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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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What is “cognitive accessibility” accessibility to?Pierre Jacob - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):508-508.details
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Against Perceptual Conceptualism.Hilla Jacobson & Hilary Putnam - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):1-25.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Do we see more than we can access?Alex Byrne, David Hilbert & Susanna Siegel - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (5-6):501-502.details
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Psychology supports independence of phenomenal consciousness.Tyler Burge - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):500-501.details
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Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.details
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Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.details
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Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
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Consciousness and cognitive access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.details
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On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness. Polity.details
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Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.details
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