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Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel (2017). Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness.

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  1. Introspective Humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
    Viewed from a certain perspective, nothing can seem more secure than introspection. Consider an ordinary conscious episode—say, your current visual experience of the colour of this page. You can judge, when reflecting on this experience, that you have a visual experience as of something white with black marks before you. Does it seem reasonable to doubt this introspective judgement? Surely not—such doubt would seem utterly fanciful. The trustworthiness of introspection is not only assumed by commonsense, it is also taken for (...)
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  2. Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  3. Mental Paint and Mental Latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
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  4. The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
    Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by their propositional content. But there are a number of crucial points where these domains intersect. One central locus of intersection arises from the existence of phenomenal beliefs: beliefs that are about experiences.
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  5. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.R. M. Chisholm - 1957 - Philosophical Quarterly 9 (37):366-373.
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    Objectual Attitudes.Graeme Forbes - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2):141-183.
  7. Patterns of Discovery.Norwood R. Hanson, A. D. Ritchie & Henryk Mehlberg - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):346-349.
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  8. Consciousness and Experience.William Lycan - 1998 - Mind 107 (427):676-679.
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  9. Against Propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
    'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they (...)
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    Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Adam Morton & Paul Churchland - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (2):299.
  11. Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
  12. Sensory Qualities, Consciousness, and Perception.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - In Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press. pp. 175-226.
  13. The Unreliability of Naive Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
    We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. We are not simply fallible at the margins but broadly inept. Examples highlighted in this essay include: emotional experience (for example, is it entirely bodily; does joy have a common, distinctive phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the (...)
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  14. The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):200-203.
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  15. Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It.John B. Watson - 1913 - Psychological Review 20 (2):158-177.