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  1. Is human information processing conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
    Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed (...)
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  • Analyzing vision at the complexity level.John K. Tsotsos - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (3):423-445.
    The general problem of visual search can be shown to be computationally intractable in a formal, complexity-theoretic sense, yet visual search is extensively involved in everyday perception, and biological systems manage to perform it remarkably well. Complexity level analysis may resolve this contradiction. Visual search can be reshaped into tractability through approximations and by optimizing the resources devoted to visual processing. Architectural constraints can be derived using the minimum cost principle to rule out a large class of potential solutions. The (...)
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  • Change blindness and priming: When it does and does not occur.Michael E. Silverman & Arien Mack - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):409-422.
    In a series of three experiments, we explored the nature of implicit representations in change blindness . Using 3 × 3 letter arrays, we asked subjects to locate changes in paired arrays separated by 80 ms ISIs, in which one, two or three letters of a row in the second array changed. In one testing version, a tone followed the second array, signaling a row for partial report . In the other version, no PR was required. After Ss reported whether (...)
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  • From simple associations to systematic reasoning: A connectionist representation of rules, variables, and dynamic binding using temporal synchrony.Lokendra Shastri & Venkat Ajjanagadde - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):417-51.
    Human agents draw a variety of inferences effortlessly, spontaneously, and with remarkable efficiency – as though these inferences were a reflexive response of their cognitive apparatus. Furthermore, these inferences are drawn with reference to a large body of background knowledge. This remarkable human ability seems paradoxical given the complexity of reasoning reported by researchers in artificial intelligence. It also poses a challenge for cognitive science and computational neuroscience: How can a system of simple and slow neuronlike elements represent a large (...)
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  • Neural darwinism and consciousness.Anil K. Seth & Bernard J. Baars - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):140-168.
    Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the ‘dynamic core’). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized (...)
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  • How to Study Consciousness Scientifically.John Searle - 1998 - Brain Research Reviews 26:379-387.
  • A neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness.Jesse Prinz - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):243-59.
    This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the (...)
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  • What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
  • Towards a true neural stance on consciousness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.
  • A field theory of consciousness.E. Roy John - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):184-213.
    This article summarizes a variety of current as well as previous research in support of a new theory of consciousness. Evidence has been steadily accumulating that information about a stimulus complex is distributed to many neuronal populations dispersed throughout the brain and is represented by the departure from randomness of the temporal pattern of neural discharges within these large ensembles. Zero phase lag synchronization occurs between discharges of neurons in different brain regions and is enhanced by presentation of stimuli. This (...)
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  • Consciousness and its (dis)contents.Jeffrey A. Gray - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):703-722.
    The first claim in the target article was that there is as yet no transparent, causal account of the relations between consciousness and brain-and-behaviour. That claim remains firm. The second claim was that the contents of consciousness consist, psychologically, of the outputs of a comparator system; the third consisted of a description of the brain mechanisms proposed to instantiate the comparator. In order to defend these claims against criticism, it has been necessary to clarify the distinction between consciousness-as-such and the (...)
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  • Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The transient hypofrontality hypothesis.A. Dietrich - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):231-256.
    It is the central hypothesis of this paper that the mental states commonly referred to as altered states of consciousness are principally due to transient prefrontal cortex deregulation. Supportive evidence from psychological and neuroscientific studies of dreaming, endurance running, meditation, daydreaming, hypnosis, and various drug-induced states is presented and integrated. It is proposed that transient hypofrontality is the unifying feature of all altered states and that the phenomenological uniqueness of each state is the result of the differential viability of various (...)
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  • Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy.Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur & Claire Sergent - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.
    Amidst the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of those dissenting results. On the basis of a minimal neuro-computational model, the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a (...)
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  • On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • Mad pain and Martian pain.David Lewis - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Harvard University Press. pp. 216-222.
  • Attention: The mechanisms of consciousness.Michael I. Posner - 1994 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Usa 91:7398-7403.
  • Consciousness.Adam Z. J. Zeman - 2001 - Brain 124 (7):1263-89.
  • The coherence definition of consciousness.Christoph von der Malsburg - 1997 - In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press. pp. 193-204.
    I will focus in this essay on a riddle that in my view is central to the consciousness issue: How does the mind or brain create the unity we perceive out of the diversity that we know is there? I contend this is a technical issue, not a philosophical one, although its resolution will have profound philosophical repercussions, and although we have at present little more than the philosophical method to attack it.
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  • The cognitive unconscious.John F. Kihlstrom - 1987 - Science 237:1445-1452.
  • A framework for consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 2003 - Nature Neuroscience 6:119-26.
  • Ongoing spontaneous activity controls access to consciousness: A neuronal model for inattentional blindness.Jean-Pierre Changeux & Stanislas Dehaene - 2005 - PLoS Biology 3 (5):e141.
    1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France.
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  • Lucid dreaming: Physiological correlates of consciousness during Rem sleep.S. LaBerge, L. Levitan & W. C. Dement - 1986 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 7 (2-3):251-258.
  • Concepts of consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1983 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 4 (1):195-232.
  • Neural correlates of conscious and unconscious vision in parietal extinction.Geraint Rees, E. Wojciulik, Karen Clarke, Masud Husain & Christopher D. Frith - 2002 - Neurocase 8 (5):387-393.
  • The neural time factor in conscious and unconscious events.Benjamin W. Libet - 1993 - In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). pp. 174--123.
  • Consciousness and the brain: The thalamocortical dialogue in health and disease.R. Llinas - 2001 - Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:166-75.
  • A competition for consciousness?John G. Taylor - 1996 - Neurocomputing 11:271-96.
  • Does consciousness cause behaviour?Susan Pockett - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):23-40.
  • Perceptual correlates of massive cortical reorganization.Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, Diane Rogers-Ramachandran & Marni Stewart - 1992 - Science 258:1159-1160.
  • The neurophysics of consciousness.E. Roy John - 2002 - Brain Research Reviews 39 (1):1-28.
  • The Unconscious Homunculus.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 2000 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 3-11.