- Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.details
|
|
In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts.Bénédicte Veillet - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):97-127.details
|
|
Postscript to "mad pain and Martian pain".David K. Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Papers 12:122-133.details
|
|
The structure of justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
``Justification and the Basis of Belief".Marshall Swain - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 25-50.details
|
|
Non-Propositional Intentionality.Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowing Other People: A Second‐Person Framework.Bonnie M. Talbert - 2014 - Ratio 28 (2):190-206.details
|
|
Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
|
|
Justification, reasons, and reliability.Marshall Swain - 1985 - Synthese 64 (1):69 - 92.details
|
|
The Epistemic View of Subjectivity.Scott Sturgeon - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):221-235.details
|
|
The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.details
|
|
Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
|
|
Knowing‐Wh and Embedded Questions.Ted Parent - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):81-95.details
|
|
Philosophical Naturalism. Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
|
|
Knowledge and Evidence, by Paul K. Moser. [REVIEW]Timm Triplett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):945-949.details
|
|
Knowledge and evidence.Paul K. Moser - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.details
|
|
The explanatory stopgap.Eric Lormand - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):303-57.details
|
|
Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
|
|
Syntax and semantics of questions.Lauri Karttunen - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (1):3--44.details
|
|
How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.details
|
|
The Intensions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities.Jaakko Hintikka - 1975 - Dordrecht: D. Reidel.details
|
|
'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63.details
|
|
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.details
|
|
Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.details
|
|
Attitudes Towards Objects.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):314-328.details
|
|
Semantic analysis of wh-complements.Jeroen Groenendijk & Martin Stokhof - 1982 - Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (2):175 - 233.details
|
|
Practical Modes of Presentation.Ephraim Glick - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):538-559.details
|
|
The problem of the basing relation.Ian Evans - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2943-2957.details
|
|
Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):190-198.details
|
|
Phenomenal knowledge.Earl Conee - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.details
|
|
Now you know who Hong oak yun is.David Braun - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):24-42.details
|
|
Thought.Gilbert Harman & Laurence BonJour - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):256.details
|
|
Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations.Patrick Bondy - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):542-569.details
|
|
There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
|
|
Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.details
|
|
Consciousness and Conceptual Mastery.Derek Ball - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt075.details
|
|
The Structure of Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):394-397.details
|
|
Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt072.details
|
|
Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts.Richard Mark Sainsbury & Michael Tye - 2012 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Edited by Michael Tye.details
|
|
Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.) - 2002 - New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2008 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
|
|
What experience teaches.David K. Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. pp. 29--57.details
|
|
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.details
|
|
On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.details
|
|
Knowledge-how: A unified account.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 136-160.details
|
|