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  1. The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.
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  • Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
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  • Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle.Michael B. Burke - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):129-139.
    Dion is a full-bodied man. Theon is that part of him which consists of all of him except his left foot. What becomes of Dion and Theon when Dion’s left foot is amputated? Employing the doctrine of sortal essentialism, I defend a surprising answer last defended by Chrysippus: that Dion survives while the seemingly unscathed Theon perishes. For replies to critics, see my publications of 1997 and (especially) 2004.
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  • Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’.Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):189-207.
    In this essay I explore the idea that the solution to some important problems of personal identity lies in the philosophy of language: more precisely in the nature of first-person reference. I will argue that the “linguistic solution” is at best partly successful.
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  • Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.
  • Collective Responsibility and Collective Obligation.Tracy Isaacs - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):40-57.
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  • Self-Made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
    The Problem of Overlappers is a puzzle about what makes it the case, and how we can know, that we have the parts we intuitively think we have. In this paper, I develop and motivate an overlooked solution to this puzzle. According to what I call the self-making view it is within our power to decide what we refer to with the personal pronoun ‘I’, so the truth of most of our beliefs about our parts is ensured by the very (...)
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  • Thinking Animals and Epistemology.Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):310-314.
    We consider one of Eric Olson's chief arguments for animalism about personal identity: the view that we are each identical to a human animal. The argument was originally given in Olson's book The Human Animal . Olson's argument presupposes an epistemological premise which we examine in detail. We argue that the premise is implausible and that Olson's defense of animalism is therefore in trouble.
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  • Ethics and the Generous Ontology.Eric T. Olson - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):259-270.
    According to a view attractive to both metaphysicians and ethicists, every period in a person’s life is the life of a being just like that person except that it exists only during that period. These “subpeople” appear to have moral status, and their interests seem to clash with ours: though it may be in some person’s interests to sacrifice for tomorrow, it is not in the interests of a subperson coinciding with him only today, who will never benefit from it. (...)
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  • Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.
    A property, F, is maximal i?, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical superve- nience by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that conscious- ness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic.
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  • The Structure of Gunk: Adventures in the Ontology of Space.Jeffery Sanford Russell - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 4.
     
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  • Against Narrativity.Galen Strawson - unknown
  • A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):148-151.
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  • The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.Maximilian Degaynesford - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):170-174.
  • An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.H. R. Smart - 1925 - Philosophical Review 34 (4):413.
  • The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?Mark Johnston - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):617-644.
  • A New Problem of the Many.Neil McKinnon - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):80-97.
    Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' has elicited many responses over the past quarter of a century. Here I present a new problem of the many. This new problem, I claim, is resistant to the solutions cunently on offer for Unger's problem.
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  • An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):221-222.
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  • What Are We?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
    This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer.
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  • Maximality and Consciousness.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):150-158.
    Being conscious is intrinsic. Suppose P, a conscious human being, “shrinks” by losing an atom from her left index finger. Suppose that at the very first instant at which P has lost that atom, the atoms that then compose her remain just as they were immediately before “the loss.” This implies—assuming MS for reductio—that, just as those atoms compose a conscious object after the loss, so they composed a conscious object before the loss. Name that latter object ‘the atom-complement’.
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  • Collective Obligations: Their Existence, Their Explanatory Power, and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals.Bill Wringe - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):472-497.
    In this paper I discuss a number of different relationships between two kinds of obligation: those which have individuals as their subject, and those which have groups of individuals as their subject. I use the name collective obligations to refer to obligations of the second sort. I argue that there are collective obligations, in this sense; that such obligations can give rise to and explain obligations which fall on individuals; that because of these facts collective obligations are not simply reducible (...)
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  • Multiplicity, Self-Narrative, and Akrasia.Jeff Sebo - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):589-605.
    In this paper, I present a new account of akrasia based on the idea that human psychology and self-narrativity are more complex and layered than we have traditionally thought. I begin by arguing that, if we have at least some different beliefs, desires, preferences, etc. in different situations, then we can rationally do what we think, at the time of action, is best for, or from the standpoint of, “part of me” while acting contrary to what we think, at the (...)
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  • What We Together Ought to Do.Alexander Dietz - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):955-982.
    I argue that we have not only individual reasons for action but also collective reasons for action: reasons which apply to us as a group. I next argue that if we together have a reason to act, then I may have a reason to do my part, but only when others will do theirs. Finally, I argue that collective reasons to do good can never make a difference to what individuals ought to do, but that other kinds of collective reasons (...)
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  • A Materialist Metaphysic of the Human Person.Hud Hudson - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):713-723.
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  • Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons.David O. Brink - 1997 - In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. pp. 96--134.
  • Selves and Moral Units.David W. Shoemaker - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):391-419.
    Derek Parfit claims that, at certain times and places, the metaphysical units he labels *'selves" may be thought of as the morally significant units (I.e., the objects of moral concern) for such things as resource distribution, moral responsibility, commitments, etc. But his concept of the self is problematic in important respects, and it remains unclear just why and how this entity should count as a moral unit in the first place. In developing a view I call *'Moderate Reductionism," I attempt (...)
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  • The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?1.Mark Johnston - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):617-644.
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  • The Just Soul.Jeff Sebo - 2015 - Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):131-143.
    Many philosophers think that, if your “day self” and “night self” are physically, psychologically, and narratively continuous with each other, then they are the same unit of moral concern. But I argue that your day self and night self can share all of these relations and still be different units of moral concern, on the grounds that they can share all of these relations and still be in the circumstances of justice. I then argue that this conception of the scope (...)
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  • What Would Teleological Causation Be?John Hawthorne & Daniel Nolan - 2006 - In Metaphysical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    As is well known, Aristotelian natural philosophy, and many other systems of natural philosophy since, have relied heavily on teleology and teleological causation. Somehow, the purpose or end of an obj ect can be used to predict and explain what that object does: once you know that the end of an acorn is to become an oak, and a few things about what sorts of circumstances are conducive to the attainment of this end, you can predict a lot about the (...)
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  • Postscripts to “Survival and Identity'.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - In Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press. pp. 73--77.
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