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  1. Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
    1. Presumably the point of, say, inculcating a moral outlook lies in a concern with how people live. It may seem that the very idea of a moral outlook makes room for, and requires, the existence of moral theory, conceived as a discipline which seeks to formulate acceptable principles of conduct. It is then natural to think of ethics as a branch of philosophy related to moral theory, so conceived, rather as the philosophy of science is related to science. On (...)
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  • The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald DE SOUSA - 1987 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (4):302-303.
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  • The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald de Sousa, Jing-Song Ma & Vincent Shen - 1987 - Philosophy and Culture 32 (10):35-66.
    How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...)
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  • From Appropriate Emotions to Values.Kevin Mulligan - 1998 - The Monist 81 (1):161-188.
    There are at least three well-known accounts of value and evaluations which assign a central role to emotions. There is first of all the emotivist view, according to which evaluations express or manifest emotional states or attitudes but have no truth values. Second is the dispositionalist view, according to which to possess a value or axiological property is to be capable of provoking or to be likely to provoke emotional responses in subjects characterised in certain ways. Third, there is an (...)
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  • How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
  • Errors About Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution.Gopal Sreenivasan - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):47-68.
    This paper examines the implications of certain social psychological experiments for moral theory—specifically, for virtue theory. Gilbert Harman and John Doris have recently argued that the empirical evidence offered by ‘situationism’ demonstrates that there is no such thing as a character trait. I dispute this conclusion. My discussion focuses on the proper interpretation of the experimental data—the data themselves I grant for the sake of argument. I develop three criticisms of the anti-trait position. Of these, the central criticism concerns three (...)
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  • The Nonexistence of Character Traits.Gilbert Harman - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):223–226.
  • Emotions and Formal Objects.Fabrice Teroni - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
    It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that (...)
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  • Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error.Gilbert Harman - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999):315-331.
    Ordinary moral thought often commits what social psychologists call 'the fundamental attribution error '. This is the error of ignoring situational factors and overconfidently assuming that distinctive behaviour or patterns of behaviour are due to an agent's distinctive character traits. In fact, there is no evidence that people have character traits in the relevant sense. Since attribution of character traits leads to much evil, we should try to educate ourselves and others to stop doing it.
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  • Character Traits in Explanation.Douglas Butler - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):215-238.
  • Emotion, Perception and Perspective.Julien A. Deonna - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.
    Abstract The content of an emotion, unlike the content of a perception, is directly dependent on the motivational set of the subject experiencing the emotion. Given the instability of this motivational set, it might be thought that there is no sense in which emotions can be said to pick up information about the environment in the same way that perception does. Whereas it is admitted that perception tracks for us what is the case in the environment, no such tracking relation, (...)
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  • Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character.Rachana Kamtekar - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):458-491.
    Situationist social psychologists tell us that information about people’s distinctive character traits, opinions, attitudes, values, or past behavior is not as useful for determining what they will do as is information about the details of their situations.1 One would expect, they say, that the possessor of a given character trait (such as helpfulness) would behave consistently (helpfully) across situations that are similar in calling for the relevant (helping) behavior, but under experimental conditions, people’s behavior is not found to be cross-situationally (...)
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  • Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology.Maria Merritt - 2000 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4):365-383.
    In this paper I examine and reply to a deflationary challenge brought against virtue ethics. The challenge comes from critics who are impressed by recent psychological evidence suggesting that much of what we take to be virtuous conduct is in fact elicited by narrowly specific social settings, as opposed to being the manifestation of robust individual character. In answer to the challenge, I suggest a conception of virtue that openly acknowledges the likelihood of its deep, ongoing dependence upon particular social (...)
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  • The Structure of Virtue.R. B. Brandt - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):64-82.
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  • Character Traits and Desires.Stephen D. Hudson - 1980 - Ethics 90 (4):539-549.
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  • The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
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