It is argued that knowledge is a form of action. It is a kind of successful attempt to attain the truth. The success must avoid a particular sort of “epistemic luck”. It must derive from competence rather than luck. Knowledge, then, is a judgment or belief that aims at truth and attains accuracy not by luck but through the agent’s cognitive adroitness, so that the attainment is apt. A higher grade of knowledge then requires that the agent attain aptly not (...) only the accuracy (truth) but even the aptness of that first-order success. This more fully apt success is on a higher level of epistemic achievement, and in this respect is a special case of a general truth of performance normativity that applies across domains of human performance, whether in the arts, in sports, in the professions, and so on. An attempt in general reaches that higher level of achievement by being not only apt but fully apt. (shrink)

This paper is part of a book symposium on my Judgment and Agency. Here I reply to the comments of three commentators: Jason Baehr, Imogen Dickie, and Hilary Kornblith.

Abstract: Open-mindedness is typically at the top of any list of the intellectual or "epistemic" virtues. Yet, providing an account that simultaneously explains why open-mindedness is an epistemically valuable trait to have and how such a trait is compatible with full-blooded belief turns out to be a challenge. Building on the work of William Hare and Jonathan Adler, I defend a view of open-mindedness that meets this challenge. On this view, open-mindedness is primarily an attitude toward oneself as a believer, (...) rather than toward any particular belief. To be open-minded is to be aware of one's fallibility as a believer, and to acknowledge the possibility that anytime one believes something, one could be wrong. In order to see that such an attitude is epistemically valuable even to an already virtuous agent, some details of the skills and habits of the open-minded agent are elucidated. (shrink)

Today, modern Western medicine is facing a quality-of-care crisis that is undermining the patient–physician relationship. In this paper, a notion of the epistemically virtuous clinician is proposed in terms of both the reliabilist and responsibilist versions of virtue epistemology, in order to help address this crisis. To that end, a clinical case study from the literature is first reconstructed. The reliabilist intellectual virtues, including the perceptual and conceptual virtues, are then discussed and applied to the case study. Next, a similar (...) method is employed to examine the responsibilist intellectual virtues, including curiosity, courage, honesty, and humility, and to apply them to the case study. To round out the discussion, the love of knowledge and both theoretical and practical wisdom are explored and applied to the case study. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of how the notion of an epistemically virtuous clinician addresses the quality-of-care crisis, in terms of the connection between ethical and intellectual virtues, and of the notion’s implications for medical education. (shrink)

In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology's central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard's objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.

To lead an environmentally virtuous life requires information—about morality, environmental issues, the impacts of our actions and commitments, our options for alternatives, and so on. On the other hand, we are finite beings with limited time and resources. We cannot feasibly investigate all of our options, and all environmental issues (let alone moral issues, more broadly). In this paper I attempt to provide initial steps towards addressing the epistemic demands of environmental virtue. In the first half of the paper I (...) provide rules of thumb with respect to (1) how to prioritize our investigations into various issues, and (2) what kinds of information we should seek with respect to these issues, and the levels of epistemic justification we ought to attain. In the second half of the paper, I turn to a modified virtue ethics, appealing to the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers to provide characterizations of morally justified and morally non-culpable actions. I then apply these latter concepts in assessing agents, their actions and projects (with respect to environmental virtue), in light of their investigative efforts, and given their particular circumstances. (shrink)

Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. I argue that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions and (...) (...) challenges for any reliabilist epistemology. (shrink)

This volume provides the reader with exclusive insights into Ernest Sosa’s latest ideas as well as main aspects of his philosophical work of the last 50 years. Ernest Sosa, one of the most distinguished contemporary philosophers, is best known for his ground-breaking work in epistemology, and has also contributed greatly to metaphysics, metaphilosophy and philosophy of language.

Section 1 articulates a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S’s success in believing the truth is attributable to S’s ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important (...) line of objection against even the genus-species claim; namely, that there is no way to understand the attribution relation so that it does all the work that it is supposed to do. Section 3 reviews several extant proposals for understanding the attribution relation, and argues that none of them are adequate for answering the objection. Section 4 proposes a different way of understanding the relation, and shows how the resulting view does resolve the objection. Section 5 completes the new account by proposing a way to understand intellectual abilities. Section 6 briefly addresses Barn Façade cases and lottery propositions. Section 7 briefly addresses a question about the scope of knowledge; in particular, it shows how the new view allows a neo-Moorean response to skepticism. (shrink)

Part One reviews some recent history of epistemology, focusing on ways in which the intellectual virtues have been invoked to solve specific epistemological problems. This part gives a sense of the contemporary landscape that has emerged and clarifies some of the disagreements among those who invoke the virtues in epistemology. Part Two explores some problems about knowledge in greater detail, and defends a externalist approach in virtue epistemology.

Section 1 articulates a genus‐species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S’s success in believing the truth is attributable to S’s ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus‐species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important (...) line of objection against even the genus‐species claim; namely, that there is no way to understand the attribution relation so that it does all the work that it is supposed to do. Section 3 reviews several extant proposals for understanding the attribution relation, and argues that none of them are adequate for answering the objection. Section 4 proposes a different way of understanding the relation, and shows how the resulting view does resolve the objection. Section 5 completes the new account by proposing a way to understand intellectual abilities. Section 6 briefly addresses Barn Façade cases and lottery propositions. Section 7 briefly addresses a question about the scope of knowledge; in particular, it shows how the new view allows a neo‐Moorean response to skepticism. (shrink)

These essays by a major epistemologist reconfigure philosophical projects across a wide spectrum, from mind to metaphysics, from epistemology to social power. Several of Goldman's classic essays are included along with many newer writings. Together these trace and continue the development of the author's unique blend of naturalism and reliabilism. Part I defends the simulation approach to mentalistic ascription and explores the psychological mechanisms of ontological individuation. Part II shows why epistemology needs help from cognitive science - not only to (...) evaluate cognitive agents but also to illuminate the practices of epistemic evaluators. Parts III and IV explain how philosophical projects can be reshaped through interchange with social science. An epistemological study of scientific activity exploits the economic paradigm, and philosophical tools are applied to analyze power in society. (shrink)

Vice epistemology is the philosophical study of the nature, identity, and epistemological significance of intellectual vices. Such vices include gullibility, dogmatism, prejudice, closed-mindedness, and negligence. These are intellectual character vices, that is, intellectual vices that are also character traits. I ask how the notion of an intellectual character vice should be understood, whether such vices exist, and how they might be epistemologically significant. The proposal is that intellectual character vices are intellectual character traits that impede effective and responsible inquiry. I (...) argue that situationist critiques of virtue epistemology pose no significant threat to this proposal. Studies by social psychologists of belief in conspiracy theories suggest that it is sometimes appropriate to explain questionable beliefs by reference to intellectual character vices. Neither ‘regulative’ nor ‘analytic’ epistemology has any good reason to question the epistemological significance of such vices. (shrink)

What are the qualities of an excellent thinker? A growing new field, virtue epistemology, answers this question. Section I distinguishes virtue epistemology from belief-based epistemology. Section II explains the two primary accounts of intellectual virtue: virtue-reliabilism and virtue-responsibilism. Virtue-reliabilists claim that the virtues are stable reliable faculties, like vision. Virtue-responsibilists claim that they are acquired character traits, like open-mindedness. Section III evaluates progress and problems with respect to three key projects: explaining low-grade knowledge, high-grade knowledge, and the individual intellectual virtues.

How can we cultivate intellectual virtues in our students? I provide an overview of virtue epistemology, explaining two types of intellectual virtues: reliabilist virtues and responsibilist virtues. I suggest that both types are acquired via some combination of practice on the part of the student and explanation on the part of the instructor. I describe strategies for teaching these two types of virtues in the classroom, including an activity for teaching the skill of using the square of opposition, and several (...) activities that encourage students to practice open-minded acts, intellectually courageous acts, and the motivation for truth. (shrink)

With its focus on intellectual virtues and their role in the acquisition and transmission of knowledge and related epistemic goods, virtue epistemology provides a rich set of tools for educational theory and practice. In particular, characteristics under the rubric of "responsibilist" virtue epistemology, like curiosity, open-mindedness, attentiveness, intellectual courage, and intellectual tenacity, can help educators and students define and attain certain worthy but nebulous educational goals like a love of learning, lifelong learning, and critical thinking. This volume is devoted to (...) exploring the intersection between virtue epistemology and education. It assembles leading virtue epistemologists and philosophers of education to address such questions as: Which virtues are most essential to education? How exactly should these virtues be understood? How is the goal of intellectual character growth related to other educational goals, for example, to critical thinking and knowledge-acquisition? What are the "best practices" for achieving this goal? Can growth in intellectual virtues be measured? The chapters are a prime example of "applied epistemology" and promise to be a seminal contribution to an area of research that is rapidly gaining attention within epistemology and beyond. (shrink)

Two intellectual vices seem to always tempt us: arrogance and diffidence. Regarding the former, the world is permeated by dogmatism and table-thumping close-mindedness. From politics, to religion, to simple matters of taste, zealots and ideologues all too often define our disagreements, often making debate and dialogue completely intractable. But to the other extreme, given a world with so much pluralism and heated disagreement, intellectual apathy and a prevailing agnosticism can be simply all too alluring. So the need for intellectual humility, (...) open-mindedness, and a careful, humble commitment to the truth are apparent. In this book, Dr Church and Dr Samuelson explicate a robust and vibrant account of the philosophy and science of this most valuable virtue, and they highlight how it can be best applied and personally developed. (shrink)

Virtue Epistemology is a new movement receiving the bulk of recent attention from top epistemologists and ethicists; this volume reflects the best work in that vein. Included are unpublished articles by such eminent philosophers as Robert Audi, Simon Blackburn, Alvin Goldman, Christopher Hookway, Keith Lehrer, and Ernest Sosa.

9 We should not expect any significant difference in the nature of the thoughts expressed by means of them. Now, in the case of anaphoric uses, what typically makes the individual salient is a descriptive characterization available from ...

Ernest Sosa argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment.

In Virtues of the Mind I object to process reliabilism on the grounds that it does not explain the good of knowledge in addition to the good of true belief. In this paper I wish to develop this objection in more detail, and will then argue that this problem pushes us first in the direction of two offspring of process reliabilism—faculty reliabilism and proper functionalism, and, finally, to a true virtue epistemology.

Contemporary virtue epistemology (hereafter ‘VE’) is a diverse collection of approaches to epistemology. At least two central tendencies are discernible among the approaches. First, they view epistemology as a normative discipline. Second, they view intellectual agents and communities as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, with a focus on the intellectual virtues and vices embodied in and expressed by these agents and communities. -/- This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary VE research program. These include (...) novel attempts to resolve longstanding disputes, solve perennial problems, grapple with novel challenges, and expand epistemology’s horizons. In the process, it reveals the diversity within VE. Beyond sharing the two unifying commitments mentioned above, its practitioners diverge over the nature of intellectual virtues, which questions to ask, and which methods to use. -/- It will be helpful to note some terminology before proceeding. First, we use ‘cognitive’, ‘epistemic’ and ‘intellectual’ synonymously. Second, we often use ‘normative’ broadly to include not only norms and rules, but also duties and values. Finally, ‘practitioners’ names contemporary virtue epistemologists. (shrink)

The paper begins by reviewing two problems for fallibilism: the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery, and Gettier problems. It is then argued that both problems can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Alternatively, to say that a (...) person knows is to say that she got things right due to her own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else. (shrink)

According to reliabilist virtue epistemology, or virtue reliabilism, knowledge is true belief that is produced by intellectual excellence (or virtue), where intellectual excellence is understood in terms of reliable, truth-directed cognitive dispositions. This essay explains why virtue reliabilism is a form of epistemological externalism, is a moderately naturalized epistemology, and is distinct from virtue responsibilism. We explain virtue reliabilism’s answers to various forms of skepticism, its solution to the Gettier Problem, and its explanation of the value of knowledge. We also (...) describe several varieties of contemporary virtue reliabilism. Finally, we offer replies to two recently prominent objections to virtue reliabilism: that it is committed to an untenable epistemological individualism, and that there are empirical reasons to doubt whether people generally have the kinds of intellectual abilities that virtue reliabilism requires for knowledge. (shrink)

ملخّـــــــــــــــص. بشارات، أحمد محمد. الالتفات في السّرد القرآني. رسالة دكتوراه في جامعة اليرموك. 2015م. (المشرف: أ.د. يوسف أبو العدوس). يعرض البحث ثلاث قضايا: الأولى، بنية الالتفات النصّي في محاولة لإجراء مفهوم يصدق على التشكّل البنيوي للالتفات النصّي، بإقامة تقابلات وظيفية بين الالتفات ووظيفتين في الدراسات السّرديّة: وظيفة الحافز ووظيفة التحفيز. إنّ الالتفات النصّي يتشكّل وفقًا للاعتبار الدلاليّ؛ فالتصوّر الشّكلي(=البنيّة التركيبية) غير وارد في إقامة مفهوم وظيفيّ للالتفات النصّي؛ أي أنّ بنيّة الالتفات بنيّة فوق صرفيّة(=صيغة الكلمة)، وفوق نحوية(=مسند ومسند إليه=جملة)، فالالتفات (...) النصّي مختلف عن الالتفات في الدّرس البلاغيّ القديم(=التفات الضمائر والأفعال...)؛ فقد يكون الالتفات النصّي مسندًا، أو إسنادًا، أو عدة جمل متتابعة(=آية أو عدة آيات في هذا البحث). والقضية الثانية، إجراء تحليل بنيويّ للالتفات النصّي في الخطاب القرآني، فالالتفات النصّي بناء لسانيّ مثير للاهتمام من جهتي الشكل والمعنى، إذ يتعالق الالتفات بمستويات واسعة من البناء النصّي في الخطاب القرآني، يدعو هذا إلى تحليل بنيّة التعالق اللسانيّ بإقامة الروابط البنيويّة في مستوى واسع من الخطاب القرآني، وهو ما قدّمه البحث في وظيفتيّ الإحالة والتكرار. والقضية الثالثة، محاولة إجراء مقاربات في المعنى، إذ يتعالق نصّ الالتفات بمستويات دلاليّة منفتحة، فمثلاً يتعالق الالتفات "وَلَنْ تَفْعَلُوا" (24\البقرة) في فكرة الإعجاز في آيات التحدي في مستوى واسع من المعنى، إذ يقدّم التحدي وظيفة مركزية في القضاء على اعتقاد الآلهة، وإقامة الاعتقاد لله وحده؛ لقد وُضِع المشكّكون في حرج، إذ يتوجب على آلهتهم أن تقدّم لهم خطابًا إلهيًا. وفي جانب آخر لم يجر التحدي في منحىً وظيفيّ واحد، فالتحدي بسورة غير التحدي بعشر سور، والتحدي بسورة وبعشرٍ غيره في مثلية القرآن {فَلْيَأْتُوا بِحَدِيثٍ مِثْلِهِ} (34\الطور)؛ إنّ هذه التحولات الوظيفية في سرديّة التحدي تقدّم ثلاثة أمور مهمة-وفق هذا البحث على الأقلّ- أ-وظيفة توحيد الله، ب-وظيفة حفظ الخطاب الإلهي مقابلاً للتحريف والافتراء، ج-الوظيفة التواصلية(= الوحي من طريق جبريل) مقابلاً لقولهم إنّ الرسول كاهن أو شاعر أو مجنون، فالمشككون يعتقدون تواصليةً في الكهنة والسحر مع عالم الجنّ، فأسقطوا ذلك على الخطاب الإلهي. -/- . (shrink)

محاضرات في إدارة المؤسسات الإعلامية تتضمن المذكرة مجموعة من المفاهيم والوظائف والأساليب الإدارية المتعلقة بإدارة المؤسسات الإعلامية ومنها : (المؤسسات) .. المفهوم، الأنواع والعناصر (الإدارة).. المفهوم، الفروع والوظائف (الرؤية والرسالة) .. المفهوم والأهمية وظيفة (التخطيط) في المؤسسة الإعلامية (التخطيط الإعلامي).. المفهوم، الخصائص والشروط وظيفة (التنظيم) في المؤسسة الإعلامية (تفويض السلطة) و(التمكين الإداري) وظيفة (التوجيه) في المؤسسة الإعلامية وظيفة (الرقابة) في المؤسسة الإعلامية (اتخاذ القرارات) جوهرالعمليات والوظائف الإدارية (التدريب الإداري) المفهوم، الأهداف والتحديات .

This paper presents a clarification for and a discussion of ''criticism's'' concept in one of the trends of discourse analysis, namely Critical Discourse Analysis. In doing so, an illustration of the dimensions and meanings of this concept is provided both in theory and practice. Here the researcher investigates conceptual metaphor in the media discourse that is against immigration. The aim is to make widespread influences of conceptual metaphor in media discourse clear; which would indicate the powerfulness of critical analysis in (...) fighting these kinds of influences unveiling their negative manifestations and suggesting other positive alternatives for them. (shrink)

The majistic speech and its syntaxic composition in the Arabic and french language comparing The concept of majestic speech and its syntaxic characteristics among the preislamic arabs is not an intention of pride, but derives from the nature of ther sociolinguistic Background. Sone of its syntaxic characteristics are relatively different according to communication and the object of the place of speech with which then are in harmony in then life. Social. Compared to the french language ; this kind of speech (...) is the privilege of the aristocratic class with its feudal spirit. In the holy Coran, its concept is thouroughly different since it is distinguished by its >. (shrink)

تطرح مقولة التناصIntertextualité عددا من القضايا النقدية، وتثير عددا من التساؤلات، لعل أهمها: كيف يمكن من وجهة نظر إسلامية أن نقيّم التناص نفسه؟ وهل يعد التعالق بين النصوص- من وجهة النظر السائدة عندنا بتأثير من الغرب- إهدارا للهوية النصية؟ وهل يعتبر التناص - من وجهة النظر هذه أيضا- عائقا بنيويا يقف دون تحقيق خصوصية التشكيل اللغوي للأديب؟ ثم ما علاقته بخصوصية الأجناس الأدبية عند الشعوب، وكيف استغل من قبل البعض لتجسيد مطالب الحداثة وما بعد الحداثة، وكلّ منهما أسهم وبأشكال مختلفة (...) أحيانا، ومتشابهة أخرى في إلغاء الهوية، تبعا للدعوة إلى إلغاء الأنماط الأساسية للفكر والإبداع وعلمنة الأخلاق، وما هو السبيل إلى حفظ هوية التناص ونصوص الهوية؟. (shrink)