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On Telling and Trusting

Mind 116 (464):875-902 (2007)

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  1. On the Rationality of Our Response to Testimony.P. Faulkner - 2002 - Synthese 131 (3):353-370.
    The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the testifier's character and (...)
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  • What Is Wrong with Lying.Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535-557.
    One thing wrong with lying is that it can be manipulative. Understanding why lying can be a form of manipulation involves understanding how our telling someone something can give them a reason to believe it, and understanding this requires seeing both how our telling things can invite trust and how trust can be a reason to believe someone. This paper aims to outline the mechanism by means of which lies can be manipulative and through doing so identify a unique reason (...)
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  • Testimony: A Philosophical Study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
    Our trust in the word of others is often dismissed as unworthy, because the illusory ideal of "autonomous knowledge" has prevailed in the debate about the nature of knowledge. Yet we are profoundly dependent on others for a vast amount of what any of us claim to know. Coady explores the nature of testimony in order to show how it might be justified as a source of knowledge, and uses the insights that he has developed to challenge certain widespread assumptions (...)
  • Trust as an Affective Attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.
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  • Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.Michael McKenna & R. Jay Wallace - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):415.
    This is an excellent book. It is innovative in scope and carefully argued throughout. The book recasts the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists as a normative debate about the conditions under which it is fair to hold a person morally responsible. Wallace’s strategy is to explain moral agency by examining the stance of holding morally responsible. On Wallace’s account, moral agency does not require the ability to do otherwise; this would invite legitimate incompatibilist suspicions about free will and determinism. Rather, (...)
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  • Learning From Words.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77-101.
    There is a widely accepted family of views in the epistemology of testimony centering around the claim that belief is the central item involved in a testimonial exchange. For instance, in describing the process of learning via testimony, Elizabeth Fricker provides the following: “one language-user has a belief, which gives rise to an utterance by him; as a result of observing this utterance another user of the same language, his audience, comes to share that belief.” In a similar spirit, Alvin (...)
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  • Testimony: A Philosophical Study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):965-972.
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  • Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Mind 106 (424):803-807.
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  • Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Philosophy 78 (305):411-414.
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  • Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
    Can we decide to trust? Sometimes, yes. And when we do, we need not believe that our trust will be vindicated. This paper is motivated by the need to incorporate these facts into an account of trust. Trust involves reliance; and in addition it requires the taking of a reactive attitude to that reliance. I explain how the states involved here differ from belief. And I explore the limits of our ability to trust. I then turn to the idea of (...)
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  • The Ethics of Trust.H. J. N. Horsburgh - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (41):343-354.
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  • Trust and Antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.
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  • Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457.
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  • Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
  • Trust Within Reason (SJ Brams).M. Hollis - 1999 - Philosophical Books 40 (2):129-130.
    Some philosophers hold that trust grows fragile when people become too rational. They advocate a retreat from reason and a return to local, traditional values. Others hold that truly rational people are both trusting and trustworthy. Everything hinges on what we mean by 'reason' and 'rational'. If these are understood in an egocentric, instrumental fashion, then they are indeed incompatible with trust. With the help of game theory, Martin Hollis argues against that narrow definition and in favour of a richer, (...)
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  • Getting Told and Being Believed.Richard A. Moran - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.
    The paper argues for the centrality of believing the speaker (as distinct from believing the statement) in the epistemology of testimony, and develops a line of thought from Angus Ross which claims that in telling someone something, the kind of reason for belief that a speaker presents is of an essentially different kind from ordinary evidence. Investigating the nature of the audience's dependence on the speaker's free assurance leads to a discussion of Grice's formulation of non-natural meaning in an epistemological (...)
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  • Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals.David Hume, L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch - 1976 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (2):265-266.
  • Trust Within Reason.Martin Hollis - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):487-490.
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  • Backgrounding Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592.
    Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision making, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in (...)
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  • Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
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  • Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.
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  • Rationality and Religious Belief.C. F. Delaney - 1981 - Religious Studies 17 (1):128-128.
     
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  • Trust. Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations.D. Gambetta - 1990 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52 (4):740-740.
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  • Learning From Words. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44-45.
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  • Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals.David Hume - 1777 - Greenwood Press.
    A scholarly edition of a work by David Hume. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.
     
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  • The Cunning of Trust.Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3):202-225.
  • Trust as a Commodity.Partha Dasgupta - 1988 - In Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Blackwell. pp. 49-72.
     
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