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  1. Nudges, Recht und Politik: Institutionelle Implikationen.Robert Lepenies & Magdalena Malecka - 2016 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (1): 487–530.
    In diesem Beitrag argumentieren wir, dass eine umfassende Implementierung sogenannter Nudges weitreichende Auswirkungen für rechtliche und politische Institutionen hat. Die wissenschaftliche Diskussion zu Nudges ist derzeit hauptsächlich von philosophischen Theorien geprägt, die im Kern einen individualistischen Ansatz vertreten. Unsere Analyse bezieht sich auf die Art und Weise, in der sich Anhänger des Nudging neuster Erkenntnisse aus den Verhaltenswissenschaften bedienen – immer in der Absicht, diese für effektives Regieren einzusetzen. Wir unterstreichen, dass die meisten Nudges, die derzeit entweder diskutiert werden oder (...)
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  • Taking Unconsidered Preferences Seriously.Robert Sugden - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:209-232.
    In normative economic analysis, it is conventional to treat each person’s preferences as that person’s own standard of value, and as the standard by which the effects of public policies on that person should be valued. The proposal that preferences should be treated in this way is usually qualified by two apparently natural conditions—that preferences are internally coherent, and that they reflect the considered judgements of the person concerned. However, there is now a great deal of evidence suggesting that, in (...)
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  • What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.
  • Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory.JohnC Harsanyi - 1977 - Erkenntnis 11 (1):25 - 53.
    The purpose of this paper is to show how some of the controversial questions concerning utilitarianism can be clarified by the modelling techniques and the other analytical tools of decision theory (and, sometimes, of game theory). It is suggested that the moral rules of utilitarian ethics have a logical status similar to that of the normative rules (theorems) of such formal normative disciplines as decision theory and game theory.The paper argues that social utility should be defined, not in hedonistic or (...)
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  • ‘On the Econ Within’: A Reply to Daniel Hausman.Gerardo Infante, Guilhem Lecouteux & Robert Sugden - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (1):33-37.
    This note replies to a comment by Daniel Hausman on our paper ‘Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics’. We clarify our characterisation of behavioural welfare economics and acknowledge that Hausman does fully endorse this approach. However, we argue that Hausman’s response to our critique, like behavioural welfare economics itself, implicitly uses a model of an inner rational agent.
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  • Reconciling Normative and Behavioural Economics.Guilhem Lecouteux - 2015 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):117.
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  • In Search of Lost Nudges.Guilhem Lecouteux - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):397-408.
    This paper discusses the validity of nudges to tackle time-inconsistent behaviours. I show that libertarian paternalism is grounded on a peculiar model of personal identity, and that the argument according to which nudges may improve one’s self-assessed well-being can be seriously questioned. I show that time inconsistencies do not necessarily reveal that the decision maker is irrational: they can also be the result of discounting over the degree of psychological connectedness between our successive selves rather than over time. Time inconsistency (...)
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  • Die politische Quacksalberei des libertären Paternalismus.Thomas Schramme - 2016 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (1):531-558.
    Der libertäre Paternalismus befürwortet Eingriffe in die Entscheidungsfindung von Bürgern, ohne ihnen Optionen völlig nehmen zu wollen. Vielmehr soll die Lenkung des Willens durch Schubser geschehen. Im folgenden Beitrag möchte ich zeigen, dass der libertäre Paternalismus auf tönernen Füßen steht. Ich bediene mich dabei des polemischen Bilds von Quacksalbern. Dieses Bild passt zu meinem argumentativen Vorgehen, da ich erstens zeigen will, dass der libertäre Paternalismus falsche Diagnosen über vermeintliche Krankheiten der Willensbildung stellt, und zweitens, dass er die falsche Therapie empfiehlt. (...)
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  • Economic Ethics, Business Ethics and the Idea of Mutual Advantages.Christoph Luetge - 2005 - Business Ethics: A European Review 14 (2):108-118.
    Many traditional conceptions of ethics use categories and arguments that have been developed under conditions of pre-modern societies and are not useful in the age of globalisation anymore. I argue that we need an economic ethics which employs economics as a key theoretical resource and which focuses on institutions for implementing moral norms. This conception is then elaborated further in the area of business ethics. It is illustrated in the case for banning child labour.
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  • Opportunity and Preference Learning.Christian Schubert - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):275-295.
  • Looking for a Psychology for the Inner Rational Agent.Robert Sugden - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (4):579-598.
    Research in psychology and behavioral economics shows that individuals’ choices often depend on “irrelevant” contextual factors. This presents problems for normative economics, which has traditionally used preference-satisfaction as its criterion. A common response is to claim that individuals have context-independent latent preferences which are “distorted” by psychological factors, and that latent preferences should be respected. This response implicitly uses a model of human action in which each human being has an “inner rational agent.” I argue that this model is psychologically (...)
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  • On the Supposed Evidence for Libertarian Paternalism.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):361-383.
    Can the general public learn to deal with risk and uncertainty, or do authorities need to steer people’s choices in the right direction? Libertarian paternalists argue that results from psychological research show that our reasoning is systematically flawed and that we are hardly educable because our cognitive biases resemble stable visual illusions. For that reason, they maintain, authorities who know what is best for us need to step in and steer our behavior with the help of “nudges.” Nudges are nothing (...)
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  • Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality.Jon Elster - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 48 (4):650-651.
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  • The Limits of Liberty Between Anarchy and Leviathan.James M. Buchanan - 1975 - Political Theory 4 (3):388-391.
  • Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.
    I take as my starting point the “one very simple principle” proclaimed by Mill in On Liberty … “That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do (...)
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  • Opportunity as Mutual Advantage.Robert Sugden - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):47-68.
    This paper argues that measurements of opportunity which focus on the contents of a person's opportunity set fail to capture open-ended aspects of opportunity that liberals should value. I propose an alternative conception of which does not require the explicit specification of opportunity sets, and which rests on an understanding of persons as responsible rather than rational agents. I suggest that issues of distributive fairness are best framed in terms of real income, and that meaningful measurements of real income are (...)
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  • The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty.Tyler Cowen - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (2):253.
    Economists use tastes as a source of information about personal welfare and judge the effects of policies upon preference satisfaction; neoclassical welfare economics is the analytical embodiment of this preference sovereignty norm. For an initial distribution of wealth, the welfare-maximizing outcome is the one that exhausts all possible gains from trade. Gains from trade are defined relative to fixed ordinal preferences. This analytical apparatus consists of both the Pareto principle, which implies that externality-free voluntary trades increase welfare, and applied costbenefit (...)
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  • The Institutional Consequences of Nudging – Nudges, Politics, and the Law.Robert Lepenies & Magdalena Małecka - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):427-437.
    In this article we argue that a widespread adoption of nudging can alter legal and political institutions. Debates on nudges thus far have largely revolved around a set of philosophical theories that we call individualistic approaches. Our analysis concerns the ways in which adherents of nudging make use of the newest findings in the behavioral sciences for the purposes of policy-making. We emphasize the fact that most nudges proposed so far are not a part of the legal system and are (...)
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  • A Political Justification of Nudging.Francesco Guala & Luigi Mittone - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):385-395.
    Thaler and Sunstein justify nudge policies from welfaristic premises: nudges are acceptable because they benefit the individuals who are nudged. A tacit assumption behind this strategy is that we can identify the true preferences of decision-makers. We argue that this assumption is often unwarranted, and that as a consequence nudge policies must be justified in a different way. A possible strategy is to abandon welfarism and endorse genuine paternalism. Another one is to argue that the biases of decision that choice (...)
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  • To Navigate Safely in the Vast Sea of Empirical Facts.Erik Angner - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3557-3575.
    This paper examines issues of ontology and methodology in behavioral economics: the attempt to increase the explanatory and predictive power of economic theory by providing it with more psychologically plausible foundations. Of special interest is the epistemological status of neoclassical economic theory within behavioral economics, the runaway success story of contemporary economics. Behavioral economists aspire to replace the fundamental assumptions of orthodox, neoclassical economic theory. Yet, behavioral economists have gone out of their way to praise those very assumptions. Matthew Rabin, (...)
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  • Decision Field Theory: A Dynamic-Cognitive Approach to Decision Making in an Uncertain Environment.Jerome R. Busemeyer & James T. Townsend - 1993 - Psychological Review 100 (3):432-459.
  • Introduction.Kalle Grill & Danny Scoccia - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (4):577-578.
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  • Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
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  • Opportunity and Preference Learning: A Reply to Christian Schubert.Robert Sugden - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):297-303.
  • On the Econ Within.Daniel M. Hausman - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (1):26-32.
    This essay examines the critique of behavioral economics that Infante, Lecouteaux and Sugden offer in:"Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent.” It identifies and questions three main criticisms that ILS make: a methodological criticism, alleging that there is no psychological basis for the attribution of purified preferences, an epistemological criticism, alleging that there is little evidence for claims about purified preferences, and a normative criticism, arguing that policies should aim to facilitate people’s choices rather than to satisfy purified preferences. The (...)
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  • Full Information Accounts of Well-Being.David Sobel - 1994 - Ethics 104 (4):784-810.
  • The Behavioural Economist and the Social Planner: To Whom Should Behavioural Welfare Economics Be Addressed?Robert Sugden - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (5):519 - 538.
    ABSTRACT This paper compares two alternative answers to the question ?Who is the addressee of welfare economics?? These answers correspond with different understandings of the status of the normative conclusions of welfare economics and have different implications for how welfare economics should be adapted in the light of the findings of behavioural economics. The conventional welfarist answer is that welfare economics is addressed to a ?social planner?, whose objective is to maximize the overall well-being of society; the planner is imagined (...)
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  • From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging—and Beyond.Adrien Barton & Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):341-359.
  • Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance.James Griffin & Richard Warner - 1989 - Ethics 99 (3):625-636.
     
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  • Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth J. Arrow - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
  • Order Ethics: Bridging the Gap Between Contractarianism and Business Ethics.Christoph Luetge, Thomas Armbrüster & Julian Müller - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 136 (4):687-697.
    Contract-based approaches have been a focus of attention in business ethics. As one of the grand traditions in political philosophy, contractarianism is founded on the notion that we will never resolve deep moral disagreement. Classical philosophers like Hobbes and Locke, or recent ones like Rawls and Gaus, seek to solve ethical conflicts on the level of social rules and procedures. Recent authors in business ethics have sought to utilize contract-based approaches for their field and to apply it to concrete business (...)
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  • Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge.Daniel M. Hausman & Brynn Welch - 2010 - Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (1):123-136.
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  • Decision Sciences and the New Case for Paternalism: Three Welfare-Related Justificatory Challenges.Roberto Fumagalli - 2016 - Social Choice and Welfare 47 (2):459-480.
    Several authors have recently advocated a so-called new case for paternalism, according to which empirical findings from distinct decision sciences provide compelling reasons in favour of paternalistic interference. In their view, the available behavioural and neuro-psychological findings enable paternalists to address traditional anti-paternalistic objections and reliably enhance the well-being of their target agents. In this paper, I combine insights from decision-making research, moral philosophy and evidence-based policy evaluation to assess the merits of this case. In particular, I articulate and defend (...)
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  • Nudging for Liberals.Andrés Moles - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (4):644-667.
    In this article I argue that anti-perfectionist liberals can accept nudging in certain areas: in particular, they can accept nudges aimed at helping people to discharge their nonenforceable duties, and to secure personal autonomy. I claim that nudging is not disrespectful since it does not involve a comparative negative judgment on people’s ability to pursue their plans, and that the judgments that motivate nudging are compatible with treating citizens as free and equal. I also claim that despite being sometimes manipulative, (...)
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  • Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom of Behavioural Welfare Economics.Gerardo Infante, Guilhem Lecouteux & Robert Sugden - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (1):1-25.
    Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human (...)
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  • Public Views on Policies Involving Nudges.William Hagman, David Andersson, Daniel Västfjäll & Gustav Tinghög - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):439-453.
    When should nudging be deemed as permissible and when should it be deemed as intrusive to individuals’ freedom of choice? Should all types of nudges be judged the same? To date the debate concerning these issues has largely proceeded without much input from the general public. The main objective of this study is to elicit public views on the use of nudges in policy. In particular we investigate attitudes toward two broad categories of nudges that we label pro-self and pro-social (...)
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  • The Problematic Welfare Standards of Behavioral Paternalism.Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):409-425.
    Behavioral paternalism raises deep concerns that do not arise in traditional welfare economics. These concerns stem from behavioral paternalism’s acceptance of the defining axioms of neoclassical rationality for normative purposes, despite having rejected them as positive descriptions of reality. We argue that behavioral paternalists have indeed accepted neoclassical rationality axioms as a welfare standard; that economists historically adopted these axioms not for their normative plausibility, but for their usefulness in formal and theoretical modeling; that broadly rational individuals might fail to (...)
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