The paper offers an explanation of what reasons for belief are, following Paul Grice in focusing on the roles of reasons in the goal-directed activity of reasoning. Reasons are particularly salient considerations that we use as indicators of the truth of beliefs and candidates for belief. Reasons are distinguished from enabling conditions by being things that we should be able to attend to in the course of our reasoning, and in assessing how well our beliefs are supported. The final section (...) argues that epistemic virtues have a role in enabling us to identify reasons and explores this by reference to the example of being observant. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the current thesis on the modern origin of the ad hominem-argument, by analysing the Aristotelian conception of it. In view of the recent accounts which consider it a relative argument, i.e., acceptable only by the particular respondent, I maintain that there are two Aristotelian versions of the ad hominem, that have identifiable characteristics, and both correspond to the standard variants distinguished in the contemporary treatments of the famous informal fallacy: the abusive and the circumstancial or (...) tu quoque types. I propose to reconstruct the two Aristotelian versions (see sections 1 and 2), which have been recognized again in the ninteenth century (sec. 3). Finally, I examine whether or not it was considered as a fallacious dialogue device by Aristotle and by A. Schopenhauer (sec. 4). (shrink)