- The rules of thought.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Benjamin W. Jarvis.details
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Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.details
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What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
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Evidence.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge as a Mental State.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.details
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Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.details
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Internalism Defended.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.details
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On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
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Metaepistemology and Skepticism.Richard A. Fumerton - 1995 - Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):197-201.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.details
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Knowledge from falsehood.Ted A. Warfield - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):405–416.details
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A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge?Andrew Cullison Neil Feit - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.details
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Justification as 'Would-Be' Knowledge.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):361-376.details
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Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):509-14.details
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Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. [REVIEW]G. E. M. Anscombe - 1982 - Ethics 95 (2):342-352.details
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Review of W ittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Brian Loar - 1985 - Noûs 19 (2):273-280.details
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Wittgenstein on rules and private language: an elementary exposition.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.A. Brueckner - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):160-165.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]David Jehle - 2006 - Studia Logica 84 (1):161-165.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]Richard Feldman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211-226.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Strong and weak justification.Alvin Goldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.details
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Internalism exposed.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):271-293.details
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Metaepistemology and Skepticism.Richard Fumerton - 1995 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):905-906.details
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Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
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When does falsehood preclude knowledge?Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.details
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Personal and doxastic justification in epistemology.Mylan Engel - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):133-150.details
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Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.details
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Knowledge and the Flow of Information.J. Christopher Maloney - 1985 - Noûs 19 (2):299-306.details
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Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Stanford, CA: MIT Press.details
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Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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Inquiry.Jon Barwise - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):429.details
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Counter Closure and Knowledge despite Falsehood.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Epistemic Justification.Ernest Sosa - 2003 - Wiley.details
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Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):515-519.details
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Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Synthese 79 (1):171-189.details
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Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (3):425-448.details
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