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  1. Should We Pass the Buck?Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. pp. 33--44.
  • What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.
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  • Reasons, Responsibility, and Reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and Deigh.T. M. Scanlon - 2002 - Ethics 112 (3):507-528.
  • Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:295-324.
    I first distinguish between different forms of the buck-passing account of value and clarify my target in other respects on buck-passers' behalf. I then raise a number of problems for the different forms of the buck-passing view that I have distinguished.
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  • Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
  • Reasons for Actions and Desires.Ulrike Heuer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):43–63.
    It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that all practical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall call any approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a "Humean approach". In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aiming to explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. (...)
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  • Through Thick and Thin: Good and its Determinates.Christine Tappolet - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (2):207-221.
    What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thick’ concepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better understood as one between a (...)
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  • Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
    When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...)
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  • Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
  • Should We Pass the Buck?Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47:159-173.
    My topic is the relation between the right and the good. I introduce it by relating some aspects of the debate between various British intuitionists in the first half of the present century. In Principia Ethica G. E. Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest good. He wrote ‘This use of “right”, as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it be also good as an end, is indeed the use to (...)
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  • Reasons and Motivation: John Broome.John Broome - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
    Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.
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  • Goodness and Choice.Philippa Foot & Alan Montefiore - 1961 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35 (1):45-80.
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  • .Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2016
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