In this study of events and their places in our language and thought, Bennett propounds and defends views about what kind of item an event is, how the language of events works, and about how these two themes are interrelated. He argues that most of the supposedly metaphysical literature is really about the semantics of their names, and that the true metaphysic of events--known by Leibniz and rediscovered by Kim--has not been universally accepted because it has been tarred with the (...) brush of a false semantic theory. (shrink)

First published in 1976, this book presents a view of language as a matter of systematic communicative behaviour.

The aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to introduce the framework of update semantics and to explain what kind of semantic phenomena may successfully be analysed in it: (ii) to give a detailed analysis of one such phenomenon: default reasoning.

In almost all principled accounts of questions questions are related to the corresponding answers. Zellig Harris (Harris 1978:1), for example, maintains that"... all interrogative sentences can be derived, by means of the independently established transformations of the language, from sentences which assert that someone is asking about a disjunction of statements which are the relevant possible answers to that interroga tive." This amounts to the claim that a yes-no question such as Will John stay? is derived from I ask you (...) whether John will stay and a wh question such as Who came is derived from something like I ask you whether A came or B came or... or X came.. Though in generative grammar interrogatives are not derived from the corresponding declaratives, the semantic interpretation of questions is akin to the syntactic source of questions posited by Harris. Jerrold J.Katz and Paul M.Postal (Katz-Postal 1964:113-117) state a reading rule for Q, the interrogative constituent, which boils down to (1) in the case of yes-no questions and to (2) in the case of wh-questions. (1) Tell me which of the following is true: John will stay or John will not stay. (2) Tell me which of the following is true: A came or B came or... or X came. Thus, the semantic interpretation of questions makes reference to the set of possible answers represented here by a disjunction of statements. (shrink)

W. Labov's & T. Labov's findings concerning their child grammar acquisition ("Learning the Syntax of Questions" in Recent Advances in the Psychology of Language, Campbell, R. & Smith, P. Eds, New York: Plenum Press, 1978) are interpreted in terms of different semantics of why & other wh-questions. Z. Dubiel.

This paper presents an analysis of wh-complements in Montague Grammar. We will be concerned primarily with semantics, though some remarks on syntax are made in Section 4. Questions and wh-comple ments in Montague Grammar have been studied in Hamblin (1976), Bennett (1979), Karttunen (1977) and Hauser (1978) among others. These proposals will not be discussed explicitly, but some differences with Karttunen's analysis will be pointed out along the way.

Logical Atomism is a philosophy that sought to account for the world in all its various aspects by relating it to the structure of the language in which we articulate information. In _The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,_ Bertrand Russell, with input from his young student Ludwig Wittgenstein, developed the concept and argues for a reformed language based on pure logic. Despite Russell’s own future doubts surrounding the concept, this founding and definitive work in analytical philosophy by one of the world’s (...) most significant philosophers is a remarkable attempt to establish a novel way of thinking. (shrink)

Talk about Beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of...

We started from the fact that type theory, in the way it was implemented in IL, makes it costly to deal with nominalization processes. We have also argued that the type hierarchy as such doesn't play any real role in a grammar; the classification it provides for different semantic objects is already contained, in some sense, in the categorial structure of the grammar itself. So, on the basis of a theory of properties (Cocchiarella's HST*) we have tried to build a (...) language (IL*) whose syntax does not contain any explicit typing of expressions. Some of the consequences that this move brings about in the overall organization of the grammar can be summarized as follows:it allows for a simple treatment of infinitives, gerunds, factives and, in general, all those phenomena which might be analyzed as cases of nominalization;it provides a simpler and more constrained semantics than IL, since IL* doesn't go beyond second order, and its non-modal basis is axiomatizable;it suggests that the role of logical form in a theory of grammar could be that of a family of theories of semantic objects;it eliminates the extrinsic limitations of a type hierarchy on the choice of the system of syntactic categories.I think that it is interesting to notice how having an explicit semantic framework helps to provide a sense in which it is legitimate to regard the syntax of a language as ‘autonomous’. (shrink)

This paper shows in detail how the formal semiotic of M. J. Cresswell [6] may be extended to provide an account of indirect question clauses in English. The resulting account is compared at various points with the theory recently propounded by Karttunen [12] and is argued to have two major advantages over the latter in that (i) it accommodates the manifest teleological relativity of who-clauses, and (ii) it avoids the need for categorial segregation of sentence-taking verbs from wh-clause-taking verbs while (...) offering a uniform explanation of various apparent semantic differences between them. (shrink)

Various as these are, they have enough in common for them all to count as events, and in recent years philosophers have turned their attention to this..

This volume tackles the slippery subject of 'meaning'.

THE PHILOSOPHY which I advocate is generally regarded as a species of realism, and accused of inconsistency because of the elements in it which seem contrary to that doctrine. For my part, I do not regard the issue between realists and their opponents as a funda- mental one; I could alter my view on this issue without changing my mind as to any of the doctrines upon which I wish to lay stress. I hold that logic is what is fundamental (...) in philosophy, and that schools should be characterized rather by their logic than by their metaphysic. My own logic is atomic, and it is this aspect upon which I should wish to lay stress. Therefore I prefer to describe my philosophy as "logical atomism," rather than as "realism," whether with or without some prefixed adjective. (shrink)

Situation Theory and Its Applications, Vol. 1 . Robin Cooper, Kuniaki Mukai, and John Perry (Eds.). Lecture Notes No. 22. ...

Preface This volume represents the proceedings of the Second Conference on Situation Theory and its Applications, held at Loch Rannoch, Scotland, ...

Written in an outstandingly clear and lively style, this 1969 book provokes its readers to rethink issues they may have regarded as long since settled.

The philosophy of logical atomism.--Logical atomism.