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  1. Axiological aspects of moral and legal decision-making.I. M. Hoian - 2019 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 16:66-77.
    Purpose. The study seeks to clarify the preconditions for moral and legal decision-making based on the identification of axiological foundations that correlate with the moral perceptions of good and evil and psychological phenomena such as emotions. Theoretical basis of the study is to apply comparative, axiological, systemic methods. This methodological approach allows us to analyze and disclose the essence of the process of moral and legal decision-making on the basis of certain axiological prerequisites and enables to substantiate the connection between (...)
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  • Philosophical and psychological dimensions of social expectations of personality.V. V. Khmil & I. S. Popovych - 2019 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 16:55-65.
    Purpose. To analyse the philosophical and psychological contexts of social expectations of personality, to form general scientific provisions, to reveal the properties, patterns of formation, development and functioning of social expectations as a process, result of reflection and construction of social reality. Theoretical basis of the study is based on the phenomenology of E. Husserl, the social constructivism philosophy of L. S. Vygotskiy, P. Berger, T. Luckmann, K. J. Gergen, ideas of constructive alternativeism of G. Kelly, psychology of social expectations (...)
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  • To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity.Sanford Goldberg (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Sandford C. Goldberg puts forward a theory of epistemic normativity that is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. This theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself.