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  1. Values in Science Beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk.Matthew J. Brown - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839.
    Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is (...)
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  • Value Judgements and the Estimation of Uncertainty in Climate Modeling.Justin Biddle & Eric Winsberg - 2010 - In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 172--197.
     
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  • On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful?Phyllis Rooney - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:13-22.
    The debate about the rational and the social in science has sometimes been developed in the context of a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values. Paying particular attention to two important discussion in the last decade, by Longino and by McMullin, I argue that a fuller understanding of values in science ultimately requires abandoning the distinction itself. This is argued directly in terms of an analysis of the lack of clarity concerning what epistemic values are. I also argue that the (...)
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  • Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy.Helen E. Longino - 1996 - In Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson (eds.), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 39--58.
    Underdetermination arguments support the conclusion that no amount of empirical data can uniquely determine theory choice. The full content of a theory outreaches those elements of it (the observational elements) that can be shown to be true (or in agreement with actual observations).2 A number of strategies have been developed to minimize the threat such arguments pose to our aspirations to scientific knowledge. I want to focus on one such strategy: the invocation of additional criteria drawn from a pool of (...)
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  • The Scientist Qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (5):893-904.
    Richard Rudner famously argues that the communication of scientific advice to policy makers involves ethical value judgments. His argument has, however, been rightly criticized. This article revives Rudner’s conclusion, by strengthening both his lines of argument: we generalize his initial assumption regarding the form in which scientists must communicate their results and complete his ‘backup’ argument by appealing to the difference between private and public decisions. Our conclusion that science advisors must, for deep-seated pragmatic reasons, make value judgments is further (...)
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  • The Value of Cognitive Values.Heather Douglas - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):796-806.
    Traditionally, cognitive values have been thought of as a collective pool of considerations in science that frequently trade against each other. I argue here that a finer-grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions. I separate the values into groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relationships. This allows us to clarify why these values (...)
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  • Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
    Critics of the ideal of value‐free science often assume that they must reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values. I argue that this assumption is mistaken and that the distinction can be used to clarify and defend the argument from inductive risk, which challenges the value‐free ideal. I develop the idea that the characteristic feature of epistemic values is that they promote, either intrinsically or extrinsically, the attainment of truths. This proposal is shown to answer common objections to the (...)
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  • A New Program for Philosophy of Science?Ronald N. Giere - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (1):15-21.
    I contend that Janet Kourany's "A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century" contains three levels of projects: (1) a naturalistic project, (2) a critical project, and (3) a political project. The naturalistic project is already well established. The critical project is less valued and less established within the profession, but seems a worthy and achievable goal. The political project, I argue, takes one outside the professional pursuit of the philosophy of science. The critical project encompasses both the evaluation of (...)
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  • Environmental Justice, Values, and Scientific Expertise.Daniel Steel & Kyle Powys Whyte - 2012 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):163-182.
  • Cognitive Attitudes and Values in Science.Kevin Elliott & David Willmes - unknown
    We argue that the analysis of cognitive attitudes should play a central role in developing more sophisticated accounts of the proper roles for values in science. First, we show that the major recent efforts to delineate appropriate roles for values in science would be strengthened by making clearer distinctions among cognitive attitudes. Next, we turn to a specific example and argue that a more careful account of the distinction between the attitudes of belief and acceptance can contribute to a better (...)
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  • Weighing Complex Evidence in a Democratic Society.Heather Douglas - 2012 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):139-162.
    Weighing complex sets of evidence (i.e., from multiple disciplines and often divergent in implications) is increasingly central to properly informed decision-making. Determining “where the weight of evidence lies” is essential both for making maximal use of available evidence and figuring out what to make of such evidence. Weighing evidence in this sense requires an approach that can handle a wide range of evidential sources (completeness), that can combine the evidence with rigor, and that can do so in a way other (...)
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  • Who has Scientific Knowledge?K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):337 – 347.
    I examine whether or not it is apt to attribute knowledge to groups of scientists. I argue that though research teams can be aptly described as having knowledge, communities of scientists identified with research fields, and the scientific community as a whole are not capable of knowing. Scientists involved in research teams are dependent on each other, and are organized in a manner to advance a goal. Such teams also adopt views that may not be identical to the views of (...)
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  • Values and Uncertainties in the Predictions of Global Climate Models.Eric Winsberg - 2012 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):111-137.
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  • Inductive Risk and Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
    Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered (...)
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  • Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Bias and Values in Scientific Research.Torsten Wilholt - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):92-101.
    When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all extra-scientific influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically (...)
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  • Three Kinds of Idealization.Michael Weisberg - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (12):639-659.
    Philosophers of science increasingly recognize the importance of idealization: the intentional introduction of distortion into scientific theories. Yet this recognition has not yielded consensus about the nature of idealization. e literature of the past thirty years contains disparate characterizations and justifications, but little evidence of convergence towards a common position.
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  • Backtracking and the Ethics of Framing: Lessons From Voles and Vasopressin.Daniel McKaughan & Kevin Elliott - 2012 - Science 338 (6112):341-344.
    When communicating scientific information, experts often face difficult choices about how to promote public understanding while also maintaining an appropriate level of objectivity. We argue that one way for scientists and others involved in communicating scientific information to alleviate these tensions is to pay closer attention to the major frames employed in the contexts in which they work. By doing so, they can ideally employ useful frames while also enabling the recipients of information to “backtrack” to relatively uncontroversial facts and (...)
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  • Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science.Kevin Elliott - unknown
    Although many philosophers have employed the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” roles for values in science, I argue that it merits further clarification. The distinction can be formulated in several ways: as a logical point, as a distinction between epistemic attitudes, or as a clarification of different consequences associated with accepting scientific claims. Moreover, it can serve either as part of a normative ideal or as a tool for policing how values influence science. While various formulations of the distinction may (...)
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  • Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-246.
  • The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
  • Statistics, Pragmatics, Induction.C. West Churchman - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (3):249-268.
  • In Defence of the Value Free Ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.
    The ideal of value free science states that the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. moral or political) values. It has been criticized on the grounds that scientists have to employ moral judgements in managing inductive risks. The paper seeks to defuse this methodological critique. Allegedly value-laden decisions can be systematically avoided, it argues, by making uncertainties explicit and articulating findings carefully. Such careful uncertainty articulation, understood as a methodological strategy, is exemplified by the current (...)
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  • Deciding to Believe.B. Williams - 1970 - In Bernard Williams (ed.), Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
     
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  • The Role of Values in Expert Reasoning.Heather Douglas - 2008 - Public Affairs Quarterly 22 (1):1-18.
  • Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?Isaac Levi - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (11):345-357.
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  • A Problem-Solving Approach to Scientific Progress.Larry Laudan - 1981 - In Ian Hacking (ed.), Scientific Revolutions. Oxford University Press.
     
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  • The Moral Responsibilities of Scientists (Tensions Between Autonomy and Responsibility).Heather E. Douglas - 2003 - American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):59 - 68.
  • Values in Science.Ernan McMullin - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982 (4):3-28.
    This paper argues that the appraisal of theory is in important respects closer in structure to value-judgement than it is to the rule-governed inference that the classical tradition in philosophy of science took for granted.
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