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  1. The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
    Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done (...)
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  • Language as Context for the Perception of Emotion.Maria Gendron Lisa Feldman Barrett, Kristen A. Lindquist - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (8):327.
  • When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions That Liberals May Not Recognize.Jonathan Haidt & Jesse Graham - 2007 - Social Justice Research 20 (1):98-116.
    Researchers in moral psychology and social justice have agreed that morality is about matters of harm, rights, and justice. On this definition of morality, conservative opposition to social justice programs appears to be immoral, and has been explained as a product of various non-moral processes such as system justification or social dominance orientation. In this article we argue that, from an anthropological perspective, the moral domain is usually much broader, encompassing many more aspects of social life and valuing institutions as (...)
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  • Basic Emotions, Relations Among Emotions, and Emotion-Cognition Relations.Carroll E. Izard - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (3):561-565.
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  • Something It Takes to Be an Emotion: The Interesting Case of Disgust.Edward B. Royzman & John Sabini - 2001 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31 (1):29–59.
  • The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing (...)
  • The Emotional Profiling of Disgust‐Eliciting Stimuli: Evidence for Primary and Complex Disgusts.Sarah Marzillier & Graham Davey - 2004 - Cognition and Emotion 18 (3):313-336.
  • The Theoretical Versus the Lay Meaning of Disgust: Implications for Emotion Research.Robin L. Nabi - 2002 - Cognition and Emotion 16 (5):695-703.