I will begin by considering how the social world appears to the scientific observer and ask the question of whether the world of scientific research, with all its categories of meaning interpretation and with all its conceptual schemes of action, is identical with the world in which the observed actor acts. Anticipating the result, I may state immediately that with the shift from one level to the other, all the conceptual schemes and all the terms of interpretation must be modified.Proceeding (...) in this direction, I encounter several problems overlapping with the problem of rational action and the “rational act unit” in Professor ParsonsParsons, Talcott’ sense. First: The conceptual scheme of rational action presupposes a more or less definite knowledge of, or orientation within, the world in which this action is performed. In this sense the term, “rationality”, is not specific to the conceptual scheme of action; it embraces the conceptual scheme of the world in general and is only one element in it. Therefore, we also must examine the problem of orientation in this world. Second: We ought to keep in mind that all interpretation of the social world has to start from the actor’s subjective point of view. Therefore, we cannot accept the term, “unit act”, as such, without trying to reduce it to its subjective meaning. Here I have to discuss in general terms why I insist on the subjective point of view. This is more than the whim of a few social scientists; social science cannot be built up except by taking cognizance of the subjective meaning the actor connects with his acting. Finally, I have to discuss the fact that there are social sciences operating on high theoretical levels that, like economics, apparently prefer to deal with statistical curves and mathematical formulae rather than with actions of human beings in the social world, yet they use the term, “rational action”, as an indispensable element of their systems. I will have to show what modification this term undergoes in these types of social sciences..). (shrink)

The paper starts with a presentation of three interrelated theses based on conceptual differentiations needed to account for the semantic complexity of the concept of rationality. The first thesis relates to the concept of observer’s rationality. The logic of observation does not differ in respect to different types of object. Therefore rationality in the social sciences is in accordance with scientific rationality in general. The second thesis argues that the rationality of the observer is sufficient for economic and sociological inquiry, (...) as demonstrated by the example of time series analysis. The third thesis refers to particular characteristics of human action that pertain to analysis in the social sciences. In many cases rationality of the observer in economics and sociology is tied to an assumption that the actor behaves with rationality in selecting the ends of action and the norms regulating social relationships. The three theses are then discussed in a context of reexamination of the works of historically important theorists, including the physiocrats, BenthamBentham, Jeremy, MarxMarx, Karl, MarshallMarshall, Alfred, and ParetoPareto, Vilfredo, as well as more general methodological and philosophical traditions. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive investigation of the work of Joseph Alois Schumpeter, one of the great economists of the twentieth century. In this study, Yuichi Shionoya highlights Schumpeter's methodological views and emphasizes his ideal of a universal social science. Taking on board all aspects of his work, he reconstructs a system which encompasses theory and metatheory. The originality of Schumpeter's work - which the author calls the two-structure approach to the evolution of mind and society - is examined in (...) the light of the intellectual field in Germany and Austria in the early twentieth century. This book is a major contribution to the history of economic thought. (shrink)

There is not, of course, a one-to-one relation between policy conclusions and the conclusions of positive economics; if there were, there would be no ...

They are correct that punctuated equilibria apply to sexually reproducing organisms and that morphological evolutionary change is regarded as largely (if not exclusively) correlated with speciation events. However, they err in suggesting that we attribute stasis strictly to "developmental constraints," which represent only one of a set of possible mechanisms that we have suggested for the causes of stasis. Others include habitat tracking and the internal structure of species themselves [for example, (2)].