The History of scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza is often called upon to support three theses: first, that Descartes had a dogmatic notion of systematic knowledge, and therefore of physics; second, that the hypothetical epistemology of physics which spread during the xviith century was the result of a general sceptical crisis; third, that this epistemology was more successful in England than in France. I reject these three theses: I point first to the tension in Descartes’ works between the ideal of (...) a completely certain science and a physics replete with hypotheses; further, I argue that the use of hypotheses by mechanical philosophers cannot be separated from their conception of physics; finally I show that, at the end of the xviith century, physicists in France as well as in England spoke through hypotheses and I examine different ways of explaining this shared practice. Richard H. Popkin’s book serves therefore as a starting point for insights into the general problem: to what extent and for what reasons some propositions in physics have been presented as hypotheses in the xviith century? (shrink)

The ArgumentThis essay describes the emergence and stabilization in French and English experimental accounts, in second half of the seventeenth century, of the narrative sequence: X did (some process in the laboratory) and X saw (something happen), where X stands for a pronoun, I or we in English,je, nousoronin French. Focussing on the French case, it shows how the use of the collective pronounonin the experimental accounts registered in the files of the Académie des Sciences is directly related to the (...) will of this newly created institution to assert a collective authority on the production and legitimization of experimental matters-of-fact produced in the laboratory. It is argued, through the case of the discovery of the blind spot in the eye by Mariotte, that this new narrative form imbeds a construal of the experiment as a public spectacle, and of the proof as a witnessing event, which eludes the Academy's attempts to monopolize the process of fact validation and favors the diffusion and display of experiments in front of larger audiences. The question of whether a privileged witness such as the King of France who patronized the Academy could not have constituted by himself a suitable audience to ensure a full legitimization of experimental matters-of-fact while remaning within the bounds of academic practices is addressed. It is answered in the negative by providing evidence for the lack of interest of the absolute monarch in experiments. On the other hand, the outdoor practices of observation and measurement are shown to interfere in a constructive manner with the absolutist power and to capture the attention of the absolutist monarch, where laboratory experiments had failed. It is proposed that natural philosophers in the early modern period bear the burden of proof in buying credibility for the phenomena they try, by paying a tribute to the standing of the patrician elites that witness their experiments. This makes sense in a straightforward manner of the lack of interest of the King of France in a practice which exalts the power of the very group he is trying hard to control through the absolutist structure of power. (shrink)

Les philosophes naturels du XVIIe siècle accordent une importance croissante aux faits nouveaux et singuliers construits par des démonstrations spectaculaires réalisées devant témoins. Cet essai tente de montrer comment cette évolution s’opère comme une synthèse de deux courants auparavant disjoints, d’un côté la pratique coopérative et informelle, critique sans être véhémente, de savants dont Mersenne constitue un bon exemple dans les années 1630, et de l’autre celle des alchimistes, remettant radicalement en cause les savoirs traditionnels tout en restant viscéralement attachés (...) au secret. On montrera comment le cercle parisien qui se réunit autour du même Mersenne au milieu du siècle pour débattre des expériences du vide réalise cette synthèse particulière. Mais dans une communauté érudite intéressée surtout à employer les faits expérimentaux comme matériau nouveau dans les disputes philosophiques, et pour laquelle la correspondance privée constitue la principale source d’information sous la forme de narrations circonstanciées par des témoins des événements singuliers survenus au cours de démonstrations expérimentales, le récit à la première personne apparaît comme une ressource superflue lorsqu’il s’agit de passer au format imprimé; Pascal, par exemple, recourt dans ses traités à une description des expériences se déployant sur un registre hypothétique et syllogistique qui exclut la narration directe. Le succès ultérieur des techniques matérielles et littéraires administrant la preuve en donnant à voir le protocole expérimental peut alors être mieux compris si l’on considère la parenté que celles-ci entretiennent avec les pratiques de la lecture publique traditionnelles dans les cercles érudits, proximité qui leur permet d’enrichir la signification et d’accroître la force de persuasion de l’expérience artificielle aux yeux des mêmes audiences. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to show the predominance of the influence of geometrical ideas in Aristotle's account of first principles in the Posterior Analytics— to show that his analysis of first principles is in its essentials an analysis of the first principles of geometry as he conceived them. My proof of this falls into two parts. I. A consideration of the parallel between Aristotle's and Euclid's account of first principles. II. A comparison between the general movement of thought (...) in the Aristotelian παγωγ and πδειξις and in the δινοια and νησις of the Platonic dialectic. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to show the predominance of the influence of geometrical ideas in Aristotle's account of first principles in the Posterior Analytics— to show that his analysis of first principles is in its essentials an analysis of the first principles of geometry as he conceived them. My proof of this falls into two parts. I. A consideration of the parallel between Aristotle's and Euclid's account of first principles. II. A comparison between the general movement of thought (...) in the Aristotelian παγωγ and πδειξις and in the δινοια and νησις of the Platonic dialectic. (shrink)

In this paper I analyse some resources for the history of manipulative skill and the acquisition of knowledge. I focus on a decade in the life of the ‘ingenious’ Robert Hooke, whose social identity epitomized the mechanically minded individual existing on the interface between gentleman natural philosophers, instrument makers and skilled craftsmen in late seventeenth-century London. The argument here is not concerned with the notion that Hooke had a unique talent for working with material objects, and indeed my purpose is (...) to rethink the ways in which we account for such virtuosity. In this vein, I do not adopt solely a realist or constructivist attitude to skill but seek to show how, in a purposeful way, Hooke drew from the resources of techniques and information made available to him by his social interaction with labourers, servants, craftsmen, gentlemen and noblemen. In Hooke's local culture, intelligence flowed between the sites where these individuals worked and socialized. I examine the practical, social and situational links between the worlds of the coffee house, the workshop and the rooms of the Royal Society at Arundel House and Gresham College. From this perspective, there were no rigid boundaries between the domains of natural philosophy, banausic culture and construction work on which Hooke was engaged, and I argue that we should examine his world in term of a series of networks of capital exchange comprised of finance, social power and mechanical expertise. (shrink)

The ArgumentDespite more than fifty years of debate on the Merton thesis, there have been few attempts to substantiate Merton's argument through empirically based comparative studies. This study of the Jesuit scientific tradition is intended to serve as a test of some of Merton's central claims.Jesuit science is remarkable for its scope and longevity, and is distinguished by its markedly empirical and utilitarian orientation. In this paper I examine the ideological structure of the Society of Jesus and find at its (...) core an “apostolic spirituality” that explains the legitimation of these forms of science within the Society. The values of apostolic spirituality strongly encouraged an activist mentality among Jesuits, which in turn led to the formation of apostolates in education, at court, and in the overseas missions. The values associated with apostolic spirituality led to the initial acceptance of active-empirical sciences within the Society, which became established as traditions because they were useful in fulfilling the goals of the Society's apostolates.This study, by providing a qualified confirmation of Merton's central claims, suggests the importance of a supra-confessional sanctification of labor and learning in the growth of active-empirical sciences. (shrink)

I have sketched the well-known distinction between facts and evidence not to defend or attack it , but rather as a preface to a key episode in the history of the conceptual categories of fact and evidence. My question is neither, “Do neutral facts exist?” nor “How does evidence prove or disprove?” but rather, “How did our current conceptions of neutral facts and enlisted evidence, and the distinction between them, come to be?” How did evidence come to be incompatible with (...) intention, and is it possible to imagine a kind of evidence that is intention-laden?It is my claim that partial answers to these questions lie buried in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature on prodigies and miracles. I shall argue that during this period prodigies briefly became the prototype for a new kind of scientific fact, and that miracles briefly exemplified a form of evidence patent to the senses and crucially dependent on intention. Both conceptions diverge sharply not only from current notions of facts and evidence, but also from medieval views on the nature of prodigies and miracles. Prodigies were originally closely akin to portent, divine signs revealing God’s will and things to come; miracles were more intimately associated with the private experience of grace than with the public evidence of the senses. Prodigies were transformed from signs into nonsignifying facts, and miracles into compelling evidence, as part of more sweeping changes in natural philosophy and theology in the mid-seventeenth century. Lorraine Daston is professor of history of science at the University of Göttingen, Federal Republic of Germany. She is the author of Classical Probability in the Enlightenment and is currently at work on a history of scientific objectivity. (shrink)

The ArgumentMany of the epistemological issues that occupied natural philosophers of the seventeenth century were expressed visually in title-page engravings. One of those issues concerned the relative status to be accorded to evidence of the senses, as compared to knowledge gained by faith or reason. In title-page illustrations, the various arguments were often waged by a series of light metaphors: the Light of Reason, the Light of Nature, and the Lights of Sense, Scripture, and Grace. When such illustrations are examined (...) with the authors' theological views in mind, it becomes apparent that in the first half of the seventeenth century, Catholic authors favored the Light of Reason as a source of truth, while Protestant authors favored the Light of Nature. Since by the end of the century it was widely accepted by scientists of all religious persuasions that certain knowledge must be grounded in sense evidence and the direct study of nature, one might argue that in this instance Protestantism was responsible for nurturing an important development of the Scientific Revolution. However, the skewed nature of the sample and the large number of counterexamples available mitigate against taking this offshoot of the Merton thesis too seriously. (shrink)

This study examines Pascal's collected works, up to and including his Pensees, from the perspective of geometry. Pascal's geometry is seen not exclusively as a model for clear demonstration or for demonstrable certainty but primarily as a means of discovery. As a consequence, the initial focus of this study is on Pascal's practice of geometry from the projective geometry of the 'Essay on Conics' and the use of the 'Arithmetic Triangle' in the development of a theory of probable outcomes to (...) the application of both of these methodologies in the solution of the 'Cycloid' problems near the end of his life. The apparent eclecticism of these works hides a common basic concern with the problem of invention, or a creative use of data or pre-existing materials in the establishment of new ideas. The problem of invention is at once tied to the rhetorical tradition inherited from antiquity and medieval culture and to 'method,' the focus of the European intellectual in the mold of Ramus, Bacon, and Descartes. Pascal's inventive practice likewise reflects the aims of these two discursive programs: finding new ways of persuasion and finding ways to new knowledge. The key to Pascalian invention is the combinatoire, a systemization of inventive approaches issuing from medieval meditative and dialectical practices. Identified in the late Renaissance with the occult sciences, the combinatoire becomes for Pascal a tool for his scientific investigations and for his construction of an initiatory passage to faith and to a search for knowledge of the divine. In much the same way, the fragmentary nature of the Pensees is a sign both of the combinatory invention used in the composition of the text and of the initiatory aim of its rhetoric. The Cartesian itinerary, essentially a path of successive conclusions leading to a full knowledge and mastery of the world, is rewritten by Pascal in the figure of this frightening, inconclusive initiation pieced together from experience, reason, and intuition. (shrink)