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  1. Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
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  • Why Paramecia Don't Have Mental Representations.Jerry A. Fodor - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):3-23.
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  • The Mythical Number Two.David E. Melnikoff & John A. Bargh - 2018 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 22 (4):280-293.
  • Scale‐Free Biology: Integrating Evolutionary and Developmental Thinking.Chris Fields & Michael Levin - 2020 - Bioessays 42 (8):1900228.
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  • Selfhood Triumvirate: From Phenomenology to Brain Activity and Back Again.Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 86:103031.
    Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts et al., 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this (...)
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  • Life and Life Only: A Radical Alternative to Life Definitionism.Carlos Mariscal & W. Ford Doolittle - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2975-2989.
    To date, no definition of life has been unequivocally accepted by the scientific community. In frustration, some authors advocate alternatives to standard definitions. These include using a list of characteristic features, focusing on life’s effects, or categorizing biospheres rather than life itself; treating life as a fuzzy category, a process or a cluster of contingent properties; or advocating a ‘wait-and-see’ approach until other examples of life are created or discovered. But these skeptical, operational, and pluralistic approaches have intensified the debate, (...)
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  • The Evolution of Foresight: What is Mental Time Travel, and is It Unique to Humans?Thomas Suddendorf & Michael C. Corballis - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):299-313.
    In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not only (...)
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  • Global Workspace Dynamics: Cortical “Binding and Propagation” Enables Conscious Contents.Bernard J. Baars, Stan Franklin & Thomas Zoega Ramsoy - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
  • The Language Faculty That Wasn't: A Usage-Based Account of Natural Language Recursion.Morten H. Christiansen & Nick Chater - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  • Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
    This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional (...)
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  • Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.
    Short abstract (98 words). Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given humans’ exceptional dependence on communication and vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of (...)
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  • How Conscious Experience and Working Memory Interact.Bernard J. Baars & Stan Franklin - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):166-172.
  • Embodied Cognition: A Field Guide.Michael L. Anderson - 2003 - Artificial Intelligence 149 (1):91-130.
    The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus.
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  • The Problem of Meaning in AI and Robotics: Still with Us After All These Years.Tom Froese & Shigeru Taguchi - 2019 - Philosophies 4 (2):14-0.
    In this essay we critically evaluate the progress that has been made in solving the problem of meaning in artificial intelligence and robotics. We remain skeptical about solutions based on deep neural networks and cognitive robotics, which in our opinion do not fundamentally address the problem. We agree with the enactive approach to cognitive science that things appear as intrinsically meaningful for living beings because of their precarious existence as adaptive autopoietic individuals. But this approach inherits the problem of failing (...)
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  • Sciences of Observation.Chris Fields - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (4):29-0.
    Multiple sciences have converged, in the past two decades, on a hitherto mostly unremarked question: what is observation? Here, I examine this evolution, focusing on three sciences: physics, especially quantum information theory, developmental biology, especially its molecular and “evo-devo” branches, and cognitive science, especially perceptual psychology and robotics. I trace the history of this question to the late 19th century, and through the conceptual revolutions of the 20th century. I show how the increasing interdisciplinary focus on the process of extracting (...)
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  • Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situated Agents, and the Future of Cognitive Science.Andy Clark - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):181-204.
    Brains, it has recently been argued, are essentially prediction machines. They are bundles of cells that support perception and action by constantly attempting to match incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions. This is achieved using a hierarchical generative model that aims to minimize prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing. Such accounts offer a unifying model of perception and action, illuminate the functional role of attention, and may neatly capture the special contribution of cortical processing to (...)
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  • Enactive Artificial Intelligence: Investigating the Systemic Organization of Life and Mind.Tom Froese & Tom Ziemke - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173 (3-4):466-500.
  • The Computational Boundary of a “Self”: Developmental Bioelectricity Drives Multicellularity and Scale-Free Cognition.Michael Levin - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
  • On Having No Head: Cognition Throughout Biological Systems.František Baluška & Michael Levin - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
  • Learning in Plants: Lessons From Mimosa Pudica.Charles I. Abramson & Ana M. Chicas-Mosier - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Rationalization is Rational.Fiery Cushman - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43:1-69.
    Rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts the beliefs and desires that would have made it rational. Then, people often adjust their own beliefs and desires to match the concocted ones. While many studies demonstrate rationalization, and a few theories describe its underlying cognitive mechanisms, we have little understanding of its function. Why is the mind designed to construct post hoc rationalizations of its behavior, and then to adopt them? This may accomplish an important task: (...)
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  • Interoceptive Inference, Emotion, and the Embodied Self.Anil K. Seth - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (11):565-573.
  • A Mechanistic Theory of Consciousness.Michael S. A. Graziano & Taylor W. Webb - 2014 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (2):163-176.
    Recently we proposed a theory of consciousness, the attention schema theory, based on findings in cognitive psychology and systems neuroscience. In that theory, consciousness is an internal model o...
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  • Is Recursion Language-Specific? Evidence of Recursive Mechanisms in the Structure of Intentional Action.Giuseppe Vicari & Mauro Adenzato - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 26:169-188.
    In their 2002 seminal paper Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch hypothesize that recursion is the only human-specific and language-specific mechanism of the faculty of language. While debate focused primarily on the meaning of recursion in the hypothesis and on the human-specific and syntax-specific character of recursion, the present work focuses on the claim that recursion is language-specific. We argue that there are recursive structures in the domain of motor intentionality by way of extending John R. Searle’s analysis of intentional action. We (...)
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  • Extended Phenotypes and Extended Organisms.J. Scott Turner - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (3):327-352.
    Phenotype, whether conventional or extended, is defined as a reflectionof an underlying genotype. Adaptation and the natural selection thatfollows from it depends upon a progressively harmonious fit betweenphenotype and environment. There is in Richard Dawkins' notion ofthe extended phenotype a paradox that seems to undercut conventionalviews of adaptation, natural selection and adaptation. In a nutshell, ifthe phenotype includes an organism's environment, how then can theorganism adapt to itself? The paradox is resolvable through aphysiological, as opposed to a genetic, theory of (...)
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  • Ecological Laws of Perceiving and Acting: In Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn.Michael T. Turvey, R. E. Shaw, Edward S. Reed & William M. Mace - 1981 - Cognition 9 (3):237-304.
  • Understanding What We See: How We Derive Meaning From Vision.Alex Clarke & Lorraine K. Tyler - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (11):677-687.
  • Being a Beast Machine: The Somatic Basis of Selfhood.Anil K. Seth & Manos Tsakiris - 2018 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 22 (11):969-981.
  • Automaticity in Social-Cognitive Processes.John A. Bargh, Kay L. Schwader, Sarah E. Hailey, Rebecca L. Dyer & Erica J. Boothby - 2012 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (12):593-605.