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They’ve lost control: reflections on skill

Synthese 191 (12):2729-2750 (2014)

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  1. The Problem of Action.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford University Press. pp. 157-62.
  • Knowing-How: Linguistics and Cognitive Science.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):220-227.
    Stanley and Williamson have defended the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a subspecies of knowing-that by appeal to the syntax and semantics of ascriptions of knowing-how. Critics have objected that this way of defending intellectualism places undue weight on linguistic considerations and fails to give sufficient attention to empirical considerations from the scientific study of the mind. In this paper, I examine and reject Stanley's recent attempt to answer the critics.
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  • The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
    This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory," the Cartesians "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.
  • Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes: Embodied Skills and Habits Between Dreyfus and Descartes.John Sutton, Doris McIlwain, Wayne Christensen & Andrew Geeves - 2011 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42 (1):78-103.
    ‘There is no place in the phenomenology of fully absorbed coping’, writes Hubert Dreyfus, ‘for mindfulness. In flow, as Sartre sees, there are only attractive and repulsive forces drawing appropriate activity out of an active body’1. Among the many ways in which history animates dynamical systems at a range of distinctive timescales, the phenomena of embodied human habit, skilful movement, and absorbed coping are among the most pervasive and mundane, and the most philosophically puzzling. In this essay we examine both (...)
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  • Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  • Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design.David Kirsh - 2013 - ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction 20 (1):30.
    The theory of embodied cognition can provide HCI practitioners and theorists with new ideas about interac-tion and new principles for better designs. I support this claim with four ideas about cognition: (1) interacting with tools changes the way we think and perceive – tools, when manipulated, are soon absorbed into the body schema, and this absorption leads to fundamental changes in the way we perceive and conceive of our environments; (2) we think with our bodies not just with our brains; (...)
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  • Knowing‐How: Problems and Considerations.Ellen Fridland - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):703-727.
    In recent years, a debate concerning the nature of knowing-how has emerged between intellectualists who claim that knowledge-how is reducible to knowledge-that and anti-intellectualists who claim that knowledge-how comprises a unique and irreducible knowledge category. The arguments between these two camps have clustered largely around two issues: intellectualists object to Gilbert Ryle's assertion that knowing-how is a kind of ability, and anti-intellectualists take issue with Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's positive, intellectualist account of knowing-how. Like most anti-intellectualists, in this paper (...)
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  • Motor Skill Depends on Knowledge of Facts.Jason Stanley & John W. Krakauer - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
  • Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    Bill Brewer presents an original view of the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. He argues that perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs at all about particular objects in the world. This fresh approach to epistemology turns away from the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and works instead from a theory of understanding in a particular area.
  • The Return of the Myth of the Mental.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):352 – 365.
    McDowell's claim that "in mature human beings, embodied coping is permeated with mindedness",1 suggests a new version of the mentalist myth which, like the others, is untrue to the phenomenon. The phenomena show that embodied skills, when we are fully absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of non-mental content that is non-conceptual, non-propositional, non-rational and non-linguistic. This is not to deny that we can monitor our activity while performing it. For solving problems, learning a new skill, receiving coaching, and (...)
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  • Propositional Knowledge and Know-How.John N. Williams - 2006 - Synthese 165 (1):107-125.
    This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes (...)
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  • Consciousness, Context, and Know-How.Charles Wallis - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):123 - 153.
    In this paper I criticize the most significant recent examples of the practical knowledge analysis of knowledge-how in the philosophical literature: David Carr [1979, Mind, 88, 394–409; 1981a, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 53–61; 1981b, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 15(1), 87–96] and Stanley & Williamson [2001, Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411–444]. I stress the importance of know-how in our contemporary understanding of the mind, and offer the beginnings of a treatment of know-how capable of providing insight in to the use (...)
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  • Knowing.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):207-238.
  • Against Intellectualism.Alva Noë - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):278-290.
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  • Methodology and the Nature of Knowing How.Michael Devitt - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (4):205-218.
  • Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-How Distinction.Marcus P. Adams - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):97-114.
    In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411–444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the (...)
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  • Intelligence Without Representation – Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental Representation.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1:367-83.
  • Implicit Learning: An Analysis of the Form and Structure of a Body of Tacit Knowledge.A. Reber - 1977 - Cognition 5 (4):333-361.
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  • Restructuring Versus Automaticity: Alternative Accounts of Skill Acquisition.Patricia W. Cheng - 1985 - Psychological Review 92 (3):414-423.
  • Implicit Knowledge and Motor Skill: What People Who Know How to Catch Don’T Know.Nick Reed, Peter McLeod & Zoltan Dienes - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):63-76.
    People are unable to report how they decide whether to move backwards or forwards to catch a ball. When asked to imagine how their angle of elevation of gaze would change when they caught a ball, most people are unable to describe what happens although their interception strategy is based on controlling changes in this angle. Just after catching a ball, many people are unable to recognise a description of how their angle of gaze changed during the catch. Some people (...)
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  • Problems with Intellectualism.Ellen Fridland - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):879-891.
    In his most recent book, Stanley (2011b) defends his Intellectualist account of knowledge how. In Know How, Stanley produces the details of a propositionalist theory of intelligent action and also responds to several objections that have been forwarded to this account in the last decade. In this paper, I will focus specifically on one claim that Stanley makes in chapter one of his book: I will focus on Stanley’s claim that automatic mechanisms can be used by the intellectualist in order (...)
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  • Problems with Dreyfus' Dialectic.Georges Rey - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):403-408.
  • Seeing and Visualizing: It's Not What You Think.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 2003 - Bradford.
    How we see and how we visualize: why the scientific account differs from our experience.
  • 6 Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought.Ellen Fridland - 2013 - In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. pp. 13--77.
  • Perception and Skill: Theoretical Foundations for a Science of Perception.Ellen Fridland - 2010 - Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center
  • Kinesthetic Memory.Maxine Sheets-Johnstone - 2003 - Theoria Et Historia Scientiarum 7 (1):69-92.
    This paper attempts to elucidate the nature of kinesthetic memory, demonstrate itscentrality to everyday human movement, and thereby promote fresh cognitive andphenomenological understandings of movement in everyday life. Prominent topics in this undertaking include kinesthesia, dynamics, and habit. The endeavor has both a critical and constructive dimension.
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