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  1. The Logic of Decision.Henry E. Kyberg - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (2):250.
  • Updating: A Psychologically Basic Situation of Probability Revision.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):253-287.
    The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1992), (...)
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  • Category-Based Induction.Daniel N. Osherson, Edward E. Smith, Ormond Wilkie & Alejandro López - 1990 - Psychological Review 97 (2):185-200.
  • Dynamic Inference and Everyday Conditional Reasoning in the New Paradigm.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):346-379.
  • Support Theory: A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective Probability.Amos Tversky & Derek J. Koehler - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):547-567.
  • Base-Rate Respect: From Ecological Rationality to Dual Processes.Aron K. Barbey & Steven A. Sloman - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):241-254.
    The phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality. In this target article, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their conceptual coherence. From this evaluation we conclude that the best account of the data should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of (...)
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  • Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing.Joshua Klayman & Young-won Ha - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (2):211-228.
  • Conditionals: A Theory of Meaning, Pragmatics, and Inference.Philip Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (4):646-678.
    The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a (...)
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  • Précis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):69-84.
    According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrationality is fundamental to many aspects of human life including the law, mental health, and language interpretation. But what is it to be rational? One answer, deeply embedded in the Western intellectual tradition since ancient Greece, is that rationality concerns reasoning according to the rules of logic – the formal theory that specifies the inferential connections that hold with certainty between propositions. Piaget viewed logical reasoning as defining (...)
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  • Similarity, Plausibility, and Judgments of Probability.E. Smith - 1993 - Cognition 49 (1-2):67-96.
  • Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances in Support Theory.Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):406-415.
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  • Uncertain Premises and Jeffrey's Rule.David E. Over & Constantinos Hadjichristidis - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):97-98.
    Oaksford & Chater (O&C) begin in the halfway Bayesian house of assuming that minor premises in conditional inferences are certain. We demonstrate that this assumption is a serious limitation. They additionally suggest that appealing to Jeffrey's rule could make their approach more general. We present evidence that this rule is not limited enough to account for actual probability judgements.
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  • Reasoning From Uncertain Premises: Effects of Expertise and Conversational Context.Rosemary J. Stevenson & David E. Over - 2001 - Thinking and Reasoning 7 (4):367 – 390.
    Four experiments investigated uncertainty about a premise in a deductive argument as a function of the expertise of the speaker and of the conversational context. The procedure mimicked everyday reasoning in that participants were not told that the premises were to be treated as certain. The results showed that the perceived likelihood of a conclusion was greater when the major or the minor premise was uttered by an expert rather than a novice (Experiment 1). The results also showed that uncertainty (...)
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  • The Pseudodiagnosticity Trap: Should Participants Consider Alternative Hypotheses?Gernot D. Kleiter, Michael E. Doherty & Ryan D. Tweney - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):332-345.
  • New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning.David E. Over - 2009 - Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):431-438.
  • Updating Beliefs in Light of Uncertain Evidence: Descriptive Assessment of Jeffrey's Rule.Daniel Osherson & Jiaying Zhao - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):288-307.
  • New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning: An Introduction to the Special Issue Edited by Elqayam, Bonnefon, and Over.Shira Elqayam & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):249-265.
  • Scope Ambiguities and Conditionals.David Over, Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):284-307.
  • Inductive Judgments About Natural Categories.Lance J. Rips - 1975 - Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 14 (6):665-681.
    The present study examined the effects of semantic structure on simple inductive judgments about category members. For a particular category, subjects were told that one of the species had a given property and were asked to estimate the proportion of instances in the other species that possessed the property. The results indicated that category structure—in particular, the typicality of the species—influenced subjects' judgments. These results were interpreted by models based on the following assumption: When little is known about the underlying (...)
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  • Default Probability.Daniel N. Osherson, Joshua Stern, Ormond Wilkie, Michael Stob & Edward E. Smith - 1991 - Cognitive Science 15 (2):251-269.
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  • Reasoning with Uncertain Categories.Gregory L. Murphy, Stephanie Y. Chen & Brian H. Ross - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (1):81 - 117.
    Five experiments investigated how people use categories to make inductions about objects whose categorisation is uncertain. Normatively, they should consider all the categories the object might be in and use a weighted combination of information from all the categories: bet-hedging. The experiments presented people with simple, artificial categories and asked them to make an induction about a new object that was most likely in one category but possibly in another. The results showed that the majority of people focused on the (...)
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  • Questions and Challenges for the New Psychology of Reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (1):5 - 31.
    In common with a number of other authors I believe that there has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning, specifically the area traditionally labelled as the study of deduction. The deduction paradigm was founded in a philosophical tradition that assumed logicality as the basis for rational thought, and provided binary propositional logic as the agreed normative framework. By contrast, many contemporary authors assume that people have degrees of uncertainty in both premises and conclusions, and reject binary logic (...)
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