Switch to: Citations

References in:

Pascal’s Wager and the Nature of God

Sophia 50 (3):331-344 (2011)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Warranted Christian Belief.P. Helm - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1110-1115.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   155 citations  
  • The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments From Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of “Appearance”.Stephen J. Wykstra - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (2):73 - 93.
  • Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This is the third volume in Alvin Plantinga's trilogy on the notion of warrant, which he defines as that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. In this volume, Plantinga examines warrant's role in theistic belief, tackling the questions of whether it is rational, reasonable, justifiable, and warranted to accept Christian belief and whether there is something epistemically unacceptable in doing so. He contends that Christian beliefs are warranted to the extent that they are formed by properly functioning cognitive faculties, thus, (...)
  • Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.Jeff Jordan - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Is it reasonable to believe in God even in the absence of strong evidence that God exists? Pragmatic arguments for theism are designed to support belief even if one lacks evidence that theism is more likely than not. Jeff Jordan proposes that there is a sound version of the most well-known argument of this kind, Pascal's Wager, and explores the issues involved - in epistemology, the ethics of belief, decision theory, and theology.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God.J. L. Mackie - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
    The late John L. Mackie, formerly of University College, Oxford.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  • The Problem of Evil and Moral Scepticism.Brice R. Wachterhauser - 1985 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 17 (3):167 - 174.
    This paper argues that the logical coherence of classical theism can be defended through the traditional free-will defense and argument from divine omniscience and human finitude, but only at the cost of moral scepticism. The above two-pronged defense entails moral scepticism because it demands that we construe clear and undeniable cases of morally unjustifiable evil as merely apparently unjustifiable evils which can be morally justified from some moral point of view. The paper argues that justification is impossible because such basic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Skeptical Theism and Moral Obligation.Stephen Maitzen - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (2):93 - 103.
    Skeptical theism claims that the probability of a perfect God’s existence isn’t at all reduced by our failure to see how such a God could allow the horrific suffering that occurs in our world. Given our finite grasp of the realm of value, skeptical theists argue, it shouldn’t surprise us that we fail to see the reasons that justify God in allowing such suffering, and thus our failure to see those reasons is no evidence against God’s existence or perfection. Critics (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands.Stephen Maitzen - 2007 - Sophia 46 (3):237-243.
    According to Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy, adherents of skeptical theism will find their sense of moral obligation undermined in a potentially ‘appalling’ way. Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea disagree, claiming that God’s commands provide skeptical theists with a source of moral obligation that withstands the skepticism in skeptical theism. I argue that Bergmann and Rea are mistaken: skeptical theists cannot consistently rely on what they take to be God’s commands.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Pascalian Wagers.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1996 - Synthese 108 (1):11 - 61.
    A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Moral Aporia.Mark Piper - 2007 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 62 (2):65 - 79.
    Skeptical theism seeks to defend theism against the problem of evil by invoking putatively reasonable skepticism concerning human epistemic limitations in order to establish that we have no epistemological basis from which to judge that apparently gratuitous evils are not in fact justified by morally sufficient reasons beyond our ken. This paper contributes to the set of distinctively practical criticisms of skeptical theism by arguing that religious believers who accept skeptical theism and take its practical implications seriously will be forced (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The Problem of Evil: Skeptical Theism Leads to Moral Paralysis.Scott Sehon - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2):67 - 80.
    Natural disasters would seem to constitute evidence against the existence of God, for, on the face of things, it is mysterious why a completely good and all-powerful God would allow the sort of suffering we see from earthquakes, diseases, and the like. The skeptical theist replies that we should not expect to be able to understand God's ways, and thus we should not regard it as surprising or mysterious that God would allow natural evil. I argue that skeptical theism leads (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil.William L. Rowe - 2006 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (2):79-92.
  • Is Pascal's Wager Self-Defeating?J. J. MacIntosh - 2000 - Sophia 39 (2):1-30.
  • Recent Criticisms and Defenses of Pascal's Wager.Robert Anderson - 1995 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 37 (1):45 - 56.
  • Why Theists Cannot Accept Skeptical Theism.Mark Piper - 2008 - Sophia 47 (2):129-148.
    In recent years skeptical theism has gained currency amongst theists as a way to escape the problem of evil by invoking putatively reasonable skepticism concerning our ability to know that instances of apparently gratuitous evil are unredeemed by morally sufficient reasons known to God alone. After explicating skeptical theism through the work of Stephen Wykstra and William Alston, I present a cumulative-case argument designed to show that skeptical theism cannot be accepted by theists insofar as it crucially undermines epistemic license (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Pascal's Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology.Nicholas Rescher - 1985 - University of Notre Dame Press.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Pascal's Wager: PHILOSOPHY.James Cargile - 1966 - Philosophy 41 (157):250-257.
    A. Pascal's statement of his wager argument is couched in terms of the theory of probability and the theory of games, and the exposition is unclear and unnecessarily complicated. The following is a ‘creative’ reformulation of the argument designed to avoid some of the objections which have been or might be raised against the original.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • On Pascal's Wager, or Why All Bets Are Off.Alan Carter - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):22-27.
  • Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments From Evil.Michael J. Almeida & Graham Oppy - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516.
    Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • The Inductive Argument From Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition.William P. Alston - 1991 - Philosophical Perspectives 5:29-67.
  • A Defence of Pascal's Wager.Geoffrey Brown - 1984 - Religious Studies 20 (3):465-479.
    Pascal's Wager, and the issues raised by it, have, despite a few notable exceptions, been an object of some neglect in recent Philosophy of Religion. Whether this neglect is from an assumption that the argument requires no comment, or from a feeling that there is something not quite academically respectable about it, I have come to believe that it is undeserved. One reason why the argument is deserving of attention from the theologian is that Pascal has managed to put his (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Pascal's Wager and the Many Gods Objection.Paul Saka - 2001 - Religious Studies 37 (3):321-341.
    Pascal's Wager is finding ever more defenders who aim to undermine the old Many Gods Objection. It is my thesis that they are mistaken. After describing the Wager and the objection, I report on Jeff Jordan's repeated attempt to limit legitimate religious hypotheses to those that are traditional. In separate sections I criticize Jordan, first coming from epistemology and second from anthropology. Then I describe George Schlesinger's repeated appeal to the ‘simplest’ religious hypothesis, and argue that it fails for similar (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Is God's Belief Requirement Rational?Greg Janzen - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (4):465-478.
    This paper sketches an evidential atheological argument that can be answered only if one of the central tenets of some theistic traditions is rejected, namely, that (propositional) belief in God is a necessary condition for salvation. The basic structure of the argument is as follows. Under theism, God is essentially omniscient, but no one can be both omniscient and irrational. So, if there is reason to hold that God is irrational, then it would follow that God doesn’t exist. And there (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument From Evil.Michael Bergmann - 2001 - Noûs 35 (2):278–296.
    Skeptical theists endorse the skeptical thesis (which is consistent with the rejection of theism) that we have no good reason for thinking the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. In his newest formulation of the evidential arguments from evil, William Rowe tries to avoid assuming the falsity of this skeptical thesis, presumably because it seems so plausible. I argue that his new argument fails to avoid doing this. Then I defend that skeptical thesis (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • The Onus of Proof in Arguments About the Problem of Evil.F. J. Fitzpatrick - 1981 - Religious Studies 17 (1):19.
    Faced with the problem of evil, theistic philosophers, in their endeavour to show that religious belief is coherent and tenable, usually produce an argument running along the following lines: The presence of evil in the world is justified by the fact that some evils are positively required for the achievement of a certain good which God wants to achieve; and this good is of such great value as to make the evils which we encounter well worth enduring. Since, then , (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Skeptical Theism and Evidential Arguments From Evil.Mike Almeida & Graham Oppy - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 - 516.
    Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Atheism: A Philosophical Justification.Michael Martin - 1992 - Temple University Press.
    "Thousands of philosophers--from the ancient Greeks to modern thinkers--have defended atheism, but none more comprehensively than Martin.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.Jeff Jordan - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (4):492-496.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Princeton University Press.
    Throughout, the book combines daring speculations with detailed investigations to portray the nature and status of rationality and the essential role that...
  • Human Nature: The Categorial Framework.P. M. S. Hacker - 2007 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This major new study by one of the most penetrating and persistent critics of philosophical and scientific orthodoxy, returns to Aristotle in order to examine the salient categories in terms of which we think about ourselves and our nature, and the distinctive forms of explanation we invoke to render ourselves intelligible to ourselves. The culmination of 40 years of thought on the philosophy of mind and the nature of the mankind Written by one of the world’s leading philosophers, the co-author (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • The Logic of Pascal's Wager.Ian Hacking - 1972 - American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (2):186 - 192.
  • Pascal's Wager.James Cargile - 1982 - In Steven M. Cahn & David Shatz (eds.), Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 250-.
    A. Pascal's statement of his wager argument is couched in terms of the theory of probability and the theory of games, and the exposition is unclear and unnecessarily complicated. The following is a ‘creative’ reformulation of the argument designed to avoid some of the objections which have been or might be raised against the original.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations