Tom Birch has decisively transformed the so-called “considerability” question by arguing that all things must be “considerable” from the start in “the root sense” if we are to determine what further kinds of value they may have. Spelling out this kind of “root” or “deep” consideration proves to be difficult, however, especially in light of post-Kantian conceptions of mind. Such consideration may also ask of the world too ready a kind of self-revelation. This paper proposes another, complementary version of universal (...) consideration: as a kind of practical invitation, as a way of creating the space within which a response can emerge or an exchange coevolve. I conclude by locating this vision within a picture of ethics as a whole that brings what I call its “originary” stage, rather than its formal stage, into focus. (shrink)

From the book: What is to be done with political ecology? Nothing. What is to be done? Political ecology!

I offer an epistemologically grounded revisioning of Tom Birch’s ethical principle of universal consideration, suggesting that epistemologies have ethical dimensions and hence that universal moral consideration is intrinsic to the epistemological enterprise. I contrast epistemologies of domination with epistemologies in part constituted by the generosity of spirit that is the hallmark of Birch’s notion of universal consideration.

An ethics-based epistemology is necessary for environmental philosophy—a sharply different approach from the epistemology-based ethics that the field has inherited, mostly implicitly, from mainstream ethics. In this paper, we try to uncover this inherited epistemology and point toward an alternative. In section two, we outline a general contrast between an ethics-based epistemology and an epistemology-based ethics. In section three, we examine the relationship between ethics and epistemology in an ethics-based epistemology, drawing extensively on examples from indigenous cultures. We briefly explore (...) several striking implications of an ethics-based epistemology in sections four and five. (shrink)

An ethics-based epistemology is necessary for environmental philosophy—a sharply different approach from the epistemology-based ethics that the field has inherited, mostly implicitly, from mainstream ethics. In this paper, we try to uncover this inherited epistemology and point toward an alternative. In section two, we outline a general contrast between an ethics-based epistemology and an epistemology-based ethics. In section three, we examine the relationship between ethics and epistemology in an ethics-based epistemology, drawing extensively on examples from indigenous cultures. We briefly explore (...) several striking implications of an ethics-based epistemology in sections four and five. (shrink)

One of the central, abiding, and unresolved questions in environmental ethics has focused on the criterion for moral considerability or practical respect. In this essay, I call that question itself into question and argue that the search for this criterion should be abandoned because (1) it presupposes the ethical legitimacy of the Western project of planetary domination, (2) the philosophical methods that are andshould be used to address the question properly involve giving consideration in a root sense to everything, (3) (...) the history of the question suggests that it must be kept open, and (4) our deontic experience, the original source of ethical obligations, requires approaching all others, of all sorts, with a mindfulness that is clean of any a priori criterion of respect and positive value. The good work that has been doneon the question should be reconceived as having established rules for the normal, daily consideration of various kinds of others. Giving consideration in the root sense should be separated from giving high regard or positive value to what is considered. Overall, in this essay I argue that universal consideration—giving attention to others of all sorts, with the goal of ascertaining what, if any, direct ethical obligations arise from relating with them—should be adopted as one of the central constitutive principles of practical reasonableness. (shrink)

Moving from Heidegger’s suggestion that philosophy has fallen into the Thaletian well because of its inadequate theorization of the essence of things, I retrace in Heidegger’s description of things as gathering elements that enable a discourse on things in terms of their alterity,· I explore the richness of such an alterity in its differing from Levinas’s otherness of the other person; I suggest the formulation of an ethics of things which, through a reciprocal exposure of Heidegger and Levinas, might rescue (...) philosophy from its fall into the Thaletian well.Suite à la thèse de Heidegger selon laquelle la philosophie, depuis qu’elle théorise I’essence des choses, aurait chuté dans le puits de Thalès, j’identifie, à partir de la description heideggérienne de la chose comme rassemblement, les elements qui rendent possible un discours sur les choses en tant qu’altérité. J’explore la richesse d’une telle altérité en ce qu’elle diffire de I’altérité lévinassienne de I’autre personne. Je propose la formulation d’une ethique des choses qui, par I’éclaircissement réciproque de Heidegger et de Lévinas, pourrait prévenir la chute de la philosophie dans le puits de Thalès. (shrink)

Moving from Heidegger’s suggestion that philosophy has fallen into the Thaletian well because of its inadequate theorization of the essence of things, I retrace in Heidegger’s description of things as gathering elements that enable a discourse on things in terms of their alterity,· I explore the richness of such an alterity in its differing from Levinas’s otherness of the other person; I suggest the formulation of an ethics of things which, through a reciprocal exposure of Heidegger and Levinas, might rescue (...) philosophy from its fall into the Thaletian well.Suite à la thèse de Heidegger selon laquelle la philosophie, depuis qu’elle théorise I’essence des choses, aurait chuté dans le puits de Thalès, j’identifie, à partir de la description heideggérienne de la chose comme rassemblement, les elements qui rendent possible un discours sur les choses en tant qu’altérité. J’explore la richesse d’une telle altérité en ce qu’elle diffire de I’altérité lévinassienne de I’autre personne. Je propose la formulation d’une ethique des choses qui, par I’éclaircissement réciproque de Heidegger et de Lévinas, pourrait prévenir la chute de la philosophie dans le puits de Thalès. (shrink)

Recognized as a landmark of twentieth century intellectual history, I and Thou is Buber's masterpiece.

Speaking/Writing of God explores the manner in which religious language develops in answer to the challenges and promise of three features of the life with others: the encounter between persons, the quest by Jewish women to be accepted—including their distinctiveness/otherness as women—as full participants in Jewish communal life, and the dialogue between Jews and non-Jews. Although a major stream of modern Jewish philosophy has focused on the transcendent dimension of the relationship between persons, this book studies the contribution of feminist (...) Judaism to modern Jewish philosophy and the impact of religious pluralism on Jewish religious life and thought. (shrink)

Those nonhuman beings called "animals" pose philosophical and ethical questions that go to the root not just of what we think but of who we are. Their presence asks: what happens when "the other" can no longer safely be assumed to be human? This collection offers a set of incitements and coordinates for exploring how these issues have been represented in contemporary culture and theory, from Jurassic Park and the "horse whisperer" Monty Roberts, to the work of artists such as (...) Joseph Beuys and William Wegman; from foundational texts on the animal in the works of Heidegger and Freud, to the postmodern rethinking of ethics and animals in figures such as Singer, Deleuze, Lyotard, and Levinas; from the New York Times investigation of a North Carolina slaughterhouse, to the first appearance in any language of Jacques Derrida's recent detailed critique of Lacan's rendering of the human/animal divide. (shrink)

This elevating pull of an ethics that can account for the relation of self and other without reducing either term is the central theme of these essays.

The fifty-seven original essays in this book provide a comprehensive overview of the interdisciplinary field of animal cognition.

I offer an epistemologically grounded revisioning of Tom Birch’s ethical principle of universal consideration, suggesting that epistemologies have ethical dimensions and hence that universal moral consideration is intrinsic to the epistemological enterprise. I contrast epistemologies of domination with epistemologies in part constituted by the generosity of spirit that is the hallmark of Birch’s notion of universal consideration.

Tom Birch has decisively transformed the so-called “considerability” question by arguing that all things must be “considerable” from the start in “the root sense” if we are to determine what further kinds of value they may have. Spelling out this kind of “root” or “deep” consideration proves to be difficult, however, especially in light of post-Kantian conceptions of mind. Such consideration may also ask of the world too ready a kind of self-revelation. This paper proposes another, complementary version of universal (...) consideration: as a kind of practical invitation, as a way of creating the space within which a response can emerge or an exchange coevolve. I conclude by locating this vision within a picture of ethics as a whole that brings what I call its “originary” stage, rather than its formal stage, into focus. (shrink)

One of the central, abiding, and unresolved questions in environmental ethics has focused on the criterion for moral considerability or practical respect. In this essay, I call that question itself into question and argue that the search for this criterion should be abandoned because it presupposes the ethical legitimacy of the Western project of planetary domination, the philosophical methods that are andshould be used to address the question properly involve giving consideration in a root sense to everything, the history of (...) the question suggests that it must be kept open, and our deontic experience, the original source of ethical obligations, requires approaching all others, of all sorts, with a mindfulness that is clean of any a priori criterion of respect and positive value. The good work that has been doneon the question should be reconceived as having established rules for the normal, daily consideration of various kinds of others. Giving consideration in the root sense should be separated from giving high regard or positive value to what is considered. Overall, in this essay I argue that universal consideration—giving attention to others of all sorts, with the goal of ascertaining what, if any, direct ethical obligations arise from relating with them—should be adopted as one of the central constitutive principles of practical reasonableness. (shrink)