "natural kinds" for philosophy of science must include more than the concept of a scientific theory. I also argue for a two virtue theory of scientific explanation. Deductive subsumption under more general principles and telling the causal story have historically been regarded as alternative explications of explanatory virtue. I see them as two essential ingredients in any adequate theory of explanation. (shrink)