This article argues that whilst the idea of whistleblowing as a positive duty to do good or to prevent harm may be defendable, legislating that duty is not feasible. We develop our argument by identifying rights and duties involved in whistleblowing as two clusters: one of justice and one of benevolence. Legislative arguments have evolved to cover the justice issues and the tendency exists of extending rights and duties into the realm of benevolence. This article considers the problematic assumptions and (...) implications of whistleblowing as a positive duty, by examining the extent to which the Good Samaritan argument holds with regard to whistleblowing. We argue that three criteria necessary for whistleblowing as a legally enforceable positive duty are not met, namely that we need to be able to (1) specify who should know what, (2) minimize the risk to the whistleblower and (3) adequately deal with mistaken concerns being raised. (shrink)

The ethical debate on whistleblowing concerns centrally the conflict between the right to political free speech and the duty of loyalty to the organization where one works. This is the moral dilemma of whistleblowing. Political free speech is justified because it is a central part of liberal democracy, whereas loyalty can be motivated as a way of showing consideration for one’s associates. The political philosophy of John Rawls is applied to this dilemma, and it is shown that the requirement of (...) loyalty, in the sense that is needed to create the moral dilemma of whistleblowing, is inconsistent with that theory. In this sense, there is no moral dilemma of whistleblowing. This position has been labelled extreme in that it says that whistleblowing is always morally permitted. In a discussion and rejection of Richard De George’s criteria on permissible whistleblowing, it is pointed out that the mere rejection of loyalty will not lead to an extreme position; harms can still be taken into account. Furthermore, it is argued that the best way is, in this as in most other political circumstances, to weigh harms is provided by the free speech argument from democracy. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this article is to assess the operation of the UK’s Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA 1998) during its first 10 years and to consider its implications for the whistleblowing process. Method The article sets the legislation into context by discussing the common law background. It then gives detailed consideration to the statutory provisions and how they have been interpreted by the courts and tribunals. Results In assessing the impact of the legislation’s approach to whistleblowing both (...) in the UK and elsewhere, the author draws upon empirical research. Conclusion The author concludes that PIDA 1998 has not adequately protected whistleblowers and makes 12 recommendations for change. Despite the European Commission’s acknowledgement that whistleblowers can play a part in the fight against corruption, the author notes that common standards for their protection still seem a long way off. (shrink)

Since the introduction of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and several other national corporate governance codes, whistleblowing policies have been implemented in a growing number of companies. Existing research indicates that this type of governance codes has a limited direct effect on ethical or whistleblowing behaviour whereas whistleblowing policies at the corporate level seem to be more effective. Therefore, evidence on the impact of (inter)national corporate governance codes on the content of corporate whistleblowing policies is important to understand their (...) indirect impact on whistleblowing behaviour. This study analyzes the contents of whistleblowing policies, and parts of corporate codes of conduct and codes of ethics, describing such policies of 56 leading European companies. By classifying the contents in seven categories, an exploratory framework was created. General contents often identified were: applicability to all employees, a group-wide scope and an authoritative tone. The most common general violations to report were breaches of internal policies and external regulations or laws. The more specific violations most frequently mentioned were criminal offences and dangers to health and safety or the environment. Contacts to report to were the direct or indirect supervisors, a compliance officer or a confidential "hotline" facility. A confidentiality guarantee was common and anonymous reporting was often possible, though sometimes discouraged. Protection against retaliation is stated by ensuring that retaliation will not happen, prohibiting it or making it punishable. The requirement of good faith was frequently given. Finally, investigation of the report was often guaranteed. Surprisingly little information is given on the treatment of whistleblowers reporting an unfounded complaint in good faith, or reporting a violation they were involved in. The study's findings are most relevant to companies without a whistleblowing policy or those that intend to benchmark their policies, and to pan-European standard setters. (shrink)

Since the introduction of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and several other national corporate governance codes, whistleblowing policies have been implemented in a growing number of companies. Existing research indicates that this type of governance codes has a limited direct effect on ethical or whistleblowing behaviour whereas whistleblowing policies at the corporate level seem to be more effective. Therefore, evidence on the impact of (inter)national corporate governance codes on the content of corporate whistleblowing policies is important to understand their (...) indirect impact on whistleblowing behaviour. This study analyzes the contents of whistleblowing policies, and parts of corporate codes of conduct and codes of ethics, describing such policies of 56 leading European companies. By classifying the contents in seven categories, an exploratory framework was created. General contents often identified were: applicability to all employees, a group-wide scope and an authoritative tone. The most common general violations to report were breaches of internal policies and external regulations or laws. The more specific violations most frequently mentioned were criminal offences and dangers to health and safety or the environment. Contacts to report to were the direct or indirect supervisors, a compliance officer or a confidential “hotline” facility. A confidentiality guarantee was common and anonymous reporting was often possible, though sometimes discouraged. Protection against retaliation is stated by ensuring that retaliation will not happen, prohibiting it or making it punishable. The requirement of good faith was frequently given. Finally, investigation of the report was often guaranteed. Surprisingly little information is given on the treatment of whistleblowers reporting an unfounded complaint in good faith, or reporting a violation they were involved in. The study’s findings are most relevant to companies without a whistleblowing policy or those that intend to benchmark their policies, and to pan-European standard setters. (shrink)

This book provides essential reading for anyone with an academic or professional interest in business ethics today.