This paper develops a language for distinguishing more rigorously between various senses of the term ‘anthropocentrism.’ Specifically, it differentiates between:1. Perceptual anthropocentrism ;2. Descriptive anthropocentrism 3. Normative anthropocentrism.

Anthropocentrism can intelligibly be criticised as an ontological error, but attempts to conceive of it as an ethical error are liable to conceptual and practical confusion. After noting the paradox that the clearest instances of overcoming anthropocentrism involve precisely the sort of objectivating knowledge which many ecological critics see as itself archetypically anthropocentric, the article presents the follwoing arguments: there are some ways in which anthropocentrism is not objectionable; the defects associated with anthropocentrism in ethics are better understood as instances (...) of speciesism and human chauvinism; it is unhelpful to call these defects anthropocentrism because there is an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism in any ethic at all; moreover, because the defects do not typically involve a concern with human interests as such, the rhetoric of anti-anthropocentrism is counterproductive in practice. (shrink)

A motivation problem may arise when morally principled public policy calls for serious sacrifice, relative to ways of life and levels of well-being, on the part of the members of a free society. Apart from legal or other forms of “external” coercion, what will, could, or should move people to make the sacrifices required by morality? I explore the motivation problem in the context of morally principled public policy concerning our legacy for future generations. In this context the problem raises (...) special moral-psychological difficulties. My inquiry suggests pessimism regarding our ability to solve the motivation problem relative to what morality requires on behalf of future generations. (shrink)

A motivation problem may arise when morally principled public policy calls for serious sacrifice, relative to ways of life and levels of well-being, on the part of the meInbers of a free society. Apart from legal or other forms of “external” coercion, what will, could, or should move people to make the sacrifices required by morality? I explore the motivation problem in the context of morally principled public policyconcerning our legacy for future generations. In this context the problem raises special (...) moral-psychological difficulties. My inquiry suggests pessimism regarding our ability to solve the motivation problem relative to what morality requires on behalf of future generations. (shrink)

The assumption that environmental ethics must be nonanthropocentric in order to be adequate is mistaken. There are two forms of anthropocentrism, weak and strong, and weak anthropocentrism is adequate to support an environmental ethic. Environmental ethics is, however, distinctive vis-a-vis standard British and American ethical systems because, in order to be adequate, it must be nonindividualistic.Environmental ethics involves decisions on two levels, one kind of which differs from usual decisions affecting individual fairness while the other does not. The latter, called (...) allocational decisions, are not reducible to the former and govern the use of resources across extended time. Weak anthropocentrism provides a basis for criticizing individual, consumptive needs and can provide the basis for adjudicatingbetween these levels, thereby providing an adequate basis for environmental ethics without the questionable ontological commitments made by nonanthropocentrists in attributing intrinsie value to nature. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the problem of moral motivation. Author presents a view which, as he argues, is able to bridge the gap between acceptance of a moral rule and an action according to this rule. The main issue here is the future ethics that could possibly become a part of environmental ethics if it takes into consideration future goods and condition of nature. The author discusses rationality of moral norms in future ethics from a perspective of a universalistic (...) paradigm. Drawing from Hare and Sidgwick he maintains that temporal position of someone harmed by a present action cannot be relevant to the moral evaluation of the action in question. He also emphasizes that in case when moral agent is a future and abstract one, there is an important factor involved which could have an influence on our moral identity. It plays a crucial role because our ,,natural” motivation to act according to a rule concerns, first of all, moral subjects within a moral community. Birnbacher claims that taking non-moral motivations into account makes the prospects of future-oriented action appear much less gloomy. Therefore, in his project of future ethics, he fuses together levels of moral theory and of emotional basis of our motivation. He illustrates the point by demonstrating that the course of psychological factors has an impact on our motivation for action by the data drawn from empirical social research conducted in Europe and USA. Key words MORAL MOTIVATION, FUTURE. (shrink)