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  1. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred DRETSKE - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
  • Disjunctivism Again.Tyler Burge - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):43-80.
    In Burge [Disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. Philosophical Topics 33: 1–78, 2005], I criticized several versions of disjunctivism. McDowell defends his version against my criticisms in McDowell [Tyler Burge on disjunctivism. Philosophical Explorations 13: 243–55, 2010]. He claims that my general characterization fails to apply to his view. I show that this claim fails because it overlooks two elements in my characterization. I elaborate and extend my criticisms of his disjunctivism. I criticize his positions on infallibility and indefeasibility, and reinforce my (...)
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  • Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism.John McDowell - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255.
    In Burge 2005, Tyler Burge reads disjunctivism as the denial that there are explanatorily relevant states in common between veridical perceptions and corresponding illusions. He rejects the position as plainly inconsistent with what is known about perception. I describe a disjunctive approach to perceptual experience that is immune to Burge's attack. The main positive moral concerns how to think about fallibility.
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  • The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
    What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a (...)
  • Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.Jerry A. Fodor - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  • Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents.Matthew Nudds - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):334-346.
    Suppose that you are looking at a vase of flowers on the table in front of you. You can visually attend to the vase and to the flowers, noticing their different features: their colour, their shape and the way they are arranged. In attending to the vase, the flowers and their features, you are attending to mind-independent objects and features. Suppose, now, that you introspectively reflect on the visual experience you have when looking at the vase of flowers. In doing (...)
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  • Perception and its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.
    Physical objects are such things as stones, tables, trees, people and other animals: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world we live in. therefore expresses a commonsense commitment to physical realism: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world we live in exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone.
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  • Experience and Content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
    The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are (...)
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  • Internalization: A Metaphor We Can Live Without.Michael Kubovy & William Epstein - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):618-625.
    Shepard has supposed that the mind is stocked with innate knowledge of the world and that this knowledge figures prominently in the way we see the world. According to him, this internal knowledge is the legacy of a process of internalization; a process of natural selection over the evolutionary history of the species. Shepard has developed his proposal most fully in his analysis of the relation between kinematic geometry and the shape of the motion path in apparent motion displays. We (...)
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  • James J. Gibson: An Appreciation.Ken Nakayama - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (2):329-335.
  • Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to (...)
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  • Brightness Constancy and the Nature of Achromatic Colors.Hans Wallach - 1948 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 38 (3):310.
  • The Place of White in a World of Grays: A Double-Anchoring Theory of Lightness Perception.Paola Bressan - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (3):526-553.
  • An Anchoring Theory of Lightness Perception.Alan Gilchrist, Christos Kossyfidis, Frederick Bonato, Tiziano Agostini, Joseph Cataliotti, Xiaojun Li, Branka Spehar, Vidal Annan & Elias Economou - 1999 - Psychological Review 106 (4):795-834.
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  • The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
    There is a view abroad on which perceptual experience has representational content in this sense: in it something is represented to the perceiver as so. On the view, a perceptual experience has a face value at which it may be taken, or which may be rejected. This paper argues that that view is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so. In that sense, the senses are silent, or, in (...)
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  • Origins of Perception.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Disputatio 4 (29):1 - 38.
  • Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 254--309.
  • Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
  • The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book is a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. The Architecture of the Mind has three main goals. One is to argue for massive mental modularity. Another is to answer a 'How possibly?' challenge to any such approach. The first part of the book lays out the positive case supporting massive modularity. It also outlines how the thesis should best (...)
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  • The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Harvard University Press.
    The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...
  • Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology.Stephen Palmer - 1999 - MIT Press.
  • Reid's Rejection of Intentionalism.Todd Ganson - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 4:245-263.
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