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  1. Normativity and Rationality in Delusional Psychiatric Disorders.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.
    Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders.
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  • Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions.Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
    A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framework propositions. We argue that neither Campbell's attack on empiricism nor his rationalist (...)
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  • Refining the Explanation of Cotard's Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):111-122.
    An elegant theory in cognitive neuropsychiatry explains the Capgras and Cotard delusions as resulting from the same type of anomalous phenomenal experience explained in different ways by different sufferers. ‘Although the Capgras and Cotard delusions are phenomenally distinct, we thus think that they represent patients’ attempts to make sense of fundamentally similar experiences’ (Young and Leafhead, 1996, p. 168). On the theory proposed by Young and Leafhead, the anomalous experience results from damage to an information processing subsystem which associates an (...)
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  • Introduction: Pathologies of Belief.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):1–46.
    who are unrecognizable because they are in disguise. ¼ The person I see in the mirror is not really me. ¼ A person I knew who died is nevertheless in the hospital ward today. ¼ This arm [the speaker’s left arm] is not mine it is yours; you have..
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  • Interpreting Delusions.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):25-48.
    This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced ''defamiliarisation'' or even ''derealisation'' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of (...)
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  • In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions.Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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  • Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion.Garry Young - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.
    In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the (...)
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  • One Stage Is Not Enough.Andrew W. Young & Karel W. de Pauw - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):55-59.
  • Clarifying" Familiarity": Examining Differences in the Phenomenal Experiences of Patients Suffering From Prosopagnosia and Capgras Delusion.Garry Young - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (1):29-37.
  • Damned If You Do; Damned If You Don't: The Impasse in Cognitive Accounts of the Capgras Delusion.Cordelia Fine, Jillian Craigie & Ian Gold - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):143-151.
  • Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation.Jakob Hohwy - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):65-70.
  • Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):133-158.
    Article copyright 2002. We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher's view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second (...)
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  • A One-Stage Explanation of the Cotard Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.
  • Unusual Experiences, Reality Testing and Delusions of Alien Control.Jakob Hohwy & Raben Rosenberg - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162.
    Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with (...)
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  • Experience, Belief, and the Interpretive Fold.Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):81-86.
    Elisabeth Pacherie is a research fellow in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Her main research and publications are in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychopathology and action theory. Her publications include a book on intentionality (_Naturaliser_ _l'intentionnalité_, Paris, PUF, 1993) and she is currently preparing a book on action and agency.
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  • Delusions and the Background of Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
    I argue that some cases of delusions show the inadequacy of those theories of interpretation that rely on a necessary rationality constraint on belief ascription. In particular I challenge the view that irrational beliefs can be ascribed only against a general background of rationality. Subjects affected by delusions seem to be genuine believers and their behaviour can be successfully explained in intentional terms, but they do not meet those criteria that according to Davidson (1985a) need to be met for the (...)
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  • Anomalous Experience in Everyday Life: Its Significance for Psychopathology.Brendan A. Maher - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):547-70.
    From the wide array of phenomena that constitute the elements of mental illness we must of necessity choose a limited segment of the spectrum of pathology. The vehicle for the development of the argument will be the heterogeneous group of disorders known collectively as schizophrenia. Although we will follow current usage of the singular noun, the heterogeneity that led Bleuler to refer to “the group of schizophrenias” must be borne in mind if we are to understand the degrees of variability (...)
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  • Delusional Misidentification as Subpersonal Disintegration.Philip Gerrans - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):590-608.
    In this paper I consider a theory developed within cognitive neuropsychiatry to explain two delusions of misidentification, the Capgras and the Cotard delusions. These delusions are classified together with others in which the subject misidentifies persons, places or objects, including parts of her own body. Strictly speaking, the Cotard may not, at the level of content, be a delusion of misidentification, but I have described it as such because the theory I discuss treats it as sharing a causal and a (...)
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  • The Distributed Human Neural System for Face Perception.Elizabeth A. Hoffman, M. Ida Gobbini & James V. Haxby - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (6):223-233.
    Face perception, perhaps the most highly developed visual skill in humans, is mediated by a distributed neural system in humans that is comprised of multiple, bilateral regions. We propose a model for the organization of this system that emphasizes a distinction between the representation of invariant and changeable aspects of faces. The representation of invariant aspects of faces underlies the recognition of individuals, whereas the representation of changeable aspects of faces, such as eye gaze, expression, and lip movement, underlies the (...)
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  • What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
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  • Capgras Delusion: A Window on Face Recognition.Hadyn D. Ellis & Michael B. Lewis - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (4):149-156.
  • Pathologies of Belief.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):1-46.
    In this book, psychologists and philosophers describe and discuss a range of case studies of delusional beliefs, drawing out general lessons both for the cognitive architecture of the mind and for the notion of rationality, and exploring connections between the delusional beliefs that occur in schizophrenia and the flawed understanding of beliefs that is characteristic of autism.
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  • Delusions.A. W. Young - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):571-589.
    Although a common clinical phenomenon, delusions are difficult to explain and have a problematic conceptual status. Advances in understanding delusions have come from studies which involve detailed investigation of particular types of delusion. Some of this work is summarised, with the Capgras and Cotard delusions as specific examples. These are used to high-highlight questions for which there is the potential for fruitful dialogue with philosophers. Such questions include the criteria for deciding that a statement represents a belief, the extent to (...)
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  • Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief.Tony Stone & Andrew W. Young - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-64.
    Circumscribed delusional beliefs can follow brain injury. We suggest that these involve anomalous perceptual experiences created by a deficit to the person's perceptual system, and misinterpretation of these experiences due to biased reasoning. We use the Capgras delusion (the claim that one or more of one's close relatives has been replaced by an exact replica or impostor) to illustrate this argument. Our account maintains that people voicing this delusion suffer an impairment that leads to faces being perceived as drained of (...)
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  • The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Delusions.Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.
  • A One-Stage Explanation of the Cotard Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.
    Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage explanation (...)
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  • Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion.J. Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
  • Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
    We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...)
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  • Monothematic Delusions, Empiricism, and Framework Beliefs.Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1.
     
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  • Face Recognition and Emotional Valence: Processing Without Awareness by Neurologically Intact Participants Does Not Simulate Covert Recognition in Prosopagnosia.Anna Stone, Tim Valentine & Rob Davis - 2001 - Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience 1 (2):183-191.
  • Why Some Delusions Are Necessarily Inexplicable Beliefs.Robert Klee - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):25-34.
  • Multiple Paths to Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):65-72.
  • Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation.Jakob Hohwy - 2004 - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 11 (1):65-70.
  • The Paranoid Self.Richard Bentall - 2003 - In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press. pp. 293--318.
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  • Capgras Syndrome: A Novel Probe for Understanding the Neural Representation of the Identity and Familiarity of Persons.William Hirstein & V. S. Ramachandran - 1997 - Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 264:437-444.
  • Feeling and Thinking: Closing the Debate Over the Independence of Affect.R. B. Zajonc - 2000 - In Joseph P. Forgas (ed.), Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition. Cambridge University Press.