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  1. Démocratie contestataire ou contestation de la démocratie?Juliette Roussin - 2013 - Philosophiques 40 (2):369.
    Juliette Roussin | : Cet article a pour objet d’interroger la tendance actuelle des démocraties à s’entourer d’institutions indépendantes au fort degré de compétence en vue de limiter et de corriger les défaillances éventuelles des corps démocratiques élus et représentatifs. La légitimité démocratique de ces institutions contre-majoritaires leur viendrait, selon certains théoriciens de la démocratie, de ce qu’elles offrent la possibilité de contester les décisions collectives lorsque celles-ci sont mauvaises ou injustes, contribuant ainsi à l’amélioration globale des performances du régime (...)
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  • Law and Disagreement.Arthur Ripstein & Jeremy Waldron - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):611.
    The most obvious way of settling disagreements peacefully is to take a vote. Yet, as Jeremy Waldron points out, the attitudes of philosophers and political theorists towards majority voting have ranged from indifference to hostility. Piled on top of all this scorn for legislation comes further scorn from social choice theorists, who insist that majority rule is useless as a means of making decisions.
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  • Pourquoi confronter les raisons?Charles Girard - 2019 - Philosophiques 46 (1):67-93.
    Many contemporary philosophies of democracy agree that public deliberation plays an essential role in the making of legitimate political decisions. However, this consensus masks significant disagreement concerning the exact source of its value, as it is alternatively located in its impact on participants, in its expressive value, in its fairness, or in the quality of the decisions it produces. These rival justifications of democratic deliberation have different, and sometimes contradictory, consequences for political practices and institutions. This article analyses these justifications (...)
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  • La Sagesse de la Multitude.Charles Girard - 2019 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy (1):348-369.
    L’objection la plus ancienne et la plus redoutable à la démocratie fait valoir que le gouvernement par le peuple dessert le gouvernement pour le peuple. Les citoyens manquant pour la plupart de sagesse ou de compétence, le bien commun serait mieux assuré en confiant le pouvoir à un individu éclairé ou à une élite experte. Une réponse commune à cette objection concède la prémisse mais affirme la priorité au gouvernement par le peuple sur le gouvernement pour le peuple : le (...)
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  • On Seeking the Truth through Democracy: Estlund’s Case for the Qualified Epistemic Claim.Gerald Gaus - 2011 - Ethics 121 (2):270-300.
  • Debate: On Christiano's the constitution of equality.David Estlund - 2009 - Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (2):241-252.
  • An Epistemic Defense of Democracy: David Estlund’s Democratic Authority.Elizabeth Anderson - 2008 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 5 (1):129-139.
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  • An epistemic defense of democracy: David Estlund's democratic authority.Elizabeth Anderson - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):pp. 129-139.
    In Democratic Authority, David Estlund 2008 presents a major new defense of democracy, called epistemic proceduralism. The theory claims that democracy exercises legitimate authority in virtue of possessing a modest epistemic power: its decisions are the product of procedures that tend to produce just laws at a better than chance rate, and better than any other type of government that is justifiable within the terms of public reason. The balance Estlund strikes between epistemic and non-epistemic justifications of democracy is open (...)
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  • Law and Disagreement.Jeremy Waldron - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    Jeremy Waldron is one of the world's leading legal and political philosophers. This collection brings together thirteen of his most recent essays which, in the course of working the book up for publication, the author has revisited and thoroughly revised. He addresses central issues within the liberal tradition, focusing on the law and its role in a pluralistic state which experiences deep disagreements about values and rights, and about the role of the state itself.
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  • Law and disagreement.Jeremy Waldron - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Author Jeremy Waldron has thoroughly revised thirteen of his most recent essays in order to offer a comprehensive critique of the idea of the judicial review of legislation. He argues that a belief in rights is not the same as a commitment to a Bill of Rights. This book presents legislation by a representative assembly as a form of law making which is especially apt for a society whose members disagree with one another about fundamental issues of principle.
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  • Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many.Hélène Landemore (ed.) - 2012 - Princeton University Press.
    The maze and the masses -- Democracy as the rule of the dumb many? -- A selective genealogy of the epistemic argument for democracy -- First mechanism of democratic reason: inclusive deliberation -- Epistemic failures of deliberation -- Second mechanism of democratic reason: majority rule.
  • La vérité peut-elle survivre à la démocratie?Pascal Engel - 2012 - Revue Agone 44:31-56.
    L’une des raisons pour lesquelles la vérité et la démocratie ne semblent pas faire bon ménage est qu’on a tendance à confondre, d’une part, la liberté d’opinion et de parole avec l’égale vérité des opinions, ce qui revient à adopter une forme de relativisme, et, d’autre part, la règle de majorité avec une règle de vérité, ce qui revient à adopter une forme de théorie de la vérité comme consensus. Parce que la démocratie libérale repose sur le principe de la (...)
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