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  1. The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments From Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of “Appearance”.Stephen J. Wykstra - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (2):73 - 93.
  • Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists.Paul Draper - 1989 - Noûs 23 (3):331-350.
  • Is Belief in God Properly Basic?Alvin Plantinga - 1981 - Noûs 15 (1):41-51.
  • Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.
    It is common orthodoxy among internalists and externalists alike that knowledge is lost or defeated in situations involving misleading evidence of a suitable kind. But making sense of defeat has seemed to present a particular challenge for those who reject an internalist justification condition on knowledge. My main aim here is to argue that externalists ought to take seriously a view on which knowledge can be retained even in the face of strong seemingly defeating evidence. As an instructive example, I (...)
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  • Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
    I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...)
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  • Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument From Evil.Michael Bergmann - 2001 - Noûs 35 (2):278–296.
    Skeptical theists endorse the skeptical thesis (which is consistent with the rejection of theism) that we have no good reason for thinking the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. In his newest formulation of the evidential arguments from evil, William Rowe tries to avoid assuming the falsity of this skeptical thesis, presumably because it seems so plausible. I argue that his new argument fails to avoid doing this. Then I defend that skeptical thesis (...)
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  • On "Proper Basicality".Alvin Plantinga - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):612–621.
  • The Pandora’s Box Objection to Skeptical Theism.Stephen Law - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (3):285-299.
    Skeptical theism is a leading response to the evidential argument from evil against the existence of God. Skeptical theists attempt to block the inference from the existence of inscrutable evils to gratuitous evils by insisting that given our cognitive limitations, it wouldn’t be surprising if there were God-justifying reasons we can’t think of. A well-known objection to skeptical theism is that it opens up a skeptical Pandora’s box, generating implausibly wide-ranging forms of skepticism, including skepticism about the external world and (...)
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  • INTRODUCTION: The Evidential Argument From Evil.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 1996 - In The Evidential Argument from Evil.
    Evil, it is often said, poses a problem for theism, the view that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, "God," for short. This problem is usually called "the problem of evil." But this is a bad name for what philosophers study under that rubric. They study what is better thought of as an argument, or a host of arguments, rather than a problem. Of course, an argument from evil against theism can be both an argument and a (...)
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  • The Argument From Evil.Peter Van Inwagen - 2004 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil. Eerdmans.
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