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  1. Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives.Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.) - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
    Recent debates in philosophy of mind seemingly have resulted in an impasse. Reductive physicalism cannot account for the phenomenal mind, and nonreductive physicalism cannot safeguard a causal role for the mental as mental. Dualism was formerly considered to be the only viable alternative, but in addition to exacerbating the problem of mental causation, it is hard to square with a naturalist evolutionary framework. By 1979, Thomas Nagel argued that if reductionism and dualism fail, and a non-reductionist form of strong emergence (...)
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  • Vision: Variations on Some Berkeleian Themes.Robert Schwartz & David Marr - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):411.
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  • A Global Workspace Model for Phenomenal and Access Consciousness.Antonino Raffone & Martina Pantani - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):580-596.
    Both the global workspace theory and Block’s distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, are central in the current debates about consciousness and the neural correlates of consciousness. In this article, a unifying global workspace model for phenomenal and access consciousness is proposed. In the model, recurrent neural interactions take place in distinct yet interacting access and phenomenal brain loops. The effectiveness of feedback signaling onto sensory cortical maps is emphasized for the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Two forms of top-down (...)
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  • A Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness.Jesse Prinz - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):243-59.
    This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the (...)
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  • State Consciousness and Creature Consciousness: A Real Distinction.Neil Campbell Manson - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):405-410.
    It is widely held that there is an important distinction between the notion of consciousness as it is applied to creatures and, on the other hand, the notion of consciousness as it applies to mental states. McBride has recently argued in this journal that whilst there may be a grammatical distinction between state consciousness and creature consciousness, there is no parallel ontological distinction. It is argued here that whilst state consciousness and creature consciousness are indeed related, they are distinct properties. (...)
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  • The Structure of Experience, the Nature of the Visual, and Type 2 Blindsight‌.Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:104 - 128.
    Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field. What is the nature of that consciousness? Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish the existence of any structural—necessary—features of visual experience. I argue that it is very difficult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I investigate whether it is possible to visually, or more generally (...)
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  • Confidence and Accuracy of Near-Threshold Discrimination Responses.Craig Kunimoto, Jeff Miller & Harold Pashler - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):294-340.
    This article reports four subliminal perception experiments using the relationship between confidence and accuracy to assess awareness. Subjects discriminated among stimuli and indicated their confidence in each discrimination response. Subjects were classified as being aware of the stimuli if their confidence judgments predicted accuracy and as being unaware if they did not. In the first experiment, confidence predicted accuracy even at stimulus durations so brief that subjects claimed to be performing at chance. This finding indicates that subjects's claims that they (...)
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  • Perceptual Awareness and its Loss in Unilateral Neglect and Extinction.John Driver & Patrik Vuilleumier - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):39-88.
  • Conscious Experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.
  • Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
    This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional (...)
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  • Conscious, Preconscious, and Subliminal Processing: A Testable Taxonomy.Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur & Claire Sergent - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.
    Amidst the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of those dissenting results. On the basis of a minimal neuro-computational model, the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a (...)
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  • Availability: The Cognitive Basis of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):148-149.
    Although A-consciousness and P-consciousness are conceptually distinct, a refined notion of A-consciousness makes it plausible that the two are empirically inseparable. I suggest that the notion of direct availability for global control can play a central role here, and draw out some consequences.
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  • Availability: The Cognitive Basis of Experience?David J. Chalmers - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 148-149.
    [[This was written as a commentary on Ned Block 's paper "On A Confusion about a Function of Consciousness" . It appeared in _Behavioral_ _and Brain Sciences_ 20:148-9, 1997, and also in the collection _The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates_ edited by Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere. ]].
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1057-1062.
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  • Unconscious Imagination and the Mental Imagery Debate.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Traditionally, philosophers have appealed to the phenomenological similarity between visual experience and visual imagery to support the hypothesis that there is significant overlap between the perceptual and imaginative domains. The current evidence, however, is inconclusive: while evidence from transcranial brain stimulation seems to support this conclusion, neurophysiological evidence from brain lesion studies (e.g., from patients with brain lesions resulting in a loss of mental imagery but not a corresponding loss of perception and vice versa) indicates that there are functional and (...)
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  • Type 2 Blindsight and the Nature of Visual Experience.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:92-103.
    Blindsight is a kind of residual vision found in people with lesions to V1. Subjects with blindsight typically report no visual awareness, but they are nonetheless able to make above-chance guesses about the shape, location, color and movement of visual stimuli presented to them in their blind field. A different kind of blindsight, sometimes called type 2 blindsight, is a kind of residual vision found in patients with V1 lesions in the presence of some residual awareness. Type 2 blindsight differs (...)
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  • Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?Berit Brogaard - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (6):1076-1104.
    David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception-related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and (...)
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  • Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes?Berit Brogaard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):449-63.
    Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of uncon- scious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and col- leagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under (...)
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  • On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • Consciousness is Computational: The Lida Model of Global Workspace Theory.Bernard J. Baars & Stan Franklin - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):23-32.
  • The Conscious Access Hypothesis: Origins and Recent Evidence.Bernard J. Baars - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):47-52.
  • How Conscious Experience and Working Memory Interact.Bernard J. Baars & Stan Franklin - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):166-172.
  • The Representational Character of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
    This chapter analyzes aspects of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality. It focuses on the phenomenal character and the intentional content of perceptual states, canvassing various possible relations among them. It argues that there is a good case for a sort of representationalism, although this may not take the form that its advocates often suggest. By mapping out some of the landscape, the chapter tries to open up territory for different and promising forms of representationalism to be explored in the (...)
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  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  • The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience.Jesse Prinz - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    The Conscious Brain brings neuroscientific evidence to bear on enduring philosophical questions. Major philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness are surveyed, challenged, and extended.
  • The Unity of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Tim Bayne draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. He develops an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified, and then applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. He goes on to explore the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the (...)
  • Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - In A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism? pp. 3-31.
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  • Michotte's Experimental Phenomenology of Perception.Georges Thines, Alan Costall & George Butterworth (eds.) - 1991 - Routledge.
    This volume of collected papers, with the accompanying essays by the editors, is the definitive source book for the work of this important experimental psychologist. Originally published in 1991, it offered previously inaccessible essays by Albert Michotte on phenomenal causality, phenomenal permanence, phenomenal reality, and perception and cognition. Within these four sections are the most significant and representative of the Belgian psychologist's research in the area of experimental phenomenology. Extremely insightful introductions by the editors are included that place the essays (...)
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  • The Visual Brain in Action.A. David Milner & Melvyn A. Goodale - 1995 - Oxford University Press.
    Although the mechanics of how the eye works are well understood, debate still exists as to how the complex machinery of the brain interprets neural impulses...
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  • Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
  • A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
    Conscious experience is one of the most difficult and thorny problems in psychological science. Its study has been neglected for many years, either because it was thought to be too difficult, or because the relevant evidence was thought to be poor. Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena - such as stimulus representations known to be attended, perceptual, and informative - with closely comparable unconscious ones - such as (...)
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  • Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism.David Chalmers - 2013 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8.
    I present an argument for panpsychism: the thesis that everything is conscious, or at least that fundamental physical entities are conscious. The argument takes a Hegelian dialectical form. Panpsychism emerges as a synthesis of the thesis of materalism and the antithesis of dualism. In particular, the key premises of the causal argument for materialism and the conceivability argument for dualism are all accommodated by a certain version of panpsychism. This synthesis has its own antithesis in turn: panprotopsychism, the thesis that (...)
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  • Attention: The Mechanisms of Consciousness.Michael I. Posner - 1994 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Usa 91:7398-7403.
  • The Information Integration Theory of Consciousness.Giulio Tononi - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 287--299.
  • A Theory of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
  • The Problems of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1998 - In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. pp. 29-59.
    This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e.g. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]].
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  • Separate Visual Pathways for Perception and Action.Melvyn A. Goodale & A. David Milner - 1992 - Trends in Neurosciences 15:20-25.
  • In the Theatre of Consciousness: Global Workspace Theory, a Rigorous Scientific Theory of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):292-309.
    Can we make progress exploring consciousness? Or is it forever beyond human reach? In science we never know the ultimate outcome of the journey. We can only take whatever steps our current knowledge affords. This paper explores today's evidence from the viewpoint of Global Workspace theory. First, we ask what kind of evidence has the most direct bearing on the question. The answer given here is ‘contrastive analysis’ -- a set of paired comparisons between similar conscious and unconscious processes. This (...)
     
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  • Realistic Monism - Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):3-31.
  • Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness: Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Experience.B. J. Baars - 2005 - Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology 150:45-53.
  • Consciousness: Here, There and Everywhere?Giulio Tononi & Christof Koch - 2015 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370 (1668):20140167.
    The science of consciousness has made great strides by focusing on the behavioural and neuronal correlates of experience. However, while such correlates are important for progress to occur, they are not enough if we are to understand even basic facts, for example, why the cerebral cortex gives rise to consciousness but the cerebellum does not, though it has even more neurons and appears to be just as complicated. Moreover, correlates are of little help in many instances where we would like (...)
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  • From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0.Masafumi Oizumi, Larissa Albantakis & Giulio Tononi - 2014 - PLOS Computational Biology 10 (5):e1003588.
    This paper presents Integrated Information Theory of consciousness 3.0, which incorporates several advances over previous formulations. IIT starts from phenomenological axioms: information says that each experience is specific a sh it is what it is by how it differs from alternative experiences; integration says that it is unified a sh irreducible to non-interdependent components; exclusion says that it has unique borders and a particular spatio-temporal grain. These axioms are formalized into postulates that prescribe how physical mechanisms, such as neurons or (...)
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  • Dual-Process Theories and Consciousness: The Case for "Type Zero" Cognition.Nicholas Shea & Chris D. Frith - 2016 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 2016:1-10.
    A step towards a theory of consciousness would be to characterise the effect of consciousness on information processing. One set of results suggests that the effect of consciousness is to interfere with computations that are optimally performed non-consciously. Another set of results suggests that conscious, system 2 processing is the home of norm-compliant computation. This is contrasted with system 1 processing, thought to be typically unconscious, which operates with useful but error-prone heuristics. -/- These results can be reconciled by separating (...)
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  • Psychology's "Binding Problem" and Possible Neurobiological Solutions.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):66-90.
    Given what we know about the segregated nature of the brain and the relative absence of multi-modal association areas in the cortex, how percepts become unified is not clear. However, if we could work out how and where the brain joins together segregated outputs, we would have a start in localizing the neuronal processes that correlate with conscious perceptual experiences. In this essay, I critically examine data relevant for understanding the neurophysiological underpinnings of perception. In particular, I examine the possibility (...)
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  • Fear Perception: Can Objective and Subjective Awareness Measures Be Dissociated?Remigiusz Szczepanowski & Luiz Pessoa - 2007 - Journal of Vision 7 (4):1-17.
  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
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  • Language, Thought and Consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):593-596.
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  • There Is No Stream of Consciousness. What is All This? What is All This Stuff Around Me; This Stream of Experiences That I Seem to Be Having All the Time?S. Blackmore - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):17-28.
    Throughout history there have been people who say it is all illusion. I think they may be right. But if they are right what could this mean? If you just say 'It's all an illusion' this gets you nowhere-- except that a whole lot of other questions appear. Why should we all be victims of an illusion instead of seeing things the way they really are? What sort of illusion is it anyway? Why is it like that and not some (...)
     
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  • The Problems of Consciousness.V. F. Castellucci & S. Rossignol - 1998 - In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. pp. 77--7.
  • Neural Response to Emotional Faces with and Without Awareness; Event-Related fMRI in a Parietal Patient with Visual Extinction and Spatial Neglect.Patrik Vuilleumier, J. L. Armony, Karen Clarke, Masud Husain, Julia Driver & Raymond J. Dolan - 2002 - Neuropsychologia 40 (12):2156-2166.